AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME.Historical research into the mythological and astronomical conceptions that preceded Aristotle’s philosophy by Laurent, Régis
 
 
  3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF 
TIME 
 
Historical research into the mythological and astronomical 
conceptions that preceded Aristotle’s philosophy  
  4 
 
  5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S  
METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 
 
Historical research into the mythological and astronomical 
conceptions that preceded Aristotle’s philosophy  
 
 
BY 
 
Régis LAURENT 
 
 
Translated by 
Trista Selous 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VILLEGAGNONS-PLAISANCE EDITIONS 
16 bis rue d’Odessa 
75014 PARIS 
www.editions-villegagnons.com 
  6 
 
  7 
 
Forthcoming from Éditions villegagnons-plaisance: 
 
 
METAPHYSICS: 
 
- Régis LAURENT: Aristotle’s Metaphysics of Time - II - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 VILLEGAGNONS-PLAISANCE EDITIONS, 2015 
ISBN: 978-2-9533846-11 
  8 
 
  9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To Frédéric… 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements:  
 
 
Francine Letouzé 
 
 
  10 
 
  11 
CONTENTS 
 
PROLOGUE ....................................................................................... 15 
 
I         TIME IN ARISTOTLE’S PROTREPTICUS. INTRODUCTION 
AND QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION ........................................... 19 
A. FROM ETERNITY TO TEMPORALITY: ON INITIATION.................. 27 
B. FROM TEMPORALITY TO ETERNITY: WISDOM OVER THE LONG 
TERM ............................................................................................... 41 
II. TIME IN GREEK TRAGIC POETRY AND IN HOMER’S 
EPIC POETRY. UNFINDABLE CIRCULAR TIME .......................... 49 
A. ON FATE, OR TRAGIC POETRY AS A TECHNIQUE FOR VEILING 
TIME. ............................................................................................... 53 
B. ON THE HERO, OR EPIC POETRY AS A TECHNIQUE FOR UNVEILING 
TIME. ............................................................................................... 63 
III.  TIME IN HESIOD’S MYTHOLGY AND PYTHAGOREAN 
THEOPHANY. THE SACRED SOURCES OF CIRCULAR TIME IN 
CLASSICAL GREECE. ....................................................................... 77 
A. ON THE MYTH OF CRONOS OR THE STRUCTURING OF UNIVERSAL 
TIME IN “AGES OF THE WORLD”. ...................................................... 79 
B. ON THE PYTHAGOREAN MYSTERIES, OR THE STRUCTURING OF 
HUMAN TIME IN PHASES OF LIFE INDEPENDENT OF BODILY UNITY . 102 
IV. FROM PLATONIC MYTHIC TIME TO IONIAN 
SCIENTIFIC TIME. THE ROOTS OF ARISTOTLE’S PHILOSOPHY 
OF TIME .......................................................................................... 117 
A. ON PLATONIC IDEOLOGY, OR MYTHIC TIME AS AN ATTEMPT TO 
VEIL INITIATORY TIME. .................................................................. 121 
B. ON IONIAN ASTRONOMY, OR THE COMING OF CONCEPTUAL TIME, 
OPENING THE WORLD TO FUTURE TIME. ......................................... 150 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ............................................................................ 207 
INDEX  ............................................................................................ 229 
  12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  13 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To seek the t ruth would be to  pursue f ly ing game  
 
Proverb of  unknown or igin  ci ted in:  
Aristo t le ,  Metaphysics ,   ,  5 ,  1009b 40  
 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH INTO PRE-ARISTOTELIAN TIME  
 15 
 
 
 
 
 
P R O L O G U E  
 
 
This book is the first chapter of my doctoral thesis in philosophy, 
written between September 2001 and October 2008. I am presenting 
this part only, as the thesis developed in the other two parts posed 
problems both to the scholars who were its first readers and to me. 
When I finished writing it a dichotomy became apparent, the origins 
and potential effects of which proved very hard to identify. I also 
remain unconvinced of its heuristic value and faithfulness to 
Aristotle’s thought. This thesis proposes that it is possible to 
distinguish the existence of time from its being in qualitative terms, 
but not to separate them quantitatively. So I have subjected my 
argument to further examination, involving a review of all the sources, 
to verify the detail of the reasoning behind this theoretical position, 
point by point. 
The present work refers only to the Greek sources. The 
mediaeval sources will be considered in the second part, alongside 
textual analyses of the Aristotelian corpus. This first book presents 
what seems to constitute the conditioning affecting Aristotle’s 
resolution of the question of time. The so-called historico-sociological 
method we shall develop is borrowed from the French philosopher 
Pierre-Maxime Schuhl3 and our exegete for Aristotle’s texts will be 
another 1930s scholar, Werner Jaeger. I have returned to this method 
via my training in linguistics.4 The work of Ferdinand de Saussure is 
                                                 
3 This methodology is set out in his doctoral thesis, published as Essai sur la 
formation de la pensée grecque. Introduction historique à une étude de la 
philosophie de Platon. PUF, 1934, pp. 7-12. 
4 The first version of Werner Jaeger’s book, which is a continuation of his doctoral 
thesis of 1912, was written in German in 1923 with the title Aristoteles. 
Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung. The English version was 
published in 1948. The French translation I used is by Olivier Sedeyn. It is based on 
both these texts and was published by Éditions de L’Eclat in 1997. 
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profoundly incompatible with the historico-comparative method that 
was adopted by Jaeger and is still used in the universities. Here, 
therefore, we shall adopt a denotative approach influenced by 
sociology, rather than a connotative approach, before reversing this 
relationship in metaphysics. So we shall have little to say here about 
Aristotle and still less about metaphysics. However, the selection of 
Greek sources should indicate the theoretical positions that will later 
be rejected. If substance can be defined by all that it is not, Aristotle’s 
position on time can also be established by all that his model rejects in 
the course of its conceptualisation. 
We embarked on the present work with only a summary 
knowledge of Greek time before Aristotle’s period and it seemed 
impossible to discuss this notion in the Aristotelian corpus without 
having first undertaken some research. It would have been impossible 
to undertake such a reconstruction without the remarkable work of 
Catherine Darbo-Peschanski of the CNRS. Her book Construction du 
temps dans le monde grec ancien5 provided the foundations upon 
which, stone by stone, we have sought to construct a historical 
landscape portraying the notion of time before Aristotle. Hence the 
subtitle of the present book: Historical research into the mythological 
and astronomical conceptions that preceded Aristotle’s philosophy. 
Next, we should note that the information gathered has not been 
organised along historical lines. The aim here was not to write a 
historical study. Indeed such an undertaking would have required an 
initial concept of time, when the western concept of time used by 
historians stems largely from Aristotle’s model. So we should have 
found ourselves caught in a circular argument in which the time we 
were seeking was inscribed in a time that was already implicitly 
defined. The elements collected have thus been tested against concepts 
that are unveiled without historical presuppositions. Our successive 
investigations will examine the distinction between linear and circular 
time, question the notion of interval and consider that of télos, to 
ensure the terrain is properly prepared for the metaphysical 
discussions that will follow. 
The references to non-Greek philosophies in this study are 
intended as aids to understanding. This is the sole justification for our 
compendious discussion of Friedrich Nietzsche, Georg Wilhelm 
                                                 
5 Catherine Darbo-Peschanski (ed.), Constructions du temps dans le monde grec 
ancien, CNRS, 2000. 
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Friedrich Hegel, Martin Heidegger and Giambattista Vico. The fact 
that some people are already familiar with the thought of these 
philosophers means it can be used as a springboard for a more rapid 
understanding of the theses advanced here. Furthermore, a 
demonstration without conviction is almost certainly of use only to its 
author.6 As for the relationship between Aristotle’s thought and that of 
Plato, it is to be hoped that the present work will reveal as clearly as 
possible the distinction between ideology and true conceptual thought. 
Let us be clear: there is no support in this quarter for the widely 
accepted thesis of an obvious kinship between the two systems of 
thought. The link will be broken by a return to Pythagoreanism. The 
suggestion that Plato was a great representative of Pythagoreanism is 
all too readily made when, as we shall see, Aristotle seems to have 
had far greater mastery of Pythagorean thought. Having not initially 
been aware of the importance of Pythagoreanism for a discussion of 
Aristotle’s philosophy, the reader may feel we are spending too much 
time on it. It should be emphasised, however, that the elements 
identified in this discussion will subsequently determine the 
relationship between Plato’s thought and that of Aristotle. It will also 
be noted that the place given here to Hesiod as a theologian is not 
compatible with the view usually advanced by the history of 
philosophy. To this we would respond by observing that this approach 
to Hesiod should not be understood in terms of a linear historical 
model; it is justified only in the light of the particular issue of the 
nature of time. Lastly, the reader may well be surprised by the 
discussion of “Phoenician” sources in describing the Ionian vision of 
the world. We considered abandoning this contentious aspect of our 
work on several occasions, but once again it will be justified by our 
understanding of Pythagoreanism. 
Our study of Greek time before Aristotle will be introduced by 
a commentary on one of his first books, the Protrepticus.7 This will 
reveal two different kinds of time, a circular, initiatory time of 
Platonic inspiration and a philosophical time advanced by Aristotle. 
We shall return to poetic conceptions in order to examine this 
                                                 
6 Cf. Fernando Gil, La conviction, Flammarion, 2000 (p. 224, focusing on Aristotle’s 
theory of knowledge). 
7 It is hard to understand a commentary on a text without having first read the text 
itself. This letter by Aristotle is available in an English translation by D.S. 
Hutchinson & M.R. Johnson here: www.protrepticus.info. 
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dichotomy. The Tragedians will enable us to provide an initial outline 
of Greek time, after which Homer’s epic works will reveal the way 
that the Greek notion of time is bound up with the religious sphere. 
Hesiod’s work will complete this initiatory vision. We shall then dive 
into Pythagoreanism. Our understanding of this current will enable us 
to draw a clear distinction between its vision of the world and that of 
the Ionians. We shall then return to the early Ionian thinkers Thales 
and Anaximander, to discover that this Milesian vision of the world 
seems to have been adopted by Aristotle as the basis for his first 
model of the concept of time. Our next book will see the return of the 
thought of the théologoï. It is the recognition of this re-emergence of 
the notions of the “Italian” school that will oblige us to question the 
division between the being and existence of time. It will be 
“supposed” that this division might have its roots within the history of 
ideas, in the struggle between the Ionian vision of the world and that 
which is called “Italian”. Pythagoreanism offers a fragile synthesis of 
the two, which must be continually disentangled and made anew in 
order to understand the tensions inherent in Greek thought. 
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We have given you, O Adam, no visage proper to yourself, nor any 
endowment properly your own, in order that whatever place, whatever 
form, whatever gifts you may, with premeditation, select, these same 
you may have and possess through your own judgment and decision. 
The nature of all other creatures is defined and restricted within laws 
which We have laid down; you, by contrast, impeded by no such 
restrictions, may, by your own free will, to whose custody We have 
assigned you, trace for yourself the lineaments of your own nature. I 
have placed you at the very centre of the world, so that from that 
vantage point you may with greater ease glance round about you on all 
that the world contains. We have made you a creature neither of 
heaven nor of earth, neither mortal nor immortal, in order that you 
may, as the free and proud shaper of your own being, fashion yourself 
in the form you may prefer. 
Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man8 
 
 
Of the three works of Aristotle’s youth discovered or reconstructed 
from doxographical elements in the late 19th century, the Eudemian 
Ethics, the papyrus On Philosophy and the Protrepticus, the latter is 
generally regarded as a crucial text introducing Aristotle’s thought.9 
We shall provide a commentary on this text, which can clearly serve 
as a general illustration of philosophy, since the problems encountered 
and their resolutions will shape our understanding of this Greek art 
over later centuries. Detailed analysis of the Protrepticus will then 
give us a strong foundation on which to build our argument in relation 
to time within the vast Aristotelean corpus. 
We should begin by noting that the approach we intend to 
develop, foregrounding the Protrepticus as a basis for a reasoned 
understanding of Aristotle’s work, has nothing arbitrary about it. We 
are merely returning to an old philosophical tradition for which this 
text was a “manifesto”, as Canadian philosopher D.S. Hutchinson 
suggests:10 
Aristotle’s Invitation to philosophy was among the most famous and 
influential books of philosophy in the ancient world. For about a 
millennium, from the middle of the fourth century BCE, when the 
Cynic philosopher Crates read it to a shoemaker in his workshop in 
                                                 
8 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, Oration on the Dignity of Man, trans. A. Robert 
Caponigri (Chicago: Regnery, 1956). 
9 Bertrand Dumoulin, Recherches sur le premier Aristote (Eudème, De la 
philosophie, Protreptique), Vrin, 2000 (1981). 
10 D.S. Hutchinson and Monte Ransome Johnson, Aristotle. Invitation to 
Philosophy, Toronto, 2002, p. 2. 
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Athens, to the early sixth century CE, when the Neoplatonist 
philosopher and statesman Boethius, languishing under sentence of 
death in a prison cell in Ravenna, recalled ideas from it to mind and 
adapted them in his own Consolation of Philosophy, Aristotle’s book 
inspired dozens of generations of readers to appreciate a philosophical 
approach to life. 
From Cicero (1st century BCE) with his Hortensius,11 an exhortation 
to philosophy written for Roman citizens, to Boethius (6th century 
CE) and his book The Consolation of Philosophy,12 most other 
examples of a protrepticus are reworkings of Aristotle’s invitation to 
philosophy. However, to return to a tradition without understanding its 
underlying reasons is to risk reproducing the errors of history. We 
have chosen to begin with one of Aristotle’s earliest writings primarily 
because, like the philologist Jaeger, we believe it is possible to find 
temporal consistency in the changes found in an author’s thought. 
This is not to share the systemic conception of Aristotle scholars such 
as Octave Hamelin.13 The existence of a finite corpus of Aristotle’s 
writings does not imply that we must adopt a synchronic approach to 
its concepts, as Jaeger clearly indicates:14 
System will now mean not the outwardly visible façade, the 
construction of a totality of knowledge, lifeless and dogmatic, out of 
the multiplicity of particular discoveries and disciplines, but the inner 
stratification of fundamental conceptions, which Aristotle was the first 
to bring to light.  
If we wish to analyse the growth of a concept within a system of 
thought, we must first accept that the concepts inherent in this thought 
do change, in other words that it did not spring into being all of a 
piece in the Stoic manner. Since our task is to analyse the concept of 
time, these methodological clarifications will enable us to avoid 
confusing content with the form that we should like to grasp, in other 
words to avoid confusing changes in Aristotle’s thought over time 
                                                 
11 This work is lost. For a historical reconstruction see Michel Ruch, L’Hortensius 
de Cicéron. Histoire et reconstruction, Paris 1958, and for a discussion of the 
initiatory dimension of this philosophy, “Cicéron et l’Orphisme”, Revue des Etudes 
Augustiniennes, 1960, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1-10. 
12 Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy trans. Victor Watts, Penguin Classics, 
1999. 
13 Octave Hamelin, Le Système d’Aristote, 1985 (1920). Moreover, Hamelin 
provides no discussion of time in the Aristotelian corpus, as though the issue were 
absent from Aristotle’s thought.   
14 Jaeger, Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History of his Development, trans. Richard 
Robinson, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1934, pp. 374-5. 
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with our historical understanding of change within systems of thought 
in general. It is moreover difficult to consider this philosophy without 
identifying certain historic layers that have become presuppositions. 
For example, Raymond Weil observed not so long ago:15 
It is ultimately difficult to strip the study of Aristotle from all the 
Aristotelean sayings that have been extracted from his work. 
Aristotle’s work as we see it today is overlaid with so many 
interpretations that has become very hard to tell which interpretation 
belongs to which current of thought. Yet it seems to me that the major 
influences were those of the Neoplatonists, to which the teaching of 
Aristotle’s texts still owes a great deal. Furthermore, if we remember 
that Neoplatonist teaching was merely a continuation of the teaching 
within the Athens School itself, we cannot disregard its influence. The 
Athens School, which began its teaching with Plato (4th century BCE) 
and ended with Damascius (6th century CE), thus remains an 
important wellspring that still runs through our current understanding 
of Aristotle’s thought.16 Within this school Aristotle’s philosophy was 
taught before that of Plato, for reasons that have nothing to do with 
historical chronology, as Marie-Claire Galparine notes:17 
There were also stages in the teaching of philosophy, and a 
compulsory order. It began with Aristotle – the “small mysteries” that 
Marinus describes in the life of Proclus. These were followed by the 
“great mysteries” of Plato and the Chaldeans. The study corpus was 
presented as an initiation and the epopteia, the vision of god, was in 
the deepest reaches of the sanctuary in the aduton of the temple. 
The term “sect”18 indicates that the teaching of philosophy was also a 
religious initiation. When Diogenes Laertius (3rd century) wrote his 
history of philosophy, which remains key to classical studies, he 
naturally entitled it Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers of 
                                                 
15 Raymond Weil, “De l’état présent des questions aristotéliciennes”, in 
L’information littéraire, 1959, no. 1; see also his book Aristote et l’histoire, 
Klincksieck, 1960. 
16 It was Justinian’s decree of 529 that ordered the closure of the Athens School in 
the name of the struggle against “the teachings of the heretics, Jews and pagans” 
Cod. Just. , I, 5, 18,11, 10, in Corpus juris civilis, I II, Krueger ed. 
17 Marie-Claire Galparine, introduction to her translation of Damascius’ Des 
premiers principes. Apories et résolutions, Verdier, 1987, p. 15. 
18 The term “sect” here does not have the pejorative meaning bequeathed to it by 
Roman history. For the Greeks a hetaireia was a group of friends and companions, a 
cooperative structure claimed by all philosophical schools. 
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Every Sect.19 It is only in this light that we can understand why the 
philosophical schools were closed under a Roman Empire that had 
adopted Christianity. The aim was not to ban pointless knowledge, but 
to prevent the development of initiatiory practices that were not 
contained within the rites of the chosen religion.20 
 The teaching of the Athens School went hand in hand with an 
“initiation” in the form of a progression through a series of aporia 
intended to lead to a vision of god. My intention in the present work is 
quite different. In my view such a propaedeutic vision involves a 
theoretical presupposition of the convergence of Plato’s theories with 
those of Aristotle to a degree that is not supported by historical fact. 
The desire to portray knowledge as tending towards a union blessed 
by a theology that seeks to be a synthesis of all knowledge 
(symphonia) has led to the merging of the theses of Plato and Aristotle 
in which the latter’s thought has been reduced to that of the former. It 
has recently been suggested (Rémi Brague, 2008) that this sacred 
union of Plato and Aristotle lasted until the work of the Byzantine 
Georgius Gemistus (known as Pletho, 15th century), who pronounced 
their divorce at the Council of Florence in 1439. Pletho’s work, taking 
the side of Plato, was translated by Marsilio Ficino in 1484 and gave 
the Renaissance his historical vision, culminating in the Reformation. 
It is hard to imagine the scale of subsequent efforts made by the 
Thomist current of the Catholic Church in France,21 Italy and Poland22 
to reintroduce Aristotle’s work as a standard for knowledge. Analysis 
of Aristotle’s concept of time will give us an opportunity to show that 
the theoretical kinship between Plato and Aristotle remains 
problematic. 
 
We shall start therefore with Aristotle’s early texts in order to find the 
roots of his enquiry into time. Rather than going back up the path 
                                                 
19 The title of this work varies from one manuscript to the next. However, according 
to its French translator Robert Genaille, this is the appropriate title. The initiatory 
dimension of the term “sect” should therefore be preserved. 
20 Cf. Pierre Hadot, Le problème du néoplatonisme alexandrin, Hiéroclès et 
Simplicius, pp. 9-10, Paris, 1978. 
21 Cf. Etienne Gilson, Le Thomisme, introduction au système de Saint Thomas, 
1919, 6th edition. 
22 For example the School of Llov, in Poland, was founded after Leo XIII’s 
encyclical of 4 August 1879 Aeterni Patris, which advocated a return to the 
philosophy of Aristotle. 
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towards the Platonic mysteries, like the teaching of the Athens School, 
this study will descend into human reality, where we shall meet the 
Lyceum’s greatest pupil Theophrastus. And to descend to the 
philosophical work of Theophrastus is surely to follow the course of 
history rather than going back to Plato’s thought. Can can we continue 
to think of Aristotle’s work through teaching in the Platonic style? To 
do so would surely be to deny the realisation of his thought within the 
Lyceum. Throughout the first part of this book, in following this thesis 
we shall also seek to remove the initiatory dimension of knowledge, 
which does not seeem to us to belong to his philosophy. To this end, 
we propose to start at the beginning with a commentary on the 
Protrepticus.  
 We shall begin by questioning the status of time in this official 
letter written by Aristotle. We shall then seek to place the questions 
we find in their historical context in order to flesh out the concepts we 
have identified. Clearing away the layers of history, we shall see the 
figure of Hesiod appearing. While Homer must be regarded as the 
“prince of tragedy”, Hesiod will emerge as the master of the Greek 
vision of time, until the arrival of the masterful thesis of that most 
magisterial of philosophers, Aristotle.  
 
The Protrepticus is a fairly substantial letter addressed to Themison, a 
prince of Cyprus.23 Missives of this kind addressed to a sovereign 
were one aspect of the civilities required of a school’s members in 
seeking protection and financial support for the institution. Indeed, as 
Aristotle indicates in this letter, since philosophy cannot and should 
not bring any economic benefit, its future is largely dependent on 
                                                 
23 According to Rémi Brague, Aristotle was 33 when he wrote this letter dated 350 
BCE. In Aristote et la question du Monde, (PUF, 1988, p. 58), Brague suggests it 
was a response to a text by Isocrates entitled Antidosis. Aristotle was indeed born in 
384 BCE in Stagira (near what is now Stavros in northwestern Chalkidiki), hence his 
modern epithet “the Stagirite”. It would be hard to see why Aristotle would have 
replied to the Antidosis of Isocrates’ (436-330 BCE) unless we were aware that his 
school was in competition with the Academy. Stagira was destroyed and Aristotle 
died in his mother’s family home in Chalcis, now capital of the island of Euboea, in 
322 BCE. Nothing would be known of this letter had another philosopher, 
Iamblichus (250-330), not reproduced lengthy extracts from it in his own 
Protrepticus five hundred years later, cf. Iamblichus, Protrepticus, French trans. 
Edouard des Places, Les Belles Lettres, 1989. 
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funding from external sources. Here we can cite a fragment from the 
Protrepticus:24 
Despite no payment coming from the people to those who do 
philosophy […]. 
Aristotle was to find himself in the same situation on leaving the 
Academy. When, to keep the School in the family,25 Plato appointed 
his nephew Speusippus as his successor,26 Aristotle found a new 
protector in Hermias before accepting the invitation of the king of 
Macedonia and becoming tutor to Prince Alexander.27 We shall use 
the fragments of the Protrepticus that have been preserved to show 
that Aristotle develops many philosophical conceptions, some of 
which set forth his early notion of time. We began by seeking to 
identify a concept of time that had some degree of univocity, but were 
obliged to note the presence of two very distinct concepts that 
intersect and overlap, in a manner of which Aristotle seems somewhat 
unaware. We should say again that this is a piece of juvenilia, which 
the philologist Jaeger believes can be located chronologically before 
the Eudemian Ethics, and which we are adopting as an introduction to 
our philosophical work on time in order to develop our argument. 
The first conception of time Aristotle uses places eternity before 
human temporality, a conception whose roots we shall seek in Orphic 
and Pythagorean beliefs. From this perspective, the series that is 
                                                 
24 Fragment 52, found in the Protrepticus of Iamblichus, VI, 40, 15; cf. also 
Xenophon, Memorabilia, I, VI. In a later period the Stoics took up this theme, 
describing as sophists those philosophers who asked to be paid for their thoughts. 
25 Plato’s father Ariston was a friend of Pericles and said to be one of the last 
descendants of Codros’s branch of the Athenian royal family. His mother Perictone 
was said to be from Solon’s branch. Plato’s failure in poetry (his first three books) 
and politics (the Socrates affair) naturally led him to protect the Academy as a 
powerful institution. Appointing a foreigner such as Aristotle as head of the School 
would clearly have been risky. For not only was Aristotle not Athenian, he was 
Macedonian. 
26 Aristotle paid the princely sum of three talents (18000 gold francs) for the books 
of Speusippus as reported by Diogenes Laertius Lives… I, p. 200, who records the 
account of Favorinus (Memoirs, Book III). This was the price of learning about the 
theoretical development of the School that he had wished to lead and from which he 
would be forever separated, Penser avec Aristote, Eres, 1991, p. 417. (Speech by 
Jacques Brunschwig at the UNESCO conference in memory of Aristotle). 
27 On this passage, see Chapter V of Jaeger’s Aristotle, Fundamentals of the History 
of his Development, op. cit. 
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human temporality is triggered by an initiation, a revelation.28 The 
second approach to time contrasts with the first by making eternity the 
endpoint of a series, where contemplation of the Good is a quest that 
demands a long period of learning. We shall discuss the first 
conception of time in greater depth, since this is the one that Aristotle 
owes to Plato and which he fairly soon abandons. As we shall see, 
even in this essay of his youth, another conception is taking shape as 
he moves towards independence. The Protrepticus contains the seed 
of this second conception, which Aristotle subsequently retained 
throughout his work. So let us begin by looking at the approach to 
time inherited from the teaching of Plato, who was Aristotle’s teacher 
for some twenty years. 
 
 
a .  F r o m  e t e r n i t y  t o  t e m p o r a l i t y :  o n  i n i t i a t i o n .  
 
Aristotle’s aim in this letter is to introduce Themison to philosophical 
wisdom, defined in Part XI:29 
Thus we take the position that success is either intelligence and a 
certain wisdom, or virtue, or great enjoyment, or all of these.30 
Aristotle argues that wisdom is the ultimate happiness. While there 
may be other sources of happiness, the happiness of contemplation is 
coextensive with supreme wisdom. His argument is built around an 
opposition between the arts of imitation from below (of nature) and 
                                                 
28 The first term in a series was called henad by Neoplatonists such as Syrianus, 
Iamblichus and Proclus. The same term appears in the philosophy of Plotinus as a 
synonym of monad, as it is in the thought of Leibniz.  
29 We have used the new French translation by Jacques Follon (Mille-et-une-nuits, 
283, 2000), which was based on the texts established by Ingemar Düring (Göteborg, 
1961), Anton-Hermann Chroust (Notre Dame, 1964) and David Ross (1955). In 
1999 Yvan Pelletier also published a French translation of Chroust’s English 
translations (after the fragments of Ross), which we have also used. Unless 
otherwise stated, the English versions used in this book are from the aforementioned 
new English translation by Hutchinson and Johnson. We should note that the 
reference work in philology remains Düring’s German language edition, Aristoteles 
Protreptikos, Frankfurt, 1969. Lastly, I have selected fragments from the 
Protrepticus of Iamblichus, the authenticity of which is no longer in doubt. 
Conversely, remembering that this work by Iamblichus was only the second part of 
his book De secta Pythagorica, we should not forget the initiatory dimension that 
may not have existed as such in Aristotle’s original version. 
30 This fragment is from Iamblichus, Protrepticus XII 59. 26-60.1. 
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from above (of Heaven). While arts such as medicine, architecture and 
gymnastics are content to imitate nature,31 philosophy is a kind of 
imitation of Heaven. Aristotle finds the authority for this position in 
Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. Why did god create us? “To observe the 
heavens”32 was Pythagoras’ reply:33 
This is the thing for the sake of which nature and the god engendered 
us. So what is this thing? When Pythagoras was asked, he said, “to 
observe the heavens”, and he used to claim that he himself was an 
observer of nature, and it was for the sake of this that he had passed 
over into life. 
So the philosopher looks to the heavens to validate his words, just as 
the helmsman steers by the stars, and Anaxagoras observed that there 
must be a noûs kubernêtês,34 in other words a guiding intellect:35 
But it is clear that the philosopher is the only producer to have both 
laws that are stable and actions that are correct and beautiful. For he is 
the only one who lives looking toward nature and toward the divine 
                                                 
31 In this text Aristotle does not place poetry among the arts of imitation, as Plato 
did. Aristotle’s thought differs from Plato’s ideology in its respect for the poet. 
Proclus’ comparison of Plato to the great Greek poet Homer is historically 
deceptive: “Plato is another Homer, not only when he is inspired to compose myths, 
but also when he speaks as a philosopher and orator.” Commentaire sur la 
République, French trans. A.-J. Festugière, Vrin, 1970, I, VI, p. 19. 
32 Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 48.  
33 Iamblichus, Protrepticus IX, 51. 11-15; see also the fragment from the same 
source at IX, 5, 7-10. 
34 The history of the character trait covered by the term philosopher is far from 
clear. Herodotus records the words addressed by Croesus to the politician, poet and 
sage Solon (I, 30): “Athenian stranger, many a tale has reached us about your 
wisdom and your travels, about how in your search for knowledge you have covered 
much ground in order to see the world.” So here there is a distinction between 
sophia, which is mastery of knowledge, and philosophia, which is a desire and quest 
for knowledge. The philosophos may be simply a curious man, whereas the sophos 
has developed this character trait to the point of turning it into a distinct social status 
within a School. Cicero makes this distinction in relation to Pythagoras, in V, iii, 9 
of his Tusculan Disputations (English version, trans. Yonge et al): “And there are 
some few who, taking no account of anything else, earnestly look into the nature of 
things; and these men call themselves studious of wisdom, that is, philosophers: and 
as there it is the most reputable occupation of all to be a looker-on without making 
any acquisition, so in life, contemplating things, and acquainting oneself with them, 
greatly exceeds every other pursuit of life.” However, we know from Iamblichus’ 
Life of Pythagoras that Pythagoras always presented himself as a philosopher 
(philosophos) and never as a sage (sophos). 
35 Hutchinson and Johnson. I have linked this fragment with Anaxagoras’ “guiding 
intellect” because it seems appropriate to extend the metaphor of the ship in order to 
understand that the helm can be guided only by reading the Heavens. 
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and, just as if he were some good navigator who hitches the first 
principles of his life onto things that are eternal and steadfast, he 
moors his ship and lives life on his own terms.  
So the philosopher36 turns to the heavens because it is only there that 
eternal, fixed realities exist in the perfect totality sought by the sage. 
Having contemplated eternity, the philosopher can then embark on life 
armed with its stable laws, to make fine, straight progress.37 There are 
clear echoes of Plato here. The same conception is clearly expressed 
in the myth of the cave in Book VII of The Republic. In Plato’s myth 
an ascent into the intelligible world and contemplation of the sun, 
representing God, is followed by a descent into the world of the 
senses. The metaphor is the same in both cases: there is a correlation 
between Good, the One and the heavens, since it is through the 
mediation of the sun that Good is placed in human hands. Human 
beings then pass from hell, night and Tartarus into the light.38 It is not 
hard to see this myth as the source of a crucial argument concerning 
time. Plato indicates that the seasons are first produced by the sun and 
that human beings are chained and thus immobile from childhood 
(516b). So it is the relationship to the heavens (and notably the sun) 
that then brings them into a degree of regulated, harmonious 
                                                 
36 We find the same distinction in Platonic thought, where philosophy is only a 
character trait, defined as follows in the Charmides (155a): “… the man who is 
ready to savour study of all kinds, whom a joyful impulse drives to study, who is 
insatiable, this is the man we shall rightly call ‘’”. See the commentary 
on Plato’s Charmides (155a) by Father Marie-Dominique Philippe, “Une 
philosophie de l’être est-elle encore possible. 1. Signification de la métaphysique”, 
Tequi, p. 18 note 8. Philosophy is a path leading to wisdom and involves acquiring a 
knowledge of essences, epistéme, as we read in Plato’s first protrepticus, the 
Euthydemus (288d). It is also a discipline subject to many influences, notably from 
mathematics and religion, which we shall discuss briefly, and later becomes the 
science of Beauty in The Symposium (210d). The philosopher is a man who 
“descries a certain single knowledge connected with a beauty which has yet to be 
told” (trans. Fowler). In this development, Aristotle reflects the late period of the 
Platonic conception, in which Beauty and contemplation are once again made 
central to the acquisition of sophia. 
37 We refer to the later works of Fr Marie-Dominique Philippe (op. cit.), notably Les 
Trois Sagesses. Entretiens avec Frédéric Lenoir, Fayard, 1994. More crucially, the 
root of this questioning can be seen in his Une philosophie de l’être est-elle encore 
possible ? Fascicule I, Signification de la Métaphysique, Téqui, 1975. 
38 On this see Clémence Rammoux, La Nuit et les enfants de la Nuit dans la 
tradition grecque, Flammarion, 1986. 
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temporality, since it is there that time originates (530a).39 After this 
human beings must turn away from their unspeakable existence to 
contemplate the heavens regularly. I cite the relevant passage (518d): 
The mind as a whole must be turned away from the world of change 
until its eye can bear to look straight at reality, and at the brightest of 
all realities which is what we call the Good. 
Why turn away from the changing world? Firstly, to contemplate the 
regular movement of the planets, on which the permanence of human 
rules is based.40 But there is more. Plato links change to opinion 
(533d) and stable rules to the retreat of opinion. The sanctuary of the 
cave is primarily a retreat from the world of change, a rejection of 
time and a distancing from the temporal world. The same conception 
appears in the proem of Parmenides, as will become apparent in our 
discussion of the more fundamental relationship between thought and 
time. For now, and by way of introduction, we shall simply refer to a 
certain notion of time without defining it further and in accordance 
with Plato’s myth. Chained by the neck and feet, human beings are 
deprived of movement of either soul or body, and consequently 
derpived of time, until they are allowed to see certain images. After 
this, it is said, assimilation of this contemplation turns men into 
philosophers, forever trained for wisdom, masters of themselves and 
their own sole guides through time. How is this possible? Is it some 
irrational metamorphosis? Is an ideal transformation of the human 
condition possible? Or is it simply a myth with a meaning that will 
always remain hidden from human reason and particularly from the 
                                                 
39 Martin Heidegger proposes a reading of the myth of the cave that rules out the sun 
as the tipping point between the sensory and the intelligible. The same rejection of 
heliocentrism can be found among all Christian writers, since the notion of the 
Incarnation implies that the Earth is at the centre of the world, Questions II, French 
trans. A. Préau, Gallimard, p. 133. For this observation and other contemporary 
commentaries on this myth, see Mattéi, Platon et le miroir du mythe, PUF, 2002 
(1996), pp. 109-135, p. 126. We should also note Mattéi’s acknowledgement that the 
ideological image of the cave does not conform to the structure of Plato’s other 
myths, cf. pp. 118 and 139. At this analytical level, a reading of the “vision of the 
chariot” in the Book of Ezekiel would not be out of place.   
40 The Attic calendar featuring all the religious festivals was already in use in Athens 
at the time of Plato. For example, on 16 Hekatombaïon Athenians celebrated the 
synoikia. See Joëlle Bertrand and Michelle Brunet, Les Athéniens à la recherche de 
leur destin, A. Colin, 1993, p. 46. In Aristotle’s period the astronomer Callipus, a 
student of Eudoxus, produced a new calendar that later bore his name, cf. Jaeger, op. 
cit., p. 354. 
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reason of the common people?41 If we return to the myth’s beginning 
we can see that everything was set out from the start. Plato announces 
this at the start of his narrative (516b): 
Later on he would come to the conclusion that it is the sun that 
produces the changing seasons and years and controls everything in 
the visible world, and is in a sense responsible for everything that he 
and his fellow prisoners used to see. 
In this strange passage the philosopher appropriates the constant, 
regular time of the heavens. His own time will be in the image of the 
time of the stars, marked out by the sun.42 From now on, every 
moment of his life will retain the image of celestial eternity. The 
arrangement of the stars lodged in his soul will enable him to find his 
way through the vicissitudes of human life. This is why this entire 
mythology is perfectly condensed in the image of the helmsman used 
by Aristotle. But more importantly, the philosopher himself will now 
produce the seasons and years of the city. So man is not only in the 
image of heavenly time, he becomes it; in other words, it is up to him 
to introduce the kosmos into the city, summed up in reasoned order. 
He is not only master of himself, but also of the world, since 
henceforth it is he who must make the rain fall and the sun shine.43 
The philsopher king is a master of the arts and of politics, the all-
seeing eye, like Apuleius’ Golden Ass.44 
                                                 
41 Françoise Frontisi-Ducroux, “Figure du temps: la métamorphose”, in Darbo-
Peschanski (ed.), Constructions du temps dans le monde grec ancien, CNRS, 2000, 
pp. 49-63. 
42 We note that the opening of the necropolis of the Macedonian royal family (Philip 
and his wife Olympias) on 8 November 1977, long after the Celts had been and 
gone, also provided confirmation that the emblem of Macedonia, to which Athens 
was subject at the time, was a shining sun. 
43 In non-Athenian places of worship in Ancient Greece, gods were venerated to 
ensure the best possible results for agriculture. This was why Zeus was simply “the 
maker of rain and fine weather”, François de Polignac, “Changer de lieu, changer de 
temps, changer la cité: sites et déplacements de la construction du temps dans 
l’Athènes archaïque”, in Constructions du temps dans le monde grec ancien, pp. 
143-154, p. 151. 
44 While it has been suggested that a philosopher had to be curious, the fact remains 
that the term “curiosity” has no equivalent in Greek. It was left to Cicero to 
introduce the Latin noun curiositas, which developed into the English “curious” and 
French “curieux”. According to Alonso Tordesillas, Cicero is reported as saying, “In 
curiositate oxypeinos” (“I am hungry with curiositas”). On the history of the term, 
see Maria Tasinato, translated into French by Jean-Paul Manganaro with a preface 
by Tordesillas, La Curiosité. Apulée et Augustin, Verdier, 1999. Plato was 
undoubtedly struck by this character trait in his student Aristotle, whom he 
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It is here that I should like to concur with the harsh political critique of 
Plato’s philosophy advanced by Michel-Pierre Edmond. In throwing 
this mythological powder into the citizens’ eyes, Plato unabashedly 
grants himself the central place in the functioning of culture. But can 
any culture, be it Greek, Oriental, French or European, have a centre 
and, if so, can that centre be embodied by a person? Doubts are surely 
justified and are expressed by Edmond as follows:45 
The philosopher replaces the poet to become the new figure in whom 
society is invited to seek its own identity and question itself, because 
he speaks to it of itself in a way that is public and verifiable against 
these new benchmarks. Politico-philosophical fiction replaces poetic 
fiction; it becomes a kind of optical medium through which the city 
passes and in which it acquires an unusual degree of visibility. It sees 
itself in this fiction as it is and as it should be. Plato was most 
definitely the first to challenge the celebrated, future “Greek miracle”.  
In Edmond’s view the excessive importance given to the philosopher 
was a cause of Greek decadence. For a position of such omnipotence 
necessarily places the philosopher at the centre of the city. The 
philosopher is thus central to culture and must describe the present 
time. Of course the same goes for the past, which the new figure is 
required to reveal, replacing the old bards and rhapsodes, historians 
such as Thucydides and so on. Meanwhile, the poets, those learned 
figures who describe the future in the city, are muzzled in order to 
leave the central role to the philosophers.46 
                                                                                                                   
nicknamed anagnoste (the reader). Plato’s irony is fully apparent in his choice of 
term, since an anagnoste was usually a slave who read aloud to an Athenian 
aristocrat. Athenians never read books themselves, even if they were philosophers or 
poets, but listened to them being read. The fact that Aristotle was the first 
philosopher in the history of thought to read the ancient texts directly clearly shows 
that he had too great a “thirst for information”, as mentioned by Brunschwig (art. 
cit.), to be satisfied with the oral sources to which convention would have confined 
him. We therefore surmise that, though unrepresented in the Greek lexicon, the 
character trait of curiosity was fully manifested by Aristotle. How deceptive 
language can be! 
45 Michel-Pierre Edmond, Le philosophe-roi. Platon et le politique, Payot, 1991, p. 
149. 
46 All knowledge preceding the emergence of philosophical thinking is then classed 
as mythology, with the pejorative sense that this term acquires for Plato. Discourse 
(mûthos) is henceforth split in two: on the one hand there is the true discourse of the 
philosopher (épistemè) and, on the other, the rest, in other words the ancient 
tradition, relegated to the category of mythology. On this tricky subject our 
argument draws on the thesis advanced by Luc Brisson in Platon, Les mots et les 
mythes, Maspero, 1982. For our own part, we see here the birth of a particular act of 
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Plato’s conception of philosophy seems to be more a reflection 
of hubris than of truth. It is a position in relation to power that 
contrasts sharply with that adopted by Aristotle who, as is well 
known, preferred to be away from the city and the Lyceum, well away 
from such Platonic high jinks. We shall see that this split from Plato 
over the status of the activity of philosophy begins in the Protrepticus. 
Aristotle turns away with some irony from Plato’s conception of the 
philosopher-king and master of the “world”. In this regard it becomes 
more and more difficult to agree with Pierre Aubenque when he 
argues that Aristotle retained a vision of a time of original 
revelation:47 
Time is thus no longer the site of forgetting, as Plato thought, nor that 
of revelation, as Aristotle seems to have believed at one time. 
Forgetting and revelation suppose the existence of an absolute truth, 
independent of human knowledge, which exists in itself at the start or 
end of history, in other words outside the field of human history. 
Aristotle never completely abandoned this conception.  
On the contrary, in my view not only did Aristotle abandon this 
conception of initiatory time in his youth, but he was also the first 
thinker to place himself within history, through his writing itself. 
Plato, adopting an initiatory, traditional time, was careful not to write. 
Aristotle on the other hand was not subject to such sacred obligations; 
he read the texts himself and took them as a basis for his own 
thinking. So, if the conception of time developed in these passages is 
                                                                                                                   
speech, the political source of ideological discourse, a field then unknown in cities 
governed by monarchs, oligarchs and emerging democracy. So it is no surprise to 
find such ideological remarks in Plato’s Republic. See for example Edmond’s 
commentary on Plato’s republic 382d in op. cit. p. 150: “A people resort to 
mythology when they do not know what really happened in the events of their 
distant past, and the mythological falsehood must seem as true as possible.” Is there 
a better definition of ideology? Is this not philosophy’s first nihilistic act? Such, at 
least, is the argument advanced by Nietzsche, fulminating on discovering this 
superimposition of politics in the domain of the arts of thought: “Everything 
genuinely Hellenic is made responsible for the state of decay (and Plato is just as 
ungrateful to Pericles, Homer, tragedy, rhetoric, as the prophets were to David and 
Saul). The decline of Greece is understood as an objection to the foundations of 
Hellenic culture: basic error of philosophers –. Conclusion: the Greek world 
perishes.” Nietzsche, The Will to Power, Walter Kaufmann (ed.), trans. Kaufmann 
and R.J. Hollingdale, Vintage, 1968, I, pp. 231-2. 
47 Pierre Aubenque, Le problème de l’Etre chez Aristote, PUF, 1994, p. 91. 
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indeed initiatory, as I would maintain, how did Aristotle understand 
the temporal dimension in a strictly philosophical manner?48 
This question can be approached in the light of another passage 
from the Protrepticus, which mentions the Isles of the Blessed. The 
place of the knowledge of eternity may be the heavens, as Aristotle 
suggests in accordance with Plato, but it may also be a new Heaven, 
another imaginary “world” located in the Isles of the Blessed:49 
One might see that what we say is all the more true if someone 
transported us in thought, as it were, to the Isles of the Blessed, for in 
that place neither use nor benefit would be produced in anything else, 
and only thinking, and observation remains, which we say even now is 
a free way of life. If this is true, then surely any one of us would be 
rightly ashamed if, when the right was granted to us to settle in the 
Isles of the Blessed, he was by his own fault unable to do so.  
This conception of a place where human beings would be in 
permanent contact with eternity may be based on the ancient myth of 
Atlantis,50 but above all it seeks to use myth to prove that the only 
happiness possible lies in the contemplation of eternity and that 
knowledge of eternity can be brought to earth, even if the place on 
earth to which it is brought is itself imaginary.51 
                                                 
48 The Athenian political regime in which Aristotle was active applied the 
autocthony principle and afforded no civil rights to aliens. For example, we know 
that Aristotle did not own the Lyceum, since he had no right to own property. This is 
confirmed by his will, found in Chalcis, and according to Jaeger (op. cit., p. 325) it 
was Theophrastus who held the deeds. 
49 Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 50. 
50 This myth is recorded by Plato in the Timaeus (17a) and in the Critias (27c). 
Pierre Vidal-Naquet reveals all the irony of this narrative, the sole aim of which is to 
discredit the ancients. It would seem to be the most fake myth in Greek tradition – a 
pastiche. See Brisson, Platon, Les mots et les mythes, Maspero, 1982, p. 22. 
51 This conception of the Isles of the Blessed is linked to Plato’s model of time, 
which we shall consider a little later on. For now we will note what Brague has to 
say about it: “Greek legend also states that, under the reign of Zeus, the dethroned 
Chronos was not relegated to an indeterminate place of idleness, but lived in exile in 
the Isles of the Blessed, over which he ruled.” Brague, “L’isolation du sage” in Du 
temps chez Platon et Aristote, PUF, 1982, p. 91. This conception is also present in 
Hesiod, Works and Days (169) and in Pindar’s Olympian Odes (2, 70). For Plato the 
Isles of the Blessed represented the philosophical life. The Academy represented the 
Isles in the City, as the place of the blessed. After many vicissitudes, the Platonic 
school selected the neighbourhood of the gymnasium of Akadémos as the site of this 
philosophical place (the Academy). Meanwhile Aristotle moved to Assos, the Troad 
coast and Mytilene and spent time in Macedonia before returning to Athens, at the 
age of 45, to found the peripatetic school, the Lyceum – a study garden, as Jaeger 
called it. 
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 We should add that, to our knowledge, this is also the only place 
in the entire Aristotelian corpus in which Aristotle mentions a fault, an 
element of shame linked to the past, in a rhetorical register generally 
seen as reflecting a sense of guilt.52 There is no trace of such an idea 
of culpability in Aristotle’s Ethics, which we propose to discuss. So 
where does it come from? In this text Aristotle refers to these two 
Platonic myths, but he could equally well have chosen others from the 
same catalogue, most of which convey the same vision. We could 
mention, for example, the allegory of the fish in the Phaedo,53 the 
myth of Glaucos or the allegory of the beasts in The Republic.54 After 
a long time spent reading all these myths and allegories, Schuhl 
attributes them all to a single source in the Orphic and Pythagorean 
tradition which, while perhaps periodically nourished by truly 
scientific discoveries, remains profoundly religious:55 
Similarly in the great myths of the soul, the abstract construct of 
individual destiny, domined by the idea of a judgement involving a 
fall and expiation, is illustrated by a growing wealth of images in the 
Gorgias, Phaedo, Republic and Phaedrus, and reappears more quickly 
in the Timaeus and the Laws. These images are borrowed from either 
the Orphic and Pythagorean traditions, whose source can be dated 
back to the Minoan civilisation, or the most recent scientific notions, 
as in the Phaedo […], while that of the world of the blessed makes use 
of new geographical research.  
The poetic work in these different versions is clear to see, and similar 
in every way to the work of dreams, which seeks to integrate recent 
scientific discoveries – the diurnal elements – with the nocturnal 
elements of the past, in other words the cultural tradition.56 However, 
it does seem that this heritage is Pythagorean, as Jaeger also 
                                                 
52 Aristotle does of course include shame (aiskuné) in his work, but he does not 
integrate it into his personal ethics, cf. notably Rhetoric, 78b 24, 83b 12-13, 85a 13 
and 90a 2.  
53 Plato, Phaedo, 109-110, French trans. Brisson. 
54 Plato, Republic, X, 611 for the first myth and IX, 586 for the second. 
55 Schuhl, La fabulation platonicienne, Vrin, 1968, p. 44. 
56 Long before psychoanalysis and its founder Sigmund Freud, the work of 
mythology was compared to that of dreams by Plotinus, cf. Enneads, V, 5, §12.  
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suggests,57 and here again we see why the Neoplatonists were later so 
drawn to this text by Aristotle.58 
 Confirmation is provided by the internal consistency of the text. 
At the end of the letter Aristotle describes a particular initiatory rite, 
the origins of which can easily be found in Pythagoreanism. As we 
have just seen, Aristotle found an underlying authority for his art in 
Pythagoreanism, and this was the most widely held view in the Athens 
School:59 
So who would consider himself successful and happy, looking at these 
things for which we have been composed right from the beginning by 
nature, as if for punishment – all of us – as they say the mysteries 
relate? For the ancients express this in an inspired way by saying the 
soul “pays a punishment” and we live for the atonement of certain 
great failings. 
Failings and guilt are key components of a certain Orphic belief.60 But 
crucially it is the relationship between this belief and initiation that 
explains the conception of time that persists in Aristotle’s words, still 
uttered under the influence of his master Plato. Initiatory cults all 
involve a belief in eternal knowledge that can be acquired through an 
initiation that brings about revelation.61 And it is this belief in 
                                                 
57 Jaeger, Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his Development, p. 61, “The 
Neoplatonists were attracted by the ascetic and religious character of the book. They 
considered it evidence of Aristotle’s supposed Platonism, or at any rate a means of 
reconciling the contradictions between Plato and the peripatetic doctrine.”  
58 According to Schuhl, op. cit., p. 45, Plotinus compares this mythology to that of 
Empedocles (Enneads, IV, 8) while Porphyry compares it to the Cave of the 
Nymphs in Homer’s Odyssey. While we have found several references to 
Empedocles’ conception in Homer’s Iliad, notably in book VII, why this mythology 
is not accompanied by any sense of guilt in either Homer’s conceptions or those of 
Empedocles has yet to be explained. Moreover when the philologist Nietzsche 
adopted all this for himself, it was through this “rite”, with the coming of 
Zarathustra, that the Superman strove to bring news of a vision beyond good and 
evil, a vision that is thus merely a return to Empedocles, and indeed to Homer; it is 
the vision of a world without guilt, so a vision that is certainly not that of 
Pythagoreanism or Orphism. Thus Spoke Zarathustra III, “On the Vision and the 
Riddle”, trans. Hollingdale, Penguin, 1969.  
59 Hutchinson and Johnson, Iamblichus 47.21-48.2. 
60 An interesting discussion of Greek initiatory cults and their relationship to time 
can be found in “La figure de Chronos dans la théogonie orphique et ses antécédents 
iraniens”, Mythes et représentations du temps, CNRS, 1985, pp. 37-55. 
61 The Greeks gave no credit to these beliefs, which the philosophers adopted to 
give authority to their words. Nietzsche constantly reminds us of this in his 
Genealogy of Morals: “Throughout the longest period of their history the Greeks 
used their gods for no other purpose than to keep ‘bad conscience’ at bay, to be 
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“revelation” that explains why eternity is placed before temporality. 
Eternity can be placed before temporality only if it is possible to attain 
the ultimate revelation of an ideal, perfect whole. After initiation, it 
becomes easy to steer one’s life with discernment, for the unfolding 
time of human life remains indelibly stamped with this vision. 
Following Pythagoras and Plato, Aristotle thus accepts that it is 
possible to attain a knowledge of eternity that will set philosophy on 
the path of right conduct. It is in this sense that we can say that 
eternity precedes temporality, in other words that the time of the soul 
is not the same as the time of the body, the exclusion of the body 
being the sine qua non of such a view. Indeed Aristotle gives 
definitive expression to this idea in a blistering comparison at the end 
of his letter to Themison:62 
For the conjunction of the soul with the body looks very much like a 
thing of this sort; for as they say the Tyrrhenians often torture those 
they capture by chaining corpses right against their living bodies, face 
to face, fastening each limb to a limb, similarly the soul seems to be 
stretched out and stuck onto all the sensitive members of the body.  
So Aristotle is comparing the body to the dead and the soul to the 
living!63 This confirms at least one thing, which is that within the 
Platonic conception adopted by the young Aristotle, in order for man 
to become wise and attain the full life of his soul, to share that part of 
the divine that is within him, he must necessarily abandon the mortal 
body and with it sensation. It is at this level of reading that we can 
truly see that Aristotle is still under the influence of Plato.64 Why? 
Because throughout the rest of his œuvre we will see the return of the 
senses as the very foundation of knowledge, through induction. 
Furthermore, and apparently paradoxically, Aristotle founds the entire 
                                                                                                                   
allowed to enjoy the freedom of their soul: thus, in a sense diametrically opposed to 
that in which Christianity has made use of its God. […] ‘It is a wonder!’ he says on 
one occasion – at issue is the case of Aegisthos, a very serious case – ‘It is a wonder 
how much mortals complain about the gods! They allege that evil comes only from 
us; but they are the authors of their own misery, even contrary to fate, through lack 
of reason.” (Trans. Douglas Smith, Oxford World’s Classics, 2008, p. 74). Here 
Nietzsche is referring to a passage from Homer’s Odyssey, I, 32-34, which we shall 
analyse below. 
62 Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 42 (Iamblichus, VIII, 48.2-48.9). 
63 Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 82e 2 sq. 
64 For a critique of this approach, see Nietzsche, “What is the meaning of ascetic 
ideals?” The Genealogy of Morals III, p. 77 ff. Incidentally, “The ascetic treats life 
as a wrong track along which one must retrace one's steps to the point at which it 
begins; or as a mistake which one rectifies”, p. 96. 
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argument of the Protrepticus on the assertion that it is sight that 
underpins all knowledge, and particularly all contemplation. 
Throughout his letter he constantly uses analogies with sight and uses 
the eye as an example. How can we accede to wisdom if we do not use 
the senses of which sight is one? On this point Aristotle’s position has 
already been strongly established in other parts of the text. Two 
fragments definitively set out the relationship between sensation and 
life. To reject sensation is to radically reject life itself:65 
Living is distinguished from not living by sensing, and living is 
defined by its presence and power, and if this is taken out life is not 
worth living, as if life itself were eliminated along with sensation. 
Aristotle quickly disengaged from the Platonic sacred approach by 
preserving sensation and, in not relegating the body to a lesser rank, 
he rescues knowledge and respects life itself. Moreover the 3rd book of 
his treatise On Philosophy contains a conclusive essay that returns to 
the same considerations, once more integrating the body and its 
sensory capacities, which enable us to contemplate the beauty of the 
world. As Schuhl suggests, this is a “rehabilitation of the sensory 
world” in order to give the reader “a taste for beauty”:66 
Great was the saying of Aristotle: “Suppose there were men who had 
lived always underground, in good and well-lighted dwellings, 
adorned with statues and pictures, and furnished with everything in 
which those who are thought happy abound. Suppose, however, that 
they had never gone above ground, but had learned by report and 
hearsay that there is a divine authority and power. Suppose that then, 
at some time, the jaws of the earth opened, and they were able to 
escape and make their way from those hidden dwellings into these 
regions which we inhabit. When they suddenly saw earth and seas and 
sky, when they learned the grandeur of clouds and the power of winds, 
when they saw the sun and learned his grandeur and beauty and the 
power shown in his filling the sky with light and making day; when, 
again, night darkened the lands and they saw the whole sky picked out 
and adorned with stars, and the varying lights of the moon as it waxes 
and wanes, and the risings and settings of all these bodies, and their 
courses settled and immutable to all eternity ; when they saw those 
things, most certainly they would have judged both that there are gods 
and that these great works are the works of gods.”.  
                                                 
65 Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 37, Iamblichus, VII, 44. 9-13. Another fragment 
confirms this position (p. 37, Iamblichus, VII, 44, 17-20): “If living is valuable 
because of sensation, and sensation is a kind of cognition, and we choose it because 
the soul is capable of recognizing by means of it…” 
66 David Ross trans. fragment 12; this passage was found in Cicero’s De natura 
deorum (37). 
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What differences do we find between this development and a myth of 
Pythagorean obedience such as the myth of the cave? Fundamentally 
the difference is this: the stage preceding contemplation is no longer 
described as hell or purgatory – a form of damnation that man must 
redeem with his own life; there is no reference to original sin, a fault 
to be compensated for, a debt to the gods that must be repayed by a 
denial of the body or the sacrifice of a few oxen. On the contrary, in 
this state men already live a life of opulence and joy. But they are 
deprived of the contemplation of the heavens and this is why they 
cannot know that the gods exist and that all the beauty of the world is 
their doing. 
Yet, if we opt for this thesis an obstacle soon appears. For if 
men already live in opulence and happiness, what need would they 
have of gods?67 In reality all this opulence and happiness are artificial; 
what we find here is just a show of happiness – ostentation at worst. 
True happiness in life, the supreme happiness that is later the subject 
of the two Ethics, is to try to reach that part of one’s soul that engages 
with the divine. Indeed Aristotle concludes his letter with this 
argument:68 
So nothing divine or happy belongs to humans apart from just that one 
thing worth taking seriously, as much insight and intelligence as is in 
us, for, of what’s ours, this alone seems to be immortal, and this alone 
divine. 
Having reached the end of our reading of the Protrepticus, it is time to 
summarise what we have learned about Aristotle’s early conception of 
time. If we follow the path it lays down, eternity appears as anterior to 
                                                 
67 We shall see that this relates to a different religious tradition, the Iranian 
conception that Plato would adopt at the end of his life. The same tradition was 
followed by Nietzsche, through a return to an old esoteric doctrine arising out of 
Zoroastrianism. The Zoroastrian texts from the Sassanian period in Iran (and 
perhaps also older texts, though this would require verification) explain that the 
world will continue for 9,000 or 12,000 years, depending on whether time unfolds 
over two or three trimillennia. The second or third trimillennium launches the entire 
cycle and human beings; the third or fourth sees the end of the overall cycle, with 
the coming of Zarathustra. On this question Jaeger provides the following 
information (op. cit., p. 132): “From that time onwards the Academy was keenly 
interested in Zarathustra and the teaching of the Magi. Plato’s pupil Hermodorus 
discussed astralism in his Mathematics, he derived the name Zarathustra from it, 
declaring that it means ‘star-worshipper’.” This phase is known to mark the end of 
the struggle between good and evil, between Ormuzd (the good, who would become 
Zeus) and Ahriman (the bad, who would become Hades).  
68 Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 42; Iamblichus, VIII, 48. 9-13.  
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human temporality. Knowledge of eternity appears necessary to the 
government of the soul so that, when it decides to take singular, 
temporal form, it is guided by the right rules that will lead to the 
construction of Good within the City. But it is vital to note that there 
is a time, a moment of transition, a “rite” that enables man to realise 
that it is he who produces time. Hence we can suggest that the 
Platonic myths discussed emphasise a crucial moment in which man 
realises that time is not external to him, as others think, but that on the 
contrary the appropriation of time turns him into a philosopher 
capable of governing himself. At this point Aristotle is still within the 
Pythagorean tradition and influenced by the later thought of Plato – 
which was that of the entire Academy. So he accepts that it is possible 
to have access to an immediate or initial form of contemplation that 
will guide human steps once and for all. This is the contemplation of 
the heavens, the only place where a temporal constant has always 
reigned, a permanent cycle of which the philosopher’s behaviour is 
the reflection. But for Aristotle the heavens are also the metaphor 
most compatible with the nature of the divine. To imitate the heavens 
is thus to imitate the nature of God; it is to have access to the divine 
nature within us, which the sage must copy in order to attain the most 
excellent happiness and the most perfect life. 
So here in concise form is what we can say about this early 
conception of time. In clearing the ground on which to set out the 
questions we will consider, we should emphasise that this initiatory 
conception of time describes circular time. We shall seek to locate its 
historical origin within the world of poetry and myth. We shall then 
see whether this temporal vision has a precise astronomical source. 
But first and foremost we need to set out the second conception of 
time developed in this letter. For several passages lead us to think that 
there are other conceptions that are not reducible to the initiatory 
vision mentioned above. We believe that these early considerations 
show the emerging outline of a singular understanding of time within 
Aristotle’s philosophy. We shall now demonstrate this by commenting 
on extracts from this letter. 
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b .  F r o m  t e m p o r a l i t y  t o  e t e r n i t y :  o n  w i s d o m  o v e r  
t h e  l o n g  t e r m .  
 
The second conception of time developed in this text locates eternity 
at the end of time. Eternity no longer triggers a series, but interrupts it, 
if we are to maintain the mathematical comparison; to express the 
same thing without comparisons, eternity is what completes time. So it 
is located in the final instant that ends all of time past: the death of 
human beings. Here we have the foundation on which Aristotle will 
go on to build his entire conception of time, centred on the concept of 
entelechy.69 This conception is no longer Platonic, since the soul 
seems to die at the same time as the body,70 indicating that the concept 
of life after death that has been rejected and with it the doctrine of 
reincarnation. We now propose to demonstrate that all this is radically 
anti-Platonic.  
 
Firstly, Jaeger tells us:71 
Alongside the Platonic view that the soul remembers the other world 
he sets his thesis that it remembers this one. 
So Aristotle puts an end to traditional, cyclical time, the time of 
metempsychosis, in which souls are caught up in a universal cycle and 
merely pass through a body. His discussion implies a time that 
correlates with the time of the body. The soul is subject to the same 
time as the body. This is why wisdom can only be attained at the end 
of a biological human life. Aristotle subsequently retained this 
conception of time until the end of his life. Here we have the first 
outline of the Aristotelian concept of entelechy, the first attempt to 
bind soul to body in a coupling later reinforced by his entelechic 
                                                 
69 Entelechy (, entelekheia) relates to the future. To put it simply, in the 
context of this introduction, the notion of entelechy does not involve a simple 
relationship between the future and becoming (teleology) and nor does it imply the 
theological notion of Providence, still less the late Protestant notion of progress. 
Here we can confine ourselves to the formulation proposed by Sophocles: “Many 
things shall mortals learn by seeing; but, before he sees, no man may read the future 
or his fate.” Ajax, vv. 1418-1420, trans. Richard Claverhouse Jebb. 
70 A short article by Thomas More Robinson provides a clear, simple analysis of 
Platonic dualism: “Caractères constitutifs du dualisme âme-corps dans le corpus 
platonicum”, kairos kai logos, 11, 1997, pp. 1-28.  
71 Jaeger, op. cit., p. 51. 
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conception in a near perfect philosophical essay.72 However, if the 
circle of Heaven gave continuity to Platonic time, as we have seen in 
the myth of the cave, how does Aristotle reestablish continuity once 
he has abandoned that analogy? What will provide the continuity that 
is necessary to the permanence of both the heavens and physical 
phenomena? How can Aristotle explain the continuous duration of 
human lives and still more of human institutions? We shall provide a 
more theoretical analysis of these questions in our next book. We shall 
now begin by describing the general time mentioned by Aristotle in 
the Protrepticus. We shall seek to understand this conception of time 
in the light of its historical context, before moving into the theoretical 
field. 
 
First, does Aristotle accept that human beings go through a “process” 
of improvement? For we observe that human beings develop from the 
condition of children whose actions are not guided by laws to the 
wisdom of old age prior to death. Is time the only guarentee of this 
evolution? Let us see what Aristotle tells us. He suggests that children 
are devoid of wisdom and cites the common phrase:73 
“No knife for a child.” 
In his eyes adults without culture are like slaves74 who make choices 
only by imitation. According to Jaeger, he takes an extract from one of 
the papyri of Oxyrynchus found in Egypt:75 
                                                 
72 From the outset Aristotle’s concept of entelechy is linked to the relationship 
between the body and its soul. If, like the body, the soul dies, there is no longer any 
formal anteriority of the soul in relation to the body, leading to the following 
synthesis in On the Soul: “Now given that there are bodies of such and such a kind, 
viz. having life, the soul cannot be a body; for the body is the subject or matter, not 
what is attributed to it. Hence the soul must be a substance in the sense of the form 
of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and 
thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized.” II, 1 412a 16-22, The 
Complete Works of Aristotle, vols. 1 and 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Princeton 
University Press, 1984. 
73 Chroust’s translation introduces a paraphrase by Stobaeus (III, 3.25) also noted 
by Hutchinson and Johnson (p. 6) “The saying ‘no knife for a child’ means ‘don’t 
put power into the hands of the bad.’” To avoid getting involved in philological 
disagreements, we have cited only the fragments found in the Protrepticus of 
Iamblichus, which is why we think it unnecessary to follow Stobaeus’ paraphrase.  
74 In Greek as in Latin, the same term refers to both a child and a slave: pais puer. 
This is the same neutral approach to childhood, Les Athéniens à la recherche d’un 
destin, p. 187. 
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Just as a man would be a ridiculous figure if he were intellectually and 
morally inferior to his slaves, in the same way we must believe a man 
miserable if his possessions are more valuable than himself … Satiety 
begets wantonness, says the proverb. Vulgarity linked with power and 
possessions brings forth folly.   
We should state that in the Constitution of the Athenians Aristotle 
attributes the citation of this proverb to Solon, linking it more closely 
to the political sphere, which seems to conform more to the initial 
meaning conveyed by the original here.76 But in the Protrepticus the 
literal sense can be retained. Children are indeed the first stage of a 
development towards wisdom, with layers that should be reflected in 
the social hierarchy. The wisest will necessarily also be the oldest and 
consequently should hold the positions of greatest power. Lastly, even 
in the absence of any real culture, old age seems to give human beings 
a certain authority. In every case, Aristotle says, when man is close to 
his end, he is necessarily close to his completion and consequently 
there must be something of the Good in him. So there is a certain 
precedence of body over soul in terms of what results, which is the 
complete opposite of the Platonic conception that we discussed earlier. 
This is how Aristotle conveys his argument:77 
Further, if in everything the end is always better (for everthing that 
comes to be comes to be for the sake of the end result, and what is for 
the sake of something is better, indeed best of all), and the natural end 
result is the one that in the order of development is naturally last to be 
achieved when the development is completed without interruption, 
surely the first human parts to acquire their end are the bodily ones, 
and later on the parts of the soul, and somehow the end of the better 
part always comes later than its coming to be. Surely the soul is 
posterior to the body, and intelligence is the final stage of the soul, for 
we see that it is the last thing to come to be by nature in humans, and 
that is why old age lays claim to this alone of good things.  
If we follow the Protrepticus to the letter, we must think first that 
human nature follows a temporal path from birth to death.78 This 
                                                                                                                   
75 Jaeger, op. cit., p. 57 (note 6, p. 435). We have cited the extract cited by Jaeger, 
(fragment 57 of Pap. Oxyrh. Vol. IV, pp. 83 sq.) of which Aristotle provides only a 
part. 
76 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, XII, 2, ed. Barnes. 
77 Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 48, Iamblichus, IX 51. 16-52. 5. 
78 This precedence is nothing more or less than respect for human life and, more 
generally in Aristotle’s work, for biological life including all non-human species 
(animals and plants). Life precedes all thought, which is why the study of animals 
and plants is one of the finest manifestations of this respectful approach to life. See 
for example Aristotle’s On Length and Shortness of Life in Barnes vol. 1. 
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temporality is then split into the two correlative times of the body and 
soul. It is beause these times are so to speak “homogenous” that the 
evolution of the one leads to the evolution of the other, in other words 
it is not possible for wisdom, the end of the time of the soul, to exist at 
the beginning of the time of the flesh, in childhood. Similarly and 
reciprocally, it is impossible for the end of the human body not to be 
accompanied by a degree of wisdom. It is impossible for an old man 
to have a child’s unregulated soul. While the genetic evolution of 
human beings may be natural, how does cultural wisdom have time to 
develop? Time may be a necessary criterion, but it is certainly not 
enough.79 The soul develops through education, which is, Aristotle 
tells us here, the minimum condition for the acquisition of happiness. 
And while animals quickly acquire a degree of independent life, 
human beings must constantly employ a great many arts to ensure 
their survival until their biological end:80 
For example, to begin with, even with reproduction, some seeds 
presumably germinate unguarded, whatever kind of land they may fall 
onto, but others also need the skill of farming; and, in a similar way, 
some animals also attain their full nature by themselves, but a human 
needs many skills for his security, both at first in respect of their birth, 
and again later, in respect of their nurturing.  
The young Aristotle divides engendered things into those engendered 
by nature and those engendered by art, but both move towards a goal 
(those engendered by chance have no goal). Nature tends towards a 
goal higher than that of human art, since the arts are content merely to 
imitate Nature.81 For this reason, in order to attain wisdom, the 
ultimate goal of education, human beings must employ many arts to 
                                                 
79 However, if these two temporalities evolve in correlation, what is the point of 
teaching wisdom to young men whose natural time prevents them acquiring it? Plato 
would reply that the teaching of wisdom and philosophy is only possible by 
constructing myths. Proof of this can be found in the passage in which Protagoras 
ponders this question in the presence of Socrates: “Shall I, as an elder, speak to you 
as younger men in an apologue or myth, or shall I argue out the question?” and 
comes up with the answer, “I think that the myth will be more interesting.” Plato, 
Protagoras, 320c (trans. Benjamin Jowett). Meanwhile, in accordance with his 
conception of power, Aristotle maintains that it is better to give them the “capacity 
to” become wise. Morning classes at the Lyceum were addressed to those members 
of the School who were likely to become philosophers themselves, Jaeger op. cit., p. 
316. 
80 Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 46, Iamblichus, IX, 49. 26-50.12. 
81 For a good introduction to this, see Michel Crubellier and Pierre Pellegrin, 
Aristote. Le philosophe et les savoirs, Seuil, Essais, 2002, pp. 235-260. 
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reach the same autonomy as natural things that ensure their own 
survival.82 Here we have the reason why philosophy must necessarily 
be a synthesis of all the other arts. In order to be sure of acquiring the 
full autarchy of his soul, a man must master philosophy, the art of the 
individual arts. A second reason for this can be seen in the history of 
philsophy, which was chronologically the last art to emerge in Athens. 
As the end is also the completion of something, the fact that 
philosophy emerged after the other arts clearly shows that it is the 
quintessential art, fully completing all the individual arts. 
So we can witness Aristotle’s conception of time becoming 
consolidated and, in so doing, moving further away from Plato. The 
time of the soul correlates to that of the body. This necessarily leads to 
the idea that cyclical time is no longer present. This becomes the 
fundamental idea of Aristotle’s ethical edifice. We must understand 
that this is all made possible solely by the presence of the body, which 
supports the cultural timespan in which, as we shall see, the habitual 
(éthos: ethical) aspect of human beings can emerge. The whole 
conception is wrapped in a primary, fundamental respect for human 
life, which is part of overall biological life including animals and 
plants.83 From this, it becomes clear that Aristotle locates the human 
condition in the interval between birth and death, which is the span of 
a possible ethics. But more importantly, it is the end that governs the 
unfolding of the temporal series. This is true of both human time, 
which relates to the body, and history, as shown by the status of 
philsophy itself. The greatest degree of perfection necessarily comes 
at the end, which is why philosophy is indisputably the quintessential 
art. In sum, the “end” is the completion of all things. From this 
starting point it is apparent that, while this philosophy is an argument 
for temporal continuity culminating in Aristotle’s concept of habit in 
his Ethics, analysis of the “end” that governs all this temporality will 
                                                 
82 This ideal of autarchy, which was conveyed by the primarily Athenian culture, 
finds perfect expression in a passage from the Politics: “Besides, the final cause and 
end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best”, I, 2, 1252b 
8, trans. Barnes. 
83 In this regard it is noteworthy that when Aristotle analyses the political domain 
he uses the term zôon politikon, the animal of his Politics, the man in the city, and so 
remains anchored in the biological dimension, which human beings share with the 
other species of Nature, Nichomachean Ethics, I, 5, 1097b 11, IX, 9, 1169b 18, VIII, 
14, 1162a 17-18, Eudemian Ethics, VII, 10, 1242a 22-23; Politics, I, 2, 1253a 7-8. 
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plunge us back into eternity.84 While, etymologically speaking, the 
Greek term “entelechy” (en-tel-echia) signifies “that which possesses 
the end”, its meaning will still be impossible to determine if we do not 
know which “end” (télos) Aristotle is arguing for here. So analysis of 
Aristotle’s concept of time must necessarily involve a fundamental 
understanding of the concept of entelechy, and this conception itself 
will necessarily be dependent on the envisaged end. Given the scope 
of these questions, we shall try to contain them within the context of a 
historical analysis. Such is the justification for the present study. Why 
not begin with an analysis of Aristotle’s concepts? Because Aristotle 
was first and foremost a great witness to his times and a great 
historian. All his concepts thus have profound historical and social 
dimensions. To sidestep these aspects would be to view his work only 
in terms of logic and connotation. But as most commentators have 
noted, Aristotle is a philosophical realist. So we need to “realise” his 
concept of time or, as modern linguistics has it, “denote” it within his 
world. 
  
But let us now return to the questions we have sought to discuss on the 
basis of the Protrepticus. We have identified a conception of time that 
differs radically from the one we presented in the previous section. 
The time of the philosopher’s soul is no longer set in train by an 
earlier knowledge; eternity appears at the end of the course of human 
life. The whole is consubstantial with temporal completion. This is 
why the vision of a certain totality, the Good that is correlative with 
happiness and supreme wisdom, can be acquired only after a long 
journey through human time. True wisdom is thus necessarily 
consubstantial with old age. However, the following questions remain: 
                                                 
84 The establishment in the Protrepticus of the twin terms “capacity” and “activity”, 
which together form the concept of “entelechy”, is not a thesis we have projected 
onto the text for the purposes of argument. It becomes even clearer if we accord the 
following fragment its proper value: “Thus this is what it is to use anything: if the 
capacity is for a single thing, when someone is doing this very thing, and if the 
capacity is for a number of things, when he is doing the best of them; for example, 
with flutes, one uses them either only when playing the flute, or most of all then, as 
its other uses are presumably also for the sake of this. Thus one should say that 
someone who uses a thing correctly is using it more, for the natural objective and 
mode of use belong to someone who uses a thing in a beautiful and precise way.” 
Hutchinson and Johnson, p 56, Iamblichus XI, 57.23-58.3. See also # 75. “The word 
‘living’ seems to mean two things, one with reference to a capacity and the other 
with reference to an activity.” p. 55. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH INTO PRE-ARISTOTELIAN TIME  
 47 
what is the relationship of this end to the continuous movement of 
time? How should we understand the concept of entelechy in relation 
to human lives? Is the human soul engaged in time? Is there a future 
for human beings in the world they are part of? Can we really speak of 
an abstract future, as though there were some kind of world soul? In 
other words, how will Aristotle explain time, and notably its 
continuity, on the basis of the premises set out in his Protrepticus? 
 
In the next part we propose to clarify the division we have used in this 
commentary. On the one hand is an initiatory time for which Plato 
argues. This time is circular, like the movement of the stars in their 
sphere. It is the circularity of this time that guarantees its permanence, 
in other words its continuity. On the other hand Aristotle can be seen 
as the first philosopher to formulate a strictly philsophical conception 
of time. This being so, can we identify the sources of his analysis? 
What notions did Aristotle borrow in order to form this concept of 
time? Is his intuition philosophical, theological, or poetic? In the first 
instance we shall seek to flesh out the Greek notion of time through a 
historico-sociological approach, in order to identify Aristotle’s 
sources. In so doing we shall adopt the methodology proposed by 
Schuhl, in whose view:85 
To give the thought of the philosophers of a particular country and 
time its full value, we must first be able to relate it to its preceding 
periods and relocate it in the social milieus within which it developed. 
We should note that the historico-sociological method as developed 
by Schuhl should not be confused with the historico-comparative 
method used in philology, the ashes of which provided Saussure with 
the terrain on which to build modern linguistics. Far from constituting 
any kind of conceptual determinism, this method simply reveals the 
conditioning affecting conceptual functioning while also providing the 
a priori conditions if its existence.86 
We shall start by considering conceptions of time in the work of the 
epic and tragic poets. We shall then analyse circular time in Hesiod’s 
                                                 
85 See the Preface to Schuhl’s doctoral thesis, published as Essai sur la formation 
de la pensée grecque…, op. cit., p. XI. 
86 However, what these two conceptions have in common is a refusal to use 
language as the starting point to conceive the concept. Saussure would say: “starting 
from words in defining things is a bad procedure”, Course in General Linguistics, 
Wade Buskin trans., Perry Meisel and Haun Saussy (eds.), Columbia University 
Press, 1959, p. 14. 
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mythology and in Orphic theophany. Finally we shall leave circular 
time behind to discuss the Ionian heritage in Aristotle’s thought. We 
shall also consider Plato’s approach to time, to the extent that it can be 
disentangled from the mythological thinking to which it seems 
irreversibly bound. We shall then see Aristotelian time gradually 
emerging from its cultural environment and historical heritage, before 
analysing it in more detail in our next book. However, we should not 
be too hasty in separating history from philosophical modeling since, 
as we shall see, most of the questions posed in the historico-
sociological approach will return at the philosophical and 
metaphyiscal levels. Metaphysics always moves from the conceptual 
back to the real. This is why, for example, at the ethical level Aristotle 
is also fascinated by proverbs. More logically, our historico-
sociological approach will provide a conceptual framework for our 
investigation, a set of possibilities that will then be reduced in a 
scientific manner in order to isolate our key concept of entelechy. Let 
us repeat, the concept of entelechy is the nub of the conception of time 
in Aristotle’s philosophy; it is the sun, to use a heliocentric metaphor, 
or the earth if we follow other models. 
Having rooted our discussion in the corpus with a commentary 
on the Protrepticus, Aristotle’s first text, we can now contextualise it 
within his sociological and historical environment. In so doing, we 
will refer to several of Aristotle’s minor texts, their historical accounts 
providing us with milestones on our philosophical journey. 
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With Greece we reach one of the points at which a break occurs 
in the circle to which humanity so often falls prisoner. 
Pierre-Maxime Schuhl87 
 
 
Ancient and classical Greece had a circular conception of time, or so 
states the doxa passed on by all the Germanic philosophers and others. 
Into our own century and for reasons that remain obscure, these 
thinkers have all insisted that time in the Greek tradition was circular, 
basing their view on either Plato or the Pre-Platonics. Immanuel Kant 
alone escaped this extraordinary mistake in his rigorously argued 
approach to time, and perhaps also Søren Aabye Kierkegaard, who 
avoided it by returning to the foundations of Christianity.88 The same 
cannot be said of Kant’s successors, including Hegel with the circular 
phases of his Phenomenology of Mind,89 Nietzsche with his myth of 
the eternal return90 and Martin Heidegger with the circularity of his 
concept of Dasein.91 Since the establishment of German ideology, 
                                                 
87 Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque. Introduction historique à une étude 
de la philosophie platonicienne, PUF, 1949, p. 66. 
88 The philosophy of Søren Aabye Kierkegaard is free of ideology, which is why no 
circular time is to be found in his thought, any more than the ideology of a return to 
the Greek ideal.  
89 Having read with great interest Christophe Bouton’s Temps et Esprit dans la 
philosophie de Hegel de Francfort à Ièna, published in 2000 by Vrin, it seems to us 
that Hegel’s theory of time owes more to Judeo-Christian eschatology than to an 
Ionian theory of time. However, this view is tempered when we recall that the young 
Hegel wrote his doctoral thesis on astronomy (Philosophical Dissertation on the 
Orbits of the Planets, Pierre Adler trans., Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal vol. 
12, 1/2 1987). Before drawing hasty conclusions about Hegel’s ideas, we should 
determine whether the astronomical models he studied offered him a temporal model 
that could enable him to leave behind the Christian eschatology to which he was so 
devastatingly bound. 
90 We shall return to this model in the course of the present work. 
91 On Martin Heidegger, see paragraph 63 of Being and Time in which he asserts 
and indeed confesses, “To deny the circle, to make a secret of it, or even to wish to 
overcome it means to anchor this misunderstanding once and for all. Rather, our 
attempt must aim at leaping into this “circle” primordially and completely, so that 
even at the beginning of our analysis of Dasein we make sure that we have a 
complete view of the circular being of Dasein.” Joan Stambaugh trans., revised by 
Dennis J. Schmidt, State University of New York Press, 2010, pp. 301-302. The 
circularity of Dasein underpins Heidegger’s theology. In his book Heidegger, 
Aristote, Luther. Les sources aristotéliciennes et néo-testamentaires d’Etre et temps 
(Vrin, 2005) Christian Sommer offers a perfect analysis of the meaning of this 
position: “Between the starting point (sin) and endpoint (perfection), only the three 
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there has been an underlying thesis suggesting that Greek time was 
circular. And it is through this return to the Greek ideal that the proof 
of circularity is provided. Under cover of conceptual innovation, these 
philosophies in fact envelop time in a mythology of the Platonic type. 
As the present work is not a study of German philosophy, we shall 
simply note that this circular conception of time, said to have its 
origins in the Greek tradition, or projected onto this tradition for 
religious or ideological reasons, is really the starting point for a 
conception that cannot be reconciled with reason, since reason always 
makes room for succession, as Kant so clearly shows in his Critique of 
Pure Reason.92 
Kant’s rationality runs counter to the Germanic ideology. We need 
to return to the Greek sources in order to permanently distance 
ourselves from the Germanic ideology inherent in Hegel, Nietzsche 
and, above all, Heidegger. 
So we shall ask the following question: was Greek time circular? 
We shall not claim to give a definitive answer. However, if the 
discussions that follow can shed a little light and provide a few 
rational outlines of the notion itself, we shall feel the right 
groundwork has been done for something we shall not touch on at all 
                                                                                                                   
terms fiera (justification) /esse (justice) /agere (good works) properly constitute 
progression, a circular movement, a sempiternal circuit (currunt semper). The 
Christian moves from sin to justice, from spiritual non-being (non esse in spiritu) to 
spiritual being (esse in spiritu), through justification, and this justification is his 
spiritual destiny (fiera spiritu)” p. 58. The end of this work even suggests an exit 
worthy of this philosophy. How are “sin”, “anxiety” and “worry” to be escaped? 
Simply by reading St Augustine: “Let us look more closely with St Augustine 1 at 
John IV, 18, ‘There is no fear in love’, and the continuation of this verse, which 
Heidegger did not cite, ‘But perfect love casteth out fear.’ Fear is an introduction to 
love: ‘Fear prepares a place for charity. But when once charity has begun to inhabit, 
the fear which prepared the place for it is cast out’, p. 270. It is by charity that we 
free ourselves from fear and this also means that time seems to open up before us, in 
what we call the future. Cf. also André Comte-Sponville, L’être-temps, PUF, 1999, 
p. 98: “Here we must lift Heidegger’s prohibition, free ourselves of fear and anxiety 
and return to the Greeks, to ousia as presence and to the parousia of the world: being 
is being present and there is nothing else.”  
92 It is precisely this succession that entails the notion of numerical series in Kant’s 
reasoning: “Time is in itself a series (and the formal condition of all series), and 
hence, in relation to a given present, we must distinguish a priori in it the 
antecedentia as conditions (time past) from the consequentia (time future)”, The 
Critique of Pure Reason, trans. J.M.D. Meiklejohn,  
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/4280/4280-h/4280-h.htm. 
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in the rest of our work, which is the religious conception of the 
circularity of time. We shall, moreover, provide the rational proof of 
this illusion only in the theoretical section, in the context of a 
commentary on Aristotle’s Physics. We shall seek to follow 
Aristotle’s argument that while a conception of the heavens may be 
circular insofar as the heavens have no awareness, such a conception 
cannot be applied to human time, since human awareness cannot 
accept that a future moment passes through the present into the past 
(or conversely), thereby forming a circle or cycle; otherwise we would 
be obliged to accept the co-existence of two present moments, which 
is impossible.93 Analogy with the time of the heavens (Ouranos) to 
describe the movement of the time of the soul is thus a dangerous 
illusion for an understanding of human lives. But we shall leave 
theory and this Parmenidian argument aside for now and review the 
philosophical tradition. Was the time of the Greek tradition circular, or 
are we in the presence of a transcendental illusion fostered by 
religions through doctrines of emanation? Let us start by considering 
the poetic register with a brief discussion of the tragic authors and the 
work of Homer. 
 
a .  O n  f a t e ,  o r  t r a g i c  p o e t r y  a s  a  t e c h n i q u e  f o r  
v e i l i n g  t i m e .  
 
The first suspicion in this regard appears in the work of the Hellenist 
Jacqueline de Romilly, who, in her important Le temps dans la 
tragédie grecque, suggests the need for circumspection in relation to 
this old chestnut of academic philosophy:94 
It is generally agreed that the Ancient Greeks favoured that which 
remains over that which changes, permanence over evolution. They 
have readily been attributed with doctrines such as those of cyclical 
                                                 
93 In a lecture given at the École Polytechnique on 11 May 2006, the physicist 
Etienne Klein used the same argument to account for this impossibility. He backed 
up his thesis with the following demonstration: for there to be a second circle that 
remains the first, the sine qua non of the notion of return, the system in question 
would have to have forgotten the first circle in order to undertake a new curve. This 
argument is pertinent, as we shall see that the question of forgetting is an important 
aspect of Pythagoreanism, which also maintains that time is circular. The issue of 
forgetting is to universal time what privation (steresis) is to physical time.   
94 Jacqueline de Romilly, Le temps dans la tragédie grecque, Vrin, 1995, (1971), 
pp. 26-27. 
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time and the eternal return. This aspect has been greatly exaggerated. 
However, it is true that they liked the idea of an orderly cosmos or 
universe, in which time presided over regular alternation, rather than 
open-ended progress or perpetual transformation. For them time was 
something of a threat. It was not an evolution they wanted to be part 
of.  
In support of her thesis Romilly revisits the works of the tragic poets 
(Aeschylus, Euripides, Sophocles), leading rapidly to a strange 
observation: time seems to be completely absent from the work of the 
poets. Neither divine nor objective, and still les sacred, time seems to 
be a floating notion, to which each poet strives to give form. 
Observing this, Romilly suggests:95 
Time did not exist in the Greek tradition. The Orphic poets may have 
been the first to give it a place. But in the literary works that have 
survived to this day, we can see that, as the importance of time is 
discovered and grows, each poet is led to give it ever more personal, 
living features.  
We shall shortly undertake an analysis in greater depth to see whether 
there was indeed an Orphic influence on the Greek model of time. On 
the other hand, we should like to add a few details to the idea that all 
the tragic poets developed a subjective, singular conception of time. 
From the works that have been preserved96 it does seem that none of 
these bards developed an objective, let alone circular conception of 
time, or took for themselves the lion’s share.97 Let us begin with a few 
                                                 
95 Romilly, Le temps dans la tragédie grecque, p. 41. 
96 We should note that out of almost a thousand literary works composed by the 
tragic poets, only 32 have been preserved. For example, Sophocles wrote 123 works, 
but is known through only seven of his tragedies. This led Goethe to say, in his 
writings on art, “How little of what has happened has been written [and] how little 
of what has been written has been saved!” So we need to be cautious in attributing 
any one conception to any particular bard or rhapsode. 
97 There is a priori no relationship between time and the figure of the lion in the 
Greek world other than that influenced by later Mithraism. However, time does 
appear in the form of a lion in many representations, which seem to have Mithraic 
and Iranian sources. Brisson suggests: “Following Jørgen Zoega, Franz Cumont saw 
a personification of Time in the lion-headed divinity who may even have been called 
Aïon (“Saeculum”), a name frequently given to him by modern specialists. Then, 
going back from Mithraism to its Iranian sources, he also adopted the hypothesis 
that this Mithraic divinity was a replica of the Iranian Zurvan Akarana (“boundless 
time”).” in “La figure de chronos dans la théogonie orphique et ses antécédents 
iraniens”, art. cit., p. 47. 
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pieces of the remarkable intersubjective mosaic that is time as told by 
the tragic bards. Sophocles, in his play Electra, observes:98 
Time is god who makes rough ways smooth. 
And in his Ajax:99 
All things the long and countless elapse of time / Brings forth, 
displays, then hides once more in gloom […] From her weary round 
doth Night withdraw / That Day’s white steeds may kindle heaven 
with light […] Sleep that masters all, / Binds life awhile, yet loosens 
soon the bond. 
A little later in Ajax we find:100 
Mighty is time to dwindle all things. 
Meanwhile Euripides, said to be the most tragic poet, says in his play 
Bellerophon101 that Time “from no Father springs”, personifies it as 
“Father Time” in his Suppliants102 and, in Heracles, speaks of its 
“onward roll”. But this fragment also suggests that for Euripides: 103 
Time recks little of preserving our hopes; and when he has busied 
himself on his own business, away he flies. 
Lastly the following fragment is also attributed to him:104 
In an unbroken movement Time tirelessly pursues its eternal course, 
engendering itself. 
Meanwhile Pindar accepts that time is “father of all”105 and crucially 
attributes it with the important function of being,106 
...alone in truly testing Truth. 
Solon, who was also a great poet, similarly counts on time to “reveal 
truth”. Lastly, and in the same way, Theognis declares that time is:107 
...made of light 
What does this mean? Simply that each poet looks at time in his own 
way and seeks to give it a definition that fits the situation in his 
narrative. Time appears in situ, adapted to the characters and at the 
                                                 
98 Sophocles, Electra, l. 179, trans. R.C. Jebb. 
99 Sophocles, Ajax, ll. 646-647, trans. R.C. Trevelyan.  
100 id, 668-673.  
101 Euripides, Bellerophon, l. 303. 
102 Euripides, The Suppliants, l. 787. 
103 Euripides, Heracles, ll. 670, trans. E.P. Coleridge. 
104 Fragment of Pirithous attributed to Euripides and cited by Reynal Sorel, Orphée 
et l’orphisme, PUF, 1995, p. 49. See also the fragment attributed to Heraclitus, DK 
B1: “Time in his endless course Gives birth to endless days and nights”, Sophocles, 
Oedipus at Colonus, trans. F. Storr. 
105 Pindar, Olympian, II, ll. 17-19. 
106 Pindar Olympian, X, ll. 53-54. 
107 See also the fragments of Simonides of Ceos and Simonides of Amorgos cited 
by Schuhl, op. cit., p. 160. 
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right time (kairos). To use a Latin term, we can say that this time is 
the tempus of human beings, it is a singular time. Marcel Conche 
describes this very well in his discussion of Greek time:108 
For those who are “inside” time, it means having only a limited 
lifespan, a share of time. It is here too that, for the Greeks, the notion 
of “fate”  (from a word meaning “share”, “lot”, and , 
be allotted), originally meant that everyone has only a limited share of 
life, a share of time.  
In sum, it seems that it is impossible to theorise or objectify time109 
and, furthermore, that the objective, circular conception is unknown  
to Greek tragedy, or to the epic and, by extension, to the Greek doxa. 
Time seems consigned to subjectivity, or at least remains bound to the 
action of a subject in situ; it is a singular tempus.  
We can also return to Aristotle’s Poetics for a satisfying 
confirmation of this position. It is truly surprising to note that Aristotle 
does not discuss time at all in this work. It contains nothing that bears 
any relationship whatsoever to the notion. Here is a semantic analysis 
that gives no time whatever to time. If we accept, with Aristotle, that 
the purpose of poetry is pleasure, it is easy to understand that time has 
nothing to do with it.110 Pleasure is never deferred, it is instant and 
arranged in space, the spatiality of theatre that denies the temporality 
of the book.111 Indeed this is why a tragedy must remain within the 
frame of a single “circuit of the sun”112 in order to be staged. We 
should state that this single occurrence of time in the Poetics does not 
in fact separate the tragic genre from the epic, which does not have the 
same constraints of space and hence of time, as Victor Goldschmidt 
indicates:113 
The well known instruction (ignored throughout the rest of the 
treatise) concerning the revolution of the sun does not seek to describe 
the time of tragedy, which has its own measures that depend on the 
                                                 
108 Marcel Conche Temps et destin, De Mégare, 1980, p. 1. 
109 We know this was the view taken by Michel de Montaigne, a great reader of the 
Greek poets. Conche adds: “Montaigne perhaps follows Epicurus, who did not want 
time to be defined, saying, ‘We need not adopt any fresh terms as preferable’ (Letter 
to Herodotus §72); for the starting point for thought should be time itself, as it 
immediately and obviously appears (energia)”. Ibid., p. 9.  
110 Victor Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote, p. 220. 
111 Indeed Aristotle said, “It is with good reason, then, that they aim at pleasure too, 
since for everyone it completes life, which is desirable”. Nicomachean Ethics, X, 5, 
1175a 16-17, trans. Barnes. 
112 Aristotle, Poetics, 1449b, trans. Barnes. 
113 Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote, p. 346. 
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unity of action […] it simply serves to distinguish the ‘scope’ of 
tragedy from that of the epic poem.  
So in the Poetics, time seems constantly to be linked to space through 
the intermediary of action, which Aristotle regards as the driving force 
of the poetic genre. We could also suggest that in his discussion 
Aristotle misunderstands poetic activity, noticing only its technical 
aspect and so ignoring its true internal dimension.114 However, this 
would be to forget that he himself wrote a number of poems115 and 
that he devoted at least five books to the genre: the dialogue On Poets, 
Homeric Problems, Victories at the Dionysia, Didascaliae and the 
collection On Tragedies.116 More theoretically, we shall draw on the 
authoritative judgement of Goldschmidt, who devoted a particularly 
fine book to this subject. What Aristotle observed was that objective 
time is absent from the narrative structure of the poetic act, be it epic, 
tragic or comic, and this is how Goldschmidt communicates this 
surprising fact to us:117 
From here we could end by questioning the role of time in the Poetics. 
It has rightly been said that118 Aristotle gives no metaphysical 
foundation for time in poetry, while his treatment of time in the 
Physics (IV, 10-14) has no identifiable relationship to this question.  
So it must be accepted that this treatise can provide only elements of a 
response to a question which it never poses as such.  
We base the authority of our judgement on this work which, itself, 
finds authority in the work of Else, indicating that conviction always 
seems to arise out of collegiate agreement. There is a unanimous 
acknowledgement that time is absent from this text and this unanimity 
will serve as proof – at least we believe that this is enough for a 
particular belief to carry the day.119 Moreover, when dealing with the 
                                                 
114 In this passage we are responding to what seems to us a highly partial attack by 
Florence Dupont who, in her pamphlet Aristote ou le vampire du théâtre occidental 
(Aubier, 2007), suggests that Aristotle disembodied tragedy.   
115 The Hymn to Hermias shows that Aristotle was no novice as a poet. Cf. Jaeger, 
Aristotle…, pp. 116-117. It was this hymn that led to Aristotle’s condemnation at the 
end of his life.   
116 Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote, p. 400. 
117 Id. p. 407. 
118 Gerald F. Else, Aristotle’s poetics…, 1957, p. 575, n. 15, cited by Goldschmidt. 
119 Indeed in On the Soul III, 3, 428a 20-24, p. 681, Aristotle says, “But opinion 
involves belief (for without belief in what we opine we cannot have an opinion), and 
in the brutes though we often find imagination we never find belief. Further, every 
opinion is accompanied by belief, belief by conviction, and conviction by discourse 
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poetic register, we have decided not to use demonstration, in order to 
respect the material on which we are working. This said, we should 
add that at the end of his remarkable book on physical and poetic time 
in Aristotle’s work, Goldschmidt is brought up short by the following 
question: how is it possible that the category of time, which is so 
important to Aristotle, notably for an understanding of his Physics, is 
absent from literature? How can poetry, a genre so intimately linked to 
being, in which being writes of itself, neglect this dimension? So it 
comes as no surprise that Goldschmidt makes the same observation as 
Romilly concerning time in general and circular time in particular. 
There is no objective time in Greek thought, and no circular time 
either, to judge from the tragic genre:120 
Lastly, we can see that there is nothing here to support the 
commonplace view that the Ancients knew only “cyclical time”. 
Similarly, it is not the circle that conflicts with physical time, but the 
whole that Aristotle locates outside of time, which he has not 
explicitly linked to the infinite duration enjoyed by eternal beings, but 
which Plotinus calls eternity. That Hegel used this term in his own 
theory of time may attest to the fact that this is not an archaeological 
undertaking.   
What more is there to say? Except perhaps that this statement clearly 
sets out the investigation that we seek to pursue in the present 
discussion. Firstly, let us accept that there is no conception in Greek 
tragic poetry that supports the idea that time is circular. Secondly, let 
us note that, if we wish to consider time in Greek culture, this is not, 
as Goldschmidt so well says, “an archaeological undertaking”. It will 
be readily understood that the maintenance of the subjectivity of time 
within the poetic genre enabled each person to take his or her alotted 
time. So time can be seen as subjective, precisely in accord with the 
wish, always manifested by the poets, not to steal the other’s speech, 
not to strip others of their own time, but to give individuals their own 
alotted time. We can say that there is no theoretical model of time in 
Greek poetry since this would be part of the Greek cultural 
environment itself. And there does not seem to have been any 
objective time in this period, at least not as we understand it today.  
So it is important to stress that, if we accept that some kind of 
time does exist in Greek poetry, this is merely due to the projection of 
                                                                                                                   
of reason, while there are some of the brutes in which we find imagination, without 
discourse of reason.” 
120  Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote, p. 418. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH INTO PRE-ARISTOTELIAN TIME  
 59 
our current conceptions onto that poetry; the greatest mistake remains 
the confusion of western monotheism with Greek polytheism. In the 
polytheist Greek religious conception, all individuals had their own 
time marked out by the cycle of nature; so everyone was free to have 
their own conception of time which, however summary, was 
appropriate to their individual lives. Conversely, monotheism implies 
that all individual tempera are subject to an objective time, a divine 
Chronos.121 Olivier Boulnois, introducing the famous canonic 
Sentences of Peter Lombard, repeats the mediaeval monk’s statement 
dating from the end of his noviciate, describing the coupling of the 
Christian God with objective time. God is presented as bound to time, 
emasculating all its attributes and blocking any development:122 
In his wisdom he locks up, fixes and perpetually holds back all time, 
past, present and future, undergoing neither the coming of anything 
new nor the passing of anything past. 
So the divine kronos of Christianity requires all individual human 
tempera to be subject to it and the construction of an objective time to 
represent it (clocks, calendars of the saints, the ringing of bells) 
becomes inevitable. In order to mask Greek polytheism, Hegel based 
his Christian God on the figure of Cronos, repeating the attempt at the 
fusion of monotheism and polytheism made by the Neoplatonists.123 
This process of unification seems to have started with Cicero (106–43 
BCE), with his research on Saturn related to Hesiod’s Cronos and the 
                                                 
121 Olivier Boulnois, La puissance et son ombre de Pierre Lombard à Luther, 
Aubier, 1994, p. 27: “Becoming is external to God”. This is why St Thomas Aquinas 
created a new median time, the aevum, which measures that which never changes in 
a being. Aquinas said, “The aevum differs from both time and eternity, as something 
existing in between the other two”. This conception explains what is permanent in 
creatures – what is sub specie aeternatis, as Baruch Spinoza later put it. Summa 
Theologiae I, q. 10, art.5, see also art. 4. 
122 Peter Lombard, Sentences, distinction 42, 618 D, cited by Boulnois, op. cit. p. 
27. From the 13th century throughout the Middle Ages, these sentences served as an 
introduction to theology for all monks in all orders. St Bonaventure (Franciscan) and 
St Thomas Aquinas (Dominican) were obliged to submit to them, William of 
Ockham was labelled a heretic on the basis of his commentary the Ordinatio, and 
then there was Luther… The objective nature of time had to be admitted, on pain of 
excommunication – a lesson not forgotten by Hegel and his friends from the 
Tübingen seminary. See also Giambattista Vico, The New Science, trans. Dave 
Marsh, Penguin, 2000; French ed. La Science Nouvelle, trans. Christina Trivulzio, 
Gallimard, 1993, p. 73. 
123 Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote…, p. 86. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 60 
 
temporal Chronos.124 We should also note that the term polytheism 
itself seems to have been invented by Philo of Alexandria (13 BCE–
54 CE) and that the Latin authors do not seem to have believed that 
the Greeks were polytheists. Seneca (55 BCE–39 CE), for example, 
claims this was all twaddle.125 Yet, if that were true, how could they 
have read and understood the work of Homer and, more specifically 
for us, tragic poetry? These initial points remind us not to project onto 
this study our own conception of time, which is totally incompatible 
with the Greek vision. There is nothing in Greek tragedy to support 
the hypothesis of objective time, comparable to that later adopted by 
Christianity, still less that time might be circular in nature. 
The one notion to shed light on our investigation is that of moïra 
or fate, which seems to maintain a tenuous relationship with the tragic 
genre. For if the notion of time seems absent from tragedy, this is 
because it has not yet been disentangled from that of fate, out of which 
it later emerged. At least so Aeschylus says in his Prometheus 
Bound:126 
Chorus:  For I am of good hope that from these bonds escaped, 
Thou shalt one day be mightier than Zeus.  
Prometheus: Fate, that brings all things to an end, not thus 
Apportioneth my lot: ten thousand pangs 
 Must bow, ten thousand miseries afflict me 
 Ere from these bonds I freedom find, for Art 
 Is by much weaker than Necessity. 
Chorus: Who is the pilot of Necessity? 
Prometheus:  The Fates triform, and the unforgetting Furies. 
At the political level, not taking another person’s alotted time is the 
first act of sharing that enables people to live together – the isonomia 
underpinning Athenian democracy. It seems time can unfold only 
once human beings have accepted their own lot and linked it to the lot 
of others in trying to live together. However, this approach still seems 
to lack coherence. If time is hidden from human beings, veiled by the 
Gods, how a common fate can be shared? Some kind of time must be 
                                                 
124 Cicero, De la nature des dieux, II, XXIII, XXVIII & II, XXIV-XXV, French 
trans. E. Bréhier, in Les Stoïciens, La Pléiade, 1962, notably pp. 431-432. 
125 Seneca, De beneficiis, IV, 7. 
126 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, ll. 510-520, trans. G.M. Cookson. See also Jean 
Frere’s article ”Avenir et moïra: d’Homère à Platon“, in L’avenir, actes du congrès 
de l’association des Sociétés de philosophie en langue française, Vrin, 1987, pp. 
181-185, p.184. Frere cites a passage from the Eumenides, “For all-seeing Zeus and 
Fate herself have worked together for this ending”, vv. 1045-1047, p. 184. 
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manifested somewhere in a tragedy so that the fate of the actors can be 
shared. There are twists and turns that unveil time’s existence, but it 
seems characteristic of tragedy always to mask it. In describing these 
secret twists and turns, Françoise Létoublon finds a possible time in 
the tragedies of Aeschylus. She describes this hidden, secret time in 
her analysis of Prometheus Bound:127 
These twists and turns, implying Prometheus’s control of future time 
in the play’s dramatic economy, highlight the depth of this theme in 
the play. It is a reference to the secret that Prometheus holds, the name 
of the person who may dethrone Zeus in the future, the action of 
another that may one day end his power. The revelation of this other’s 
name may give Zeus the means to avoid such an outcome and 
Prometheus’s weapon, which gives him the power of time, is this 
hidden name, the silence that holds the future in reserve (515-525). 
Time is hidden because a part of it, the future, cannot be revealed to 
human beings. As the future belongs to the gods, time must remain 
hidden. Fate can exist only if time belongs to a different sphere from 
that of human beings – the sphere of the gods. But are silence and 
witholding speech the only ways to conceal time? Not quite. There is 
a time that goes to ground in tragedy and does not manage to 
dominate the space of human lives. However, modes of veiling are 
also modes of unveiling and nominalism cannot be the only access to 
the time revealed to human beings. It was only after reading Jules 
Vuillemin’s book Eléments de poétique that we were able to glimpse a 
possible access to tragic time.128 If the conceptions of tragic time are 
embryonic, they must necessarily be present in the infinitely small, in 
the analysis of signs. Without returning to the mediaeval doctrine of 
signatures dear to Michel Foucault, Vuillemin proposes, notably on 
the basis of a passage from Euripides’s Electra (“What sign have you 
seen, she asks the Old Man, that I can believe in?”), that the sign, in 
its three forms (natural, agreed and arbitrary),129 allows human beings 
to recognise each other and, we would also add, to understand that 
they belong to a community of fate. If a natural sign (such as a scar) 
enables physical recognition, agreed, arbitrary signs enable cultural 
                                                 
127 Françoise Létoublon, “Les paradoxes du Prométhée”, Sileno (Jan-Dec 1986), 
1987, p. 21; cited by Vuillemin, op. cit., following page, p. 51. 
128 Jules Vuillemin, Eléments de Poétique, Vrin, 1991, chap. 1, part 1, “La 
reconnaissance dans l’épopée et dans la tragédie (Aristote, Poétique, chap. XVI)”, 
pp. 29-40. 
129 ibid., p. 33. 
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recognition.130 The gods address human beings in signs and it is by 
reading those signs that human beings can agree on a common time, a 
community of fate. Singular times can then be projected into the 
future on the basis of the collegiate time of the community. In Greek 
tragedy the future and time are always understood through the 
category of the Other. The presence of the other indicates that I am 
unquestionably in some kind of time. 
 Lastly, to seek to characterise the time of tragedy would be to 
usurp the knowledge of the gods. As the gods alone have mastery of 
time, it is impossible to know whether it was linear or circular. This 
does not mean that time and the future cannot be conceptualised. 
Aristotle even secretly sought to make doing so into a science – at 
least this is what is revealed by a passage in his Of Memory and 
Recollection:131 
Now to remember what is future is not possible – that is an object of 
opinion or expectation (and indeed there might be actually a science 
of expectation, like that of divination, in which some believe). 
This simply means that Greek tragedy uses technique to conceal time 
from human beings. The tragic poets may have lacked a science of 
expectation, but they were masters of the technique of expectation, 
made possible only by an initial veiling of time. “The seeds of all the 
elements of a complex tragedy are there” as Vuillemin repeated.132 So 
this is not a genre in which any rational conception of time will be 
found. It is even less likely that we will uncover a circular time within 
it, since the role of tragedy is, once again, to veil time. Only the gods 
know what is going to happen and it is on the basis of this initial 
knowledge that they then rearrange the course of human lives, usually 
through the intercession of the chorus. In the tragic context, we 
certainly do not agree with Xenophanes that,133 
The gods have not revealed to mortals all things from the beginning; 
but mortals by long seeking discover what is better. 
We shall now turn to the epic poetry of Homer to analyse the circular 
time that we have noted as absent from tragedy. 
 
 
                                                 
130 Cf. Saussure, op. cit., p. 67, “I call the combination of a concept and a sound-
image a sign”. 
131 Aristotle, On Memory 449b 10-11, trans. Barnes, p. 714. 
132 Jules Vuillemin, Eléments de poétique, op. cit., p. 53.  
133 Xenophanes, fragment B 18, trans. Kathleen Freeman.  
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b .  O n  t h e  h e r o ,  o r  e p i c  p o e t r y  a s  a  t e c h n i q u e  
f o r  u n v e i l i n g  t i m e .   
 
Where Homer’s epic poetry is concerned it must be noted at the outset 
that an objective, analytical conception of time is completely absent 
from both the Iliad and Odyssey. Myth is set in illo tempore and does 
without time, following with the schema posited by Mircéa Eliade:134 
As Moses Finley, with his great knowledge of the society of Ithaca 
and the Homeric world, observed in his day, there is nothing in the 
poems that has a historical dimension. Everything is timeless, as in 
fables where everything happens “once upon a time”. Even when the 
characters meet again after twenty years, Ulysses and Penelope are the 
same, physically and in their feelings.  
We should note that the Odyssey is an epic narrative generally 
attributed to Homer. However, there is a problem here. We now know 
that the expedition of the Achaeans and the Aeolians against Troy 
really happened and can be situated in the period 1193–1184 BCE.135 
We also know that Homer was a bard who really existed and lived in 
the 8th century BCE. So almost five centuries had elapsed between the 
real expedition and Homer’s account of it. It can thus be hypothesised 
that, for nearly five hundred years, this story was handed on orally by 
many different bards, in very different versions, before Homer gave it 
its finest oral form. After this the Homeric version became dominant 
and continued to be passed on orally, since Homer did not commit 
either the Iliad or the Odyssey to writing. The first edition of Homer’s 
poems was commissioned by the tyrant Peisistratus (600–528). We 
know that with the help of his son Hipparchus, Peisistratus set up a 
commission with the task of recording Homer’s lines in written form. 
A first edition was put together and held in the first public library in 
Athens. Other, fairly disparate versions were later found in papyrus 
form in the great library of Alexandria, where the Greek poets were 
exiled in Aristotle’s day, after being driven from Athens by Plato the 
                                                 
134 Mircea Eliade, Le mythe de l’éternel retour, Gallimard, 1969, p. 139. See also 
Moses L. Finley, The use and abuse of history. London, 1975, pp. 14-16, cited by 
Eva Cantarella, “Introduction à l’Odyssée”, in Odyssée, Les belles lettres, I, 2001, p. 
XVIII. For a more in-depth exploration of this issue, see Vidal-Naquet, “Temps des 
dieux et temps des hommes”, Revue d’histoire des religions, 1960, p. 55 ff. 
135 Gilbert Bouchard, L’Odyssée d’Homère, Introduction, Société des Ecrivains, 
2001. 
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ideologue.136 The Homeric narratives were prescribed reading for all 
young Athenians and later for all Greeks, leading Hegel to say, very 
rightly, after Thucydides:137 
Homer is the element in which the Greek world lives, as man does in 
the air. 
Which is a poetic return to Plato’s famous words:138 
Homer must be regarded as the Prince of tragedy. 
These things provide the justification for our focus on Homer’s poetry 
in seeking to understand Greek time. At the end of the present 
development we shall see that this legacy is later assimilated by 
Aristotle into his theory of time. 
Let us begin by considering narrative structure. The myth of 
the Odyssey (which begins with Odysseus’s departure from Ithaca for 
Troy), narrated in the Iliad and the Odyssey, in fact describes only 
Odysseus’s return to his home country. There is no account of the 
outward journey made by the formidable band of men who set off 
from the Peloponnese peninsula for the shore where Troy stood, just a 
few snatches of stories that appear in the narrative of the return. Why 
did Homer omit, or regard as undeserving of song, the outward 
journey to Troy? Here is an indication that the story of Odysseus is a 
mythical narrative of the eternal return, a nostos (νόστος) in the ancient 
form identified by Eliade. And once again, the eternal return is not 
circular in form since – like that of the Argonauts139 and imaginary 
though it may be – the voyage of Odysseus’ ship in the Mediterranean 
basin in no way ressembles a circular ripple in the water. So this myth 
of eternal return is a founding myth – the first of a culture seeking 
awareness of its own foundation. And, de facto, we shall see that the 
time we find in it is in no way specific to Greek culture.  So what kind 
                                                 
136 The text was probably later reworked to create yet more different versions. 
Grammarians such as Zenodotus of Ephesus (320–240 BCE), Aristophanes of 
Byzantium and Aristarchus of Samothrace (220–143 BCE) worked on this text in 
order to standardise it. Lastly, it is likely that the most stable version is the work of 
Aristarchus. 
137 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree, 1900. 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/hi/lectures2.htm 
For Thucydides, see Vuillemin op. cit., p. 83. 
138 Plato, The Republic, X, 598d 9.  
139 Cf. Apollonius of Rhodes, Argonautica, trans. R.C. Seaton, Simon & Brown 
2013, and The Orphic Argonautica, trans. Jason Colavito, Jason Colavito, 2011.  
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of time are we dealing with in the Odyssey as related in Homer’s Iliad 
and Odyssey? Piétro Pucci suggests:140 
The time of the return, though it has the rhythms of conventional 
human temporality, is overlaid with divine temporality, set in an 
almost immemorial past. In almost all the places visted by Odysseus 
during his voyage, his arrival has been previously announced by the 
divine oracle […] But, aside from these particularities, the return of 
Odysseus himself is announced many times and predicted by Tiresias 
and Theoclymenus and is ratified by Zeus himself.  
Homer’s narratives stage a continual struggle between heroic figures 
and divine will. Every event is subject to divine will, to the boulê 
(deliberation) of Zeus, who has made it possible and to whom every 
outcome is known in advance. As Achilles says in the Iliad:141 
The will of Zeus was moving towards its end. 
So Zeus controls what could be called “history” from beginning to 
end; there is a plan, and that plan is unavoidable. It is undoubtedly 
present in Homer’s work. Next, while the signified of the narrative is 
timeless (the characters Odysseus and Penelope do not age in a 
narrative spanning twenty years), the signifier is organised by Zeus’s 
plan into an equally timeless chain, punctuated by the interventions of 
the gods, which alternate with human actions to form a pattern. In 
both cases, time in the form of temporal continuity handed to human 
beings is absent. Human beings, notably the hero, merely slow down 
events that will happen anyway – not necessarily, since reason is not 
involved here, but inevitably.  
However, there is nothing circular about this conception. To 
make it so would be to confuse Greek fate, which is subject to the will 
of Zeus, with the circular destiny of the Stoics. It is often difficult to 
grasp the difference between these two visions of divinely fixed, 
sacred time. We shall follow the interpretation proposed by Conche:142  
                                                 
140 Pietro Pucci, “Le cadre temporel de la volonté divine chez Homère”, in 
Constructions du temps dans le monde grec ancien, pp. 33-48, p. 45. 
141 Homer, Iliad, I, 5, cited by Pietro Pucci, in “Le cadre temporel de la volonté 
divine chez Homère”, art. cit., p. 33, this English trans. Robert Fagles, Penguin, 
1992, p. 77. 
142 Conche, (op. cit., p. 34.) repeats the view expressed by Paul Mazon in 
“Introduction à l’Iliade”, Iliade, les Belles Lettres, p. 299. He finds the same 
distinction in Emile Brehier’s Histoire de la Philosophie I, p. 298, which he 
mentions “the Semitic idea of an omnipotent God governing the destiny of human 
beings and things, so different from the Hellenic conception” (cf. p. 32). For further 
discussion of these questions, see Barnes, “La doctrine de l’éternel retour”, in Les 
stoïciens et leur logique, Brunschwig (ed.), Paris, 1978, pp. 10-11. 
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The Stoics see things very differently. Their conception is more 
reminiscent of the fatalism of certain peoples in the Orient, which runs 
counter to every movement of Hellenic thought […]. The Greeks 
understood fate as a matter of fact rather than necessity.  
So how did that the fact that the Greeks were subject to Zeus’s plan – 
unable to escape it, as Homer’s work clearly illustrates – differ from 
the fatalistic destiny of the Orientals? It must be said that Conche 
hesitates several times to provide tangible proof, unless this is an 
interpretative resistance in his writing. He succumbs to a dualist 
reading of will, which is an attribute of both human beings and the 
gods. The dualism of this struggle then gives the Greeks a degree of 
freedom. For our part we do not believe that Zeus’s plan can have 
anything of the more or less about it; we do not believe that Zeus can 
or wants to delay his plan so that human plans can be fulfilled:143 
Floating above everything else is that which must be played out. But 
fate can wait. Zeus has the freedom to introduce delays and postpone 
completion. And in the fulfilment of Zeus’s plans human beings also 
have some freedom to introduce delays. 
In the first place, this thesis of René Schaerer’s adopted by Conche 
substitutes the one God of monotheism for the supreme God of 
polytheism. Secondly, it does not recognise the fact that heroes alone 
are given some latitude within which to act. Lastly, Conche speaks of 
“freedom” in somewhat Kantian terms, judging by his use of this 
concept coupled with that of will. Kantian freedom contrasts with 
necessity, but with what might freedom contrast in Homer’s work? 
The inevitable does not have to be necessary (ananké); again in our 
view to say it does is to adopt a Stoic position. In Homer’s framework, 
inevitability is unrelated to reason; that comes later when the notion 
was overlaid by that of justice, in Hesiod or even in the work of 
Heraclitus.144 Furthermore, since the supreme God (Zeus) is outside 
time, he cannot suspend his plans and set them in motion again. So we 
need to try to understand the fundamental difference that makes 
freedom possible within the framework of Greek polytheism, as 
                                                 
143 Ibid., p. 33. Cf. René Schaerer, L’homme antique et la structure du monde 
intérieur d’Homère à Socrate, from which he takes the following passage: “Man is 
free within divine frameworks, and the gods are free within the frameworks of fate”. 
But how could human freedom “delay the will of Zeus”? 
144 Jean Frere, “Avenir et moïra: d’Homère à Platon”, in L’avenir, actes du congrès 
de l’association des Sociétés de philosophie en langue française, Vrin, 1987, pp. 
181-185, p. 183. 
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opposed to monotheism.145 Let us also accept this initial conceptual 
clarification, which is possible only if we regard heuristics itself as 
possible (the future of knowledge for heuristics, the future of human 
beings for the content sought through heuristics).146  
We shall start by making the following observation. In both the 
Iliad and the Odyssey of the divine Homer, Zeus’s plan seems to 
shape the temporality of human lives in a variable manner. Why is 
this? Precisely because the gods do not always agree amongst 
themselves. In both Iliad and Odyssey, Poseidon does not always 
agree with Zeus (the son of Cronos) and Athena (daughter of Zeus) is 
often required to use diplomacy with Zeus the supreme God with 
regard to the fate of the Achaeans or Odysseus of the thousand 
ruses.147 It is this original polytheistic disagreement that underpins the 
unfolding of the narrative and the vicissitudes of the Achaeans in the 
Iliad and those of Odysseus in the Odyssey.148 Whereas, for 
monotheism, God decrees that his will be done on Earth as it is in 
Heaven, polytheism has the major advantage – for human beings – 
that the multiple (gods) require time to reach the one (the supreme 
God). So where does this time come from? It is simply the time that 
the gods take to agree. After this, like the one God of monotheism, the 
supreme God immediately implements his decree on the human stage. 
In practice, as this God is outside time, any decision implies action 
ipso facto; for the Olympian god it seems that something is no sooner 
said than done. Human beings meanwhile are subject to many 
different constraints, with the consequence that thought and action are 
                                                 
145 It is for these reasons that St Thomas Aquinas adopts the traditional angelology 
that had held pagan polytheism together, cf. Louis Rougier, “Le polythéisme païen 
et l'angélologie chrétienne”, appendix to his French translation of Celsus’s The True 
Word, Celse Contre les chrétiens, Copernic, 1977, p. 245. Aquinas was called the 
angelic doctor precisely because study of the angels finally and definitively silenced 
the problem of pagan polytheism in Greek thought.  
146 Cf. Plato Meno, 80d and 80e. Aristotle proposes the following analysis of this 
apparent aporia: “The puzzle in the Meno will result; for you will learn either 
nothing, or what you know.” Posterior Analytics A, 1, 71a 29-30, trans. Barnes, p. 
114. 
147 We should note that the Athenians did not take part in the Trojan War. The 
Athenian compilers cited cheated on this point, by adding their names to the list of 
combatants. 
148 In the Odyssey, Homer reveals the etymology of the Greek name Odusseus, cf. 
I, 67; V, 340, 423; XIX, 275. Apparently it is derived from odussomai, meaning “to 
get angry”. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 68 
 
never entirely at one. This distance between thought and action is 
properly human. It is an interval that gives space to reason in action. It 
is because there is time between reason and action that action can be 
reasonable, and indeed quite simply human. However, to remain 
within the framework of Homeric thinking, the possibility of 
disagreement between the gods gives human beings a possible interval 
of time, a gap in which the hero can use a thousand ruses. While all 
the hero’s actions are inevitably limited, the interval left by the gods 
as they negotiate obliges him to act as quickly as possible, at lightning 
speed, to use a metaphor for the tota simul of Zeus’s Acts of God. In 
sum, between the idea of a decree to be issued concerning a mortal 
and its implementation by the various gods, the hero knows that he 
has a small interval of time that his life will embody. In our view the 
notion of kairos is rooted in this context of Greek polytheism, and the 
coming of monotheism would sound its death knell.149 
Many have wondered about the disappearance of the concept of 
kairos from the history of philosophy.150 It has been seen as a 
consequence of the semantic shift of the term aîon from the Greek 
sense of “age”, “man’s life”, “posterity” to that of “eternity” for the 
Neoplatonists and Plotinus.151 This has been seen as an improper 
reversal of theological analysis152 when, according to the philosopher 
and member of the Athens Academy Evanghélos Moutsopoulos, the 
term  already had the meaning of “eternity” for the 
Pythagoreans.153 In short, we are saying that the time during which the 
gods are deliberating opens a temporal gap in which human time can 
                                                 
149 Evanghélos Moutsopoulos has also analysed time on the basis of the notion of 
interval, suggesting that in Aristotle’s work kairos is simply “goodness in time” in 
Variations sur le thème du kairos de Socrate à Denys, Vrin, 2002, p. 66 As an 
introduction to this notion, see Nichomachean Ethics, A4, 1096a 26 and Eudemian 
Ethics, A8, 1217b 32, 37, 38. 
150 André Mercier, “Discours de synthèse de l’entretien d’Athènes, 1986”, Chronos 
et kairos, Vrin, Institut international de philosophie, 1988, pp. 66-74. 
151 Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, PUF, 1982, p. 29.  
152 Lambros Couloubaritsis, “Le temps hénologique”, in Les figures du temps, 
PUF, pp. 89-107, p. 95. 
153 Moutsopoulos observes, “So it is absurd to claim that, as time plays no part in 
the One, the One is time itself. Here the commentator (Proclus) raises a 
contradiction with regard to the One that dates back to the Pythagoreans and 
Orphics: supposing that the One is the first cause, the Pythagoreans attributed him 
with the name kairos, cause of what is opportune, necessary and useful, in other 
words good”, ibid., p. 140. 
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unfold. However, Homer gives this possibility only to heroes, leaving 
other people to a fate that is in fact ignorance of the deliberations of 
which they are the object. This perfectly explains the myth of 
Penelope spinning in her Ithaca house. This image of circular time, the 
time of waiting, which seems totally unsuited to the conception of 
time we have just described, does describe the human condition. The 
time of waiting has nothing feminine about it (except in the Oriental 
model); it is time that is set apart from the action, without 
contemplation. This conception of time adopted by Homer is that of 
the Lady with a Spindle and seems to be Oriental in origin, or at least 
so we are told by Charles Picard, whose words Schuhl records:154 
Where the goddess with the spindle is concerned, I am increasingly 
convinced that she was for a while the great Asian goddess, present 
along the entire Asian coast. And there was a period in which almost 
every hypostasis of Mother Earth was a goddess with a spindle. Aside 
from Homer’s Artemis, may I point out that the very old Delian hymn 
by Olen was called Eileithya, often translated as “the good spinner”.  
Penelope’s spindle is the perfect image of the time of tradition, the 
circular time of traditional societies, a passive, fate-bound time, and 
also the perfect image of a time that holds the greatest sacred truth. 
This conception is moreover found in the Greco-Roman mythology of 
the three Fates, Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos. The three Fates were 
said to govern human destinies (life, death and thus the lifetimes of 
mortals). It was said that Clotho (“to spin” in Greek) held the spindle 
that dangled from the heavens to Earth, Lachesis (“Fate” in Greek) put 
the thread on the spindle and Atropos (“inflexible” in Greek) 
determined the length of the thread that would correspond to a human 
life. Oddly, the thread of fate is circular – truth lies in circular time. 
This is a truth that has lasted for generations and explains why people 
try far too hard not to discover it until they are on the verge of death. 
Nietzsche, armed with this philological knowledge, would peddle it in 
a different way:155 
“Everything straight lies,” murmured the dwarf disdainfully.156 “All 
truth is crooked, time itself is a circle.” 
                                                 
154 Schuhl, La Fabulation platonicienne, p. 77. The model of the spindle seems to 
be a technical metaphor for the mechanism of heaven. The truth involved here is 
thus that of the harmony of the heavenly model and the circle would stem from the 
revolutions of the planets. Did Penelope ask the stars when Odysseus would return? 
155 Nietzsche, “Of the Vision and the Riddle”, in Thus Spoke Zarathustra, III, 2, p. 
178. 
156 A dwarf is a little man, in other words, a child. 
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However, the fact that Penelope has a spindle does not mean she has 
the measure of time. On the contrary, she seems to use the spindle 
only as a ruse to fend off the advances of her suitors.157 So Ananké’s 
spindle seems to have lost its sacred meaning; Penelope is not 
Artemis,158 Odysseus still less Apollo. Yet it remains true that this 
circular time of Oriental origin involving waiting does describe the 
non-heroic time which Homer’s texts must organise through the 
character of Odysseus. So the hero seems to carry an unfolding time, a 
temporality whose measure young Athenians must copy. We still need 
to provide a definitive explanation of this. 
While we have accepted that the design of the supreme god Zeus 
is implacable, like that of a sole god, unlike that of a sole god it is 
limited by lesser gods. And while everything has been set out in 
advance, the relationships between these gods, focused on Odysseus, 
is dramatised in Book 1 of the Odyssey:159 
All the gods pitied him except Poseidon, who pursued the heroic 
Odysseus with relentless malice until the day when he reached his 
own country. 
Poseidon, however, was now gone on a visit to the distant 
Ethiopians, in the most remote part of the world, half of whom live 
where the Sun goes down, and half where he rises. He had gone to 
accept a sacrifice of bulls and rams, and there he sat and enjoyed the 
pleasures of the feast. Meanwhile the rest of the gods had assembled 
in the palace of Olympian Zeus, and the Father of men and gods 
opened a discussion among them. […]  
“What a lamentable thing it is that men should blame the gods and 
regard us as the source of their troubles, when it is their own 
transgressions which bring them suffering that was not their destiny.”  
In our view this passage, also cited by Nietzsche, is the symbolic 
matrix of the entire narrative. It is to poetry what the postulate is to 
mathematics. We note that Poseidon does not even take the trouble to 
                                                 
157 In these conceptions astronomy meets astrology, rendering the conceptual 
understanding of these theories more complex. However, in every case it must be 
accepted that while the heavens do not change, the configuration of the stars does. 
From there two diametrically opposed theories can be advanced. Either 
modifications in the constellations inevitably lead to changes, which is why our 
world is completely erratic, or the grandeur of the heavens is compatible with the 
human scale, in which case knowledge of the constellations can provide the world 
with a degree permanence, the latter being the thesis of the Chaldean culture, 
adopted by Plato. 
158 Homer, Iliad, Book XXI, ll. 470-510. Artemis is Apollo’s twin sister who 
became a lioness among women.   
159 Homer, The Odyssey, trans. E.V. Rieu, Penguin, 1991, I, pp. 5-7. 
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go to Zeus’s banquet, choosing instead to visit the Ethiopians. In such 
circumstances, the narrative is probably going to go on for some time 
since, firstly, Poseidon will have to submit to the injunctions of Zeus, 
before granting the release of Odysseus from the nymphs’ lair as 
requested by Athena. It is clear that the spatial distance separating 
Zeus and Poseidon will provide the interval of time that makes the 
actions of Odysseus possible.160 Because Poseidon has gone to visit 
the Ethiopians, Zeus can still wait or at least hope.161 We would 
suggest that the hero Odysseus owes his existence to this original 
disagreement between Poseidon and Zeus. But, crucially, all this is 
possible only in the particular framework of polytheism. Only 
polytheism, with this possibility of disagreement between gods, can 
make plausible room for human time. Of course a man is limited by 
the divine injunction that decides his life and death, but within those 
limits the heroic model can serve as a pattern for his evolution in time. 
This is perfectly described by Agamemnon in the Iliad:162 
...obliged by Zeus to see wars through to their bitter end, from cradle 
to grave, till one by one we drop.  
So human beings seem indeed to be limited by the divine will, as the 
great Agamemnon reflects in this passage. It is within the interval 
created by the gods in the context of polytheism that the hero alone 
can manifest  his temporality. This notion of interval, which seems apt 
in describing time, converges with the kairological analysis of 
Moutsopoulos. Indeed it was Moutsopoulos who proposed that time 
should no longer be understood through the deceptive metaphors of 
                                                 
160 It takes Poseidon four strides to reach his intended goal, his tekmôr, Iliad, XIII, 
20.  
161 We should add that, like Zeus and Hades, Poseidon is the son of Cronos and 
Rhea. The three drew lots for shares of the Olympian World, with the result that 
Zeus took the kingdom of Heaven, Poseidon the kingdom of the Sea and, as Hades 
could not demand the kingdom of Earth, which was occupied by human beings, he 
inherited the kingdom of the Underworld. This distribution makes clear that this is 
not a cosmogony, since the Earth is left to human beings (and also high Olympus, 
according to Homer, Iliad XV, l. 185). Secondly, as Heaven covers both Earth and 
Sea, Zeus becomes the supreme God. Lastly Poseidon and Zeus have equal power 
because they are brothers of equal strength, which is why Poseidon can take his time 
standing up to Zeus. 
162 Homer, The Iliad, XIV, 85 ff. 
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the line or mathematical series. Introducing the notion of interval into 
the notion of time gave him the following definition:163 
Conversely, there is no situation in which theoretical or practical 
awareness does not engage with the reality it observes and on which it 
ceaselessly seeks to act in order to apprehend and control it better. 
This attitude leads to the adoption of two new categories, which in 
fact precede the three categories of time initially mentioned: “not yet” 
or “too soon” ( and “never again” or “too late” (). These 
categories represent a kind of original binary reduction of the three 
categories of time and define the minimum zone containing the kairos 
or right moment, which is in principle unreapeatable. During this 
moment consciousness can act on the course of events. 
At the right moment, we shall see if this understanding of time is 
specific to the notion of kairos, as Moutsopoulos suggests here. Surely 
Aristotle is saying the same of the instant that explains time (chronos) 
in his Physics. Surely the instant is what separates “not yet” from 
“never again”. Does the move from the category of quantity to the 
category of the relative justify the distinction and separation of the 
concept of kairos from that of chronos? It remains the case that the 
notion of interval seems most appropriate to provide an initial 
framework for time. So we now need to contrast circular time with the 
interval of time. But is the notion of the circle not itself included in the 
concept of the interval? 
Let us return to poetic time and see how far semantics 
corroborates our conceptual analysis. When Homer considers the 
bounds fixed by Zeus, whether in terms of the final bound of death or 
that of the spinning top of the plan of the supreme God, which turns 
an episode one way or the other, he always uses the Greek word 
tekmôr. This word, the epic form of tekmar, appears at least four times 
to express “the term fixed for the destinies of Troy”.164 The polysemy 
of tekmôr is as follows: “assigned”, “fixed”, “sign”, “term”, “end”, 
“goal”,165 a semantic field of covariation that could be closed (limited) 
by the following periphrase tending towards univocity: the assigned 
limit of the possible. This term could ultimately thus replace that of 
                                                 
163 Moutsopoulos, Variations sur le thème du kairos de Socrate à Denys, Vrin, 
2002, p. 66. 
164 Homer, The Iliad, VII, 30; IX, 48; IX, 418; IX, 685; XIII, 20. 
165 The translation by télos seems to be found only in Pindar’s Pythian Odes II, 90. 
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limit.166 Marcel Détienne notes that tekmôr is the seat of a semantic 
turntable which, in a centrifugal movement, condenses notions 
grounded in navigation, astronomy and divination.167 Contrasting with 
the Greek term skotos (darkness, obscurity), which covers the eyes of 
the dying, the signified of tekmôr (reference point) then operates in the 
following semantic space:168 
In a primordial state governed by a power of the marine depths […] 
tekmôr and poros seem to have the function of dispelling the darkness 
personnified by Skotos and opening up ways along which the sun will 
travel to bring daylight, while the luminous paths of the constellations 
spread across the vault of the sky. 
That the sun makes light, a property reserved for time by the poet 
Theognis, is the first indication that time seems to come from the 
heavens, from the procession of the stars. That this progress leads to 
light reveals all the optimism of the conception. That tekmôr is 
bounded by skotos allows us to see that this path is not without 
hazards – human vicissitudes that already reflect the impossibility of 
linear time. Lastly, it is easy to see that this notion of “bound” 
definitively excludes the metaphor of the mathematical line, which has 
none. An interval is bounded, a straight line is boundless.  
But where form is concerned, above all this passage shows that 
a notion’s semantic field is always rooted in the surrounding culture, 
from which it is often hard to extract it. And here it must be 
understood that the conceptual work of the philosopher enables 
notions to be abstracted from their historical context and thus provides 
them with a permanence and a possible use beyond any particular 
cultural inflections. In practice the concept of péras (limit) used by 
Aristotle replaces the notion of tekmôr (bound), making it independent 
of its construction in situ. All this is played out in his Rhetoric when 
he discusses the signs we have considered earlier in relation to tragic 
poetry, and which provide the bases for syllogisms. We are reminded 
here that these two terms (tekmar and peras) were synonyms in 
Greek:169 
                                                 
166 We should note that the term “term” also indicates this bound, the impossibility 
for a notion to have a boundless polysemy without de facto disappearing. On the 
semantic problem of conceptualisation, see Aristotle, Metaphysics, , 106b. 
167 Marcel Detienne and Jean-Pierre Vernant, Le cercle des liens et les ruses de 
l’intelligence, Champs, Flammarion, 1974, p. 145. 
168 Detienne and Vernant, Le cercle des liens et les ruses de l’intelligence, p. 271. 
169 Aristotle, Rhetoric, I, 2, 1357b 1-10, trans. Barnes.  
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Of signs, one kind bears the same relation as the particular bears to the 
universal, the other the same as the universal bears to the particular. A 
necessary sign is an evidence, a non-necessary sign has no specific 
name. By necessary signs I mean those on which deductions may be 
based; and this shows us why this kind of sign is called an evidence: 
when people think that what they have said cannot be refuted, they 
then think that they are bringing forward an evidence, meaning that 
the matter has now been demonstrated and completed; for the word 
peras has the same meaning as the word tekmar in the ancient tongue. 
So while Aristotle’s concept of time, which relies on the notion of 
péras, may be conceptually independent of the historical tradition, it 
still seems that the semantic median term tekmar, taken from the epic 
genre, provides its traditional foundation. “That which possesses the 
end” (entelechy) is that which possesses the limit “peras”, the bound 
“tekmôr”, but not yet the end “télos”. The concept of “télos” adds a 
vectorial dimension to the notions of “peras” and “tekmôr”, which we 
shall consider in the next part. 
 
However, remaining for now with Homer’s poetry, we need to 
understand the model that he proposes for human beings, which 
Aristotle, Plato and all the Athenians knew through the poetry they 
had learned by heart and which remained the paradigm of Greek 
time.170 Human beings are limited by the will of Zeus, who decides 
their fate, their birth and death. For the Greeks human life was thus 
irremediably finite and not infinite, as Conche says in a slightly 
different way at the end of his investigation of Greek time:171 
The life force (aiôn) is fundamentally finite. 
This eschatological finitude introduces the notion of interval. Zeus 
also decides human destiny, something human beings seem unaware 
of. On the other hand, as the vector of a temporality to be copied, the 
heroic model integrates singular, human time into the dimension of 
the action. The figures of the heroes, of which Odysseus is the perfect 
model, are vectors for the evolving life of all citizens. Within this 
model the future does exist; it is not denied to human beings, but is 
linked to heroic figures, whose memory Greek statues seek to 
preserve. This is why, after the religious unification, the list of Greek 
heroes was preserved within the sacred site of Delphi. 
                                                 
170 Aristotle’s lost treatise On Poets seems to have been written for the education of 
Alexander the Great. Homer’s place at the heart of this treatise clearly shows that his 
work was the foundation of all education. 
171 Conche, Temps et destin, Editions de Mégare, 1980, p. 83. 
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In the poetic context objective time is ultimately not necessary and a 
theory of time is pointless, since the figure of the hero is the bearer 
and guarantor of this notional, synthetic temporality that all must 
copy. This is why the early philosophers fought against the poets to 
impose analytic conceptions of time based on philosophical concepts 
rather than poetic mimesis. Their battle brought us history’s two 
earliest invectives, the first from Heraclitus:172 
Homer deserves to be flung out of the contests and given a beating; 
and also Archilochus. 
And under Plato’s auspices, there is a shift from the beating that does 
not kill to the death-dealing knife, which explains why the poets 
eventually went into exile outside Athens:173 
The dialectician’s ambition was to put language to the test “by fire and 
the sword” (Gorgias), to slip a knife along its joints to seek out the 
root of the ruses that make the poets so ingenious.   
If the hero is the bearer of time, the philosopher with his basketful of 
concepts is unnecessary. The poet is the city’s timekeeper and the first 
Athenian philosophers, such as Socrates, can only tremble at the foot 
of the clocktower.174 This perfectly explains why no concept of time is 
to be found in the epic literature. Furthermore, we have seen, with 
support from Romilly’s work, that the same was true in tragic poetry. 
This leaves dormant the question of whether it is possible to speak of 
a unified Greek time, and then to boast of being its representative. 
Here we must understand that Aristotle’s conception of time seems to 
be connected to such a vast cultural heritage that our mountain can 
bring forth only a mouse.   
Lastly, the circularity of time was a conception certainly not 
shared by the Homeric element of Greek culture. On the other hand, a 
reading of Homer suggests a notion of time that is linked to that of 
interval. Whether this interval is the site of quarrels between gods with 
                                                 
172 Heraclitus, Fragments, DK B42, Freeman trans., op. cit., p. 156. 
173 Michel-Pierre Edmond, “Le problème d’Homère”, in Le philosophe-roi. Platon 
et le politique, chap. VIII, p. 145. Xenophanes of Colophon also said that these were 
fables (plasmata) and, crucially, barbarian narratives, and thus incompatible with 
the Athenian culture of his time (530 BCE), (Fr. XIV-XVI). 
174 The tower of Kronos is mentioned in Pindar’s description of the Isles of the 
Blessed (Olympian Odes, 2, 70) cited by Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, 
p. 94. If we follow Vico, this was the tower of the magi, who climbed the Tower of 
the Augurers to consult the heavens before speaking. Vico, Origine de la poésie et 
du droit (De constantia jurisprudentis), French trans. C. Henri and A. Henry, Café, 
Clima éditeur, 1983, p. 50. 
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whom the hero must contend, as in polytheism, or the sole god’s field 
of action, as in monotheism, in both cases it opens up conceptual 
possibilities for philosophical analysis. The field of possibility 
covered by this notion also invalidates the deceptive analogy of time 
with a geometrical line or mathematical sequence.  
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Naked truth, drawn out of the inmost sources, is the object of the epic 
poet: he depicts to us merely the tranquil existence and working of 
things according to their natures; his object lies already in each point 
of his movement; therefore we hasten not impatiently to an aim, but 
linger with affection at every step. 
Letter from Schiller to Goethe, 21 April 1797 175 
 
 
Let us now turn our attention to time in Hesiod’s cosmogony and 
Orphic or, more modestly, Pythagorean theophany. It seems highly 
likely that we shall find here the source of a circular conception of 
time which, by contrast, will make manifest the load that Aristotle’s 
theory of time had to carry on its journey towards the light.  
 
 
a .  O n  t h e  m y t h  o f  C r o n o s  o r  t h e  s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  
u n i v e r s a l  t i m e  i n  “ a g e s  o f  t h e  w o r l d ”   
 
On Hesiod and Pythagoras, whose content of conceptual time we now 
propose to asses, we shall be guided by Heraclitus, who observes:176 
Much learning does not teach one to have intelligence; for it would 
have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again, Xenophanes and 
Hecataeus. 
We seem to be looking at a single tradition, which enables Heraclitus 
to put Hesiod and Pythagoras together and reject them both at once, 
having already done the same with Homer. What of circular time in 
the thought of Hesiod the mythologist? Remembering that it is in this 
mythology that we find the clearest appearance of the name of the god 
Ks (starting with a kappa), Kronos the Greek god of time, it is 
clear that this mythological influence cannot be ignored. So how will 
Hesiod and Pythagoras enrich our understanding of Aristotelian time? 
Let us begin by stating that it is in this current of thought that we shall 
find circular time serving a particular conception of the divine. It is by 
                                                 
175 In his next letter of 25 April, Schiller continues: “The tragic poet must stride 
forwards more rapidly and directly, while the epic finds his account more in a 
loitering gait. It follows also from this, as it seems to me, that the epic does well to 
abstain from such subjects as powerfully rouse for themselves the feelings, whether 
of curiosity or of sympathy, in which case, then, the action interests too much an end 
to keep itself within the bounds of a mere means.” 
https://archive.org/stream/correspondencebe01schi/correspondencebe01schi_djvu.txt 
176 Heraclitus, Fragments, DK, B40, trans. Freeman, op. cit. 
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understanding Pythagorean theophany that we shall see how this 
circular conception continued to dominate the philosophical tradition 
right through to Germanic ideology. We shall then see that Aristotle’s 
concept of time is defined by the negation of this conception, since his 
philosophical model does not retain the end (télos) proposed by this 
sacred vision of the world. We shall then obtain a initial definition in 
the negative, to be filled in by Aristotle’s thought.177 
 
We do not know exactly whether Hesiod predates Homer. Both 
Porphyry and Cicero maintain that Hesiod is older than Homer, but as 
the source is Neoplatonist we may choose to doubt it:178 
In the 4th century the Orphic genealogy of Homer and Hesiod was 
found by the historian Ephorus of Cyme, making Hesiod older than 
Homer.  
Philostratus and Xenophanes, and later Varro and Erasmus, regarded 
them as contemporaries. To fuel the legend, Plutarch records that 
Hesiod surpassed Homer in a poetry competition in the city of Chalcis 
in Euboea, based on lines 654-657 of Works and Days.179 In short, we 
shall leave the historians to their histories and locate Hesiod between 
the Illiad and Odyssey, paying little heed to the person of Homer and 
regarding him as simply the best singer of narratives that had, in any 
case, been sung before him. Indeed Reynal Sorel makes a startling 
statistical observation. We have already noted that the notion of 
destiny meant “share of life” by combining , “share” with 
, “be alotted”; this notion will now have a more precise 
meaning in the epic context. Sorel begins by confirming this common 
meaning:180 
                                                 
177 Ours is a structural approach, in the Saussurian sense of the word. According to 
Saussure’s notion of value, every term takes its meaning from what it is not. The 
notion of value supports the void of the Concept, Cours de linguistique générale, 
Tulio de Mauro (ed.), Payot, 1972, chap. IV, 224-245, pp. 155-169. Similarly, the 
value of a culture is all that it is not; in short, its value will be all the greater if it is 
able to receive other cultures. 
178 Pseudo-Plutarch, De Homero, § 2, cited by Alain Ballabriga, “Hérodote et 
l’histoire de l’épopée”, in op. cit., pp. 325-339, p. 328. 
179 The source of this legend is thought to be a text by Alcidamas, a disciple of 
Gorgias, entitled “The Contest of Homer and Hesiod”, cited by Ballabriga, 
“Hérodote et l’histoire de l’épopée” in Constructions du temps dans le monde grec 
ancien, pp. 325-339. 
180 Reynal Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique. Fragments de discursivité 
mythique. Hésiode, Orphée, Eleusis, PUF, 2000, p. 68, note 1. 
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Moïra assigns, subjects every person to the lot that falls to them by 
inexorably fixing the rules of sharing.   
For, as we have noted, Greek fate is indeed:181 
The limit assigned to each person’s rightful share. 
Having clarified and confirmed this, we need to take this process of 
definition further. In the epic context fate seems linked to more 
specific, singular notions. Sorel then gives us the following valuable 
indications:182 
It is in its association with the idea of death that moïra finds its most 
frequent use in the Iliad (27 associations in 45 occurrences). Homer’s 
phrase about a man struck a lethal blow is “red death (thanatos) and 
imperious fate (moïra) closed his eyes.” However this meaning 
disappears in the Odyssey (8 uses compared to 60) in favour of the 
idea of custom, rights and natural order. 
What does this mean? Simply that, while in the Iliad moïra remains 
divine and cannot be judged by human beings, in the Odyssey, human 
beings have clearly acquired some grasp of fate. The notion of moïra 
then becomes coupled with those of rights and natural order, in short 
with the kosmos, which is of a different order from that of the 
Olympian gods. Frère explains that this semantic shift arises in part 
out of a comparison between fate and necessity (Anankè).183 Fate as a 
single entity is replaced by an attempt to understand time by means of 
rationality. Anankè looks at human beings, and now time also “looks 
at” human beings. It is easy to see that if rationality is integrated into 
the notion of fate, this will naturally introduce discontinuity. It is the 
discontinuity of rationality that provides the notion of interval that we 
have mentioned. Within this interval, it then becomes necessary to 
organise all the parts and it is at this analytical level that the notion of 
kosmos becomes necessary.184 We can see it becoming established in 
Hesiod’s work.  
                                                 
181 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique…, p. 68. 
182 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique…, p. 68. 
183 Frere, “Avenir et moïra: d’Homère à Platon”, in L’avenir, actes du congrès de 
l’association des Sociétés de philosophie en langue française, Vrin, 1987, pp. 181-
185, p.182. 
184 The term s is used by most Presocratic thinkers, starting with the poets: 
Hesiod, Theogony, v. 738; Homer, The Iliad 4, 145 and 14, 187. For the 
philosophers, see Heraclitus (DK 22B1), Empedocles (DK 31B and 134, 5), 
Anaxagoras (DK 59B8), Diogenes (DK 64B2), etc. Whereas, for the poets, the term 
means “good order” and is manifested in “finery”, from Plato onwards it tends to be 
coupled with the notion of taxis in a physical space that is stable and bounded, as 
Solon put it, in other words it describes the order of a city. However, the notion 
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The myth of races adopted in Works and Days confirms the shift from 
a fateful, divine justice to which human beings must submit to a 
justice placed in human hands. The transmission of justice 
(dikaïosunè) to human beings is correlatively the moment when they 
must become the bearers of time. Hesiod binds justice and time 
together around the notion of fate (moïra). So exchange becomes the 
medium of time and justice (dikè), as we shall seek to show by 
discussing the well-known myth of races.185 In Hesiod time is linked 
to the notion of justice solely through the mediation of humanity. 
Human beings bring justice to humanity (dikè) and, if this justice is 
integrated into a world that already posesses time and a certain notion 
of justice (Thémis), it is because Pandora has already done her work. 
For in Hesiod the notion of justice is not linked to time from the 
outset, but arrives only when Pandora (the first woman) introduces 
sexuality and thus human temporality (tempus). Moroever this is in 
accordance with the Cosmogony, which gives justice (dikaïosunè/ 
Dikè) a secondary place.186 Here is Darbo-Peschanski’s analysis:187 
In the works, when the moment comes to dress the first woman, it is 
often forgotten that the Hours officiate alongside Athena, the Graces, 
Persuasion and Hermes, arranging garlands of spring flowers around 
Pandora. The Hours are the three daughters of Zeus and Themis  
(Fairness): Eunomia (Right sharing), Eirênê (Peace) and Dikè 
(Justice), whose theogony describes the emergence – following 
mention of its resolution by force (biêphi) – of the conflict between 
the Olympians and Titans and the division (diedassato) of honours 
among the Immortals undertaken by Zeus immediately afterwards.   
Justice (Dikè), Peace (Eirênê) and Fair distribution (Eunomia) are 
merely the three daughters of Zeus, who has long sought to make 
                                                                                                                   
retains its link with that of aesthetics (main source: Brague, La Sagesse du Monde. 
Histoire de l’expérience humaine de l’univers, Fayard, L’esprit de la Cité, 1999, p. 
31, notes p. 265.). 
185 We have already noted that Aristotle’s Protrepticus was a response to the 
Antidosis of Isocrates. There is an early dialogue entitled On Justice in the 
Aristotelian corpus, but it deals with justice only in the political sphere and so 
cannot shed much light on the relationship between justice, fate and time; see Paul 
Moraux, A la recherche de l’Aristote perdu. Le dialogue “Sur la justice”, Louvain-
Paris, Publications universitaires de Louvain-Nauwelaerts, 1957. 
186 Briefly we can say that justice is done in exchanges between human beings 
(dikè), that justice resides within human beings, as a virtue (dikaïosunè), and that 
these two forms of justice are subject to an objective Justice (Thémis), understood as 
a harmony between humanity and the time of the heavens (Zeus). 
187 Darbo-Peschanski, “Historia et historiographie grecque: Le temps des hommes”, 
in Constructions du temps dans le monde grec ancien, pp. 89-114, p. 98. 
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human time possible. Furthermore the presence of the Hours (Hôrai) – 
the seasons – long before the birth of Pandora clearly shows that time 
predates the first woman. However, this time is not yet human time, 
but the time of the heavens (Ouranos). The order of the world 
(kosmos) is fixed before Pandora’s intervention, which is why it is 
hard to agree with Sophocles’ assertion, showing a clear Oriental 
influence:188 
Silence is the grace of woman. 
It is important to respect the time it takes to give birth to temporality, 
whose many-layered mythological conception Hesiod records. Firstly, 
we need to describe time, which is still a long way from appearing in 
this story. Spring does not come in winter, the blossom is still in bud 
on the tree of the world. Let us first seek the origins of this mythology.   
We know that Greeks learned their ancestral history from the 
Egyptian priests,189 and it would require enormous credulity to  
maintain that this founding myth of Greece is actually Greek, still 
more that it emerged from Hesiod’s head, like the city of Athens from 
the head of Athena.190 This myth must emanate from a tradition 
preceding the foundation of Athens, propagated by a nobility seeking 
retrospectively to be its founder. Eliade tells us, firstly, that several 
studies indicate that the myth is Oriental in origin:191 
Notable studies, by both Cumont and H. S. Nybert, have suceeded in 
illuminating some of the obscurity that surrounds Iranian eschatology 
and in defining the influences responsible for the Judaeo-Christian 
apocalypse. Like India (and, in a certain sense, Greece), Iran knew the  
myth of the four cosmic ages. A lost Mazdean text, the Sudkar-nask 
(whose content is preserved in the Dênkart, IX, 8), referred to the four 
                                                 
188 Sophocles, Ajax, l. 293, cited by Barbara Cassin, “Aristote avec ou contre 
Kant”, in Penser avec Aristote, p. 365, note 15, this English translation R.C. 
Trevelyan. 
189 Brisson, Les mots et les mythes, p. 44; once again this is the myth of the war of 
Atlantis. For an analysis of this myth, see Mattéi, Platon et le miroir du mythe, chap. 
IX, pp. 251-281. (The island of Atlantis was the first son of Poseidon).   
190 We recall the words of an Egyptian priest to Solon: “Oh Solon, Solon, you 
Greeks are all children, and there’s no such thing as an old Greek” Plato, Timaeus, 
21, 22. Plutarch confirms: “All that lying Greece has dared to record”, cited by Vico, 
Origine de poésie et du droit. De Constantia jusrisprudentis, Café, Clima éditeur, 
1983, p. 77. Vico himself wonders, “How could it be regretted that the Greeks did 
not know the history of foreign peoples, when they had such little knowledge of the 
more distant events of their own history?” 
191 Eliade, The Myth of the Eternal Return: Or Cosmos and History, trans. Willard 
R. Trask, Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 124-125. 
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ages: gold, silver, steel, and “mixed with iron”. The same metals are 
mentioned at the beginning of the Bahman-Yašt (I,3), which, however, 
somewhat further on (II, 14), describes a cosmic tree with seven 
branches (gold, silver, bronze, copper, tin, steel, and a “mixture of 
iron”), corresponding to the sevenfold mythical history of the 
Persians. 
The Persian origins of this mythology are now well established, as 
attested by other contemporary work, such as that of Schuhl and Paul 
Mazon.192 It also seems that the members of Plato’s Academy were 
aware of this influence, through Hermodorus’ work on Zarathustra.193 
The myth bears the stigmata of traditional mythology, principally a 
nostalgia for origins.194 It is said that there was a golden age, long 
long ago, at the start of a Great Year whose length of 18,000 solar 
years195 prevents any possible return.196 After an unfortunate and 
inoportune (a-kairos) fall, human beings went through phases of 
decline (the four materials) until they were no longer able to control 
their lives and constantly longed to return to their original state 
without any possibility of doing so, as shown in the myth of Sysyphus, 
son of Aeolus. As cosmic time is not on the human scale, the circular 
                                                 
192 Schuhl acknowledges this source: “Ionian inspiration is present, but 
recognisable in Chronos Ageraos is Zeruvan Akaran, the Immortal Time of Iranian 
religions, whose form is adopted by an image of Phanès in the Modena and is also 
manifested in the form of cosmic Necessity” in Essai.., p. 233. Paul Mazon finds a 
simple reason for this influence in Hesiod’s father’s origins in Cyme in Asia Minor: 
“Similarly the myth of races, in which we might be tempted to see a vague, idealistic 
memory of the golden age of the Minoan peace, seems not to be not only a 
philosophy of history, as has been thought, […] but a very clear borrowing from 
Oriental apocalypses by Hesiod (Works, ll. 633-640), whose father was from Cyme 
in Asia Minor – the myth of ages was present in Persia and even in India”, ibid., p. 
235. 
193 Jaeger, op. cit., p. 132. This is also confirmed by Diogenes Laertius: “Dinon 
tells us that the name Zoroaster, literally interpreted, means "star-worshipper"; and 
Hermodorus agrees with him, in Lives of Eminent Philosophers, I, introduction, 
trans. Robert Drew Hicks. 
194 Cf. Eliade, La Nostalgie des origines, 1971, (1969). 
195 Pseudo-Plutarch attributes this doctrine to Heraclitus: “According to Heraclitus, 
it lasts eighteen thousand solar years” (Opinions of the Philosophers II, 892c5). We 
doubt that Heraclitus did espouse this view, which is incompatible with his other 
opinions, see Heraclitus Fragments, op. cit., p. 139. The 18,000 years became the 
18,000 worlds (‘olam) of Talmudic cosmology rooted in Jewish mysticism, cf. 
Babylonian Talmmud, Avodah Zarah, 3b or Sanhedrin, 97b. 
196 Mazdaism gives a cycle of 9000 years and Zervanism a cycle of 12000 years. 
The Greeks tend to refer to throwing the same number with the dice 10,000 times, 
Aristotle, Traité du Ciel, II, 1, 292a, note 5, French trans. J. Tricot, Vrin, 1949. 
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progress of human beings expresses the impossibility of their return to 
the first age. 
Hesiod’s version has the same characteristics as those of the 
prototype of the mythical tradition revealed by Eliade. This is 
confirmed by Annalisa Paradiso:197 
The idea of original perfection, this arkhê/akmê followed by 
decadence and longing for an original state, recalls the idea of time 
underpinning Hesiod’s Works and Days and more precisely the myth 
of races, which is a myth of gradual fall, from the golden race of the 
light-filled arkhê to the race of iron. 
Before describing Hesiod’s myth, we should make clear that the 
adoption of this mythology implies an acceptance of circular time. In 
this Greek mythology, the doctrine of the eternal return is clearly 
coupled with circular time. The following four-stage decline entails 
human attempts to return to the original, first phase. The lost paradise 
must be restored and the golden age brought back to earth in a fifth 
phase, that of Zarathustra in flesh and blood.198 However, as a Great 
Year is on a different scale from human time, human beings endlessly 
mope around in their smallness. It is a mortal, pointless, absurd fate. 
Nietzsche clearly illustrates this with his portrayal of Zarathustra in 
Paradise, on the Blissful Islands in the age of Cronos. Zarathustra’s 
cry of:199 
It is time! It is high time! 
meets the following response:200 
“Just look!” said the old steersman, “there is Zarathustra going to Hell!” 
                                                 
197 Annalisa Paradiso, “Lycurgue spartiate: analogie, anachronisme et achronie 
dans la construction historiographique du passé”, in Constructions du temps dans le 
monde grec ancien, CNRS, 2000, p. 388. 
198 Nietzsche locates his Zarathustra beyond the pillars of Hercules, outside the 
known Greek world on the Blissful Islands (the Isles of the Blessed) known today as 
the Canary Islands, Thus Spoke Zarathustra pp. 109-112. Vernant has observed that 
the Isles of the Blessed (the Elysian Fields) enjoy an eternal spring equinox, cf. The 
Odyssey, IV, ll, 563-568. 
199 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 155. We should add that, in a letter to 
Peter Gast of 20 May 1883, Nietzsche offers the following etymology: “Today I 
learned by chance the meaning of Zarathustra, which is gold star. I am delighted by 
this coincidence”, cited by Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, PUF, 1970, 
p. 35. As we have seen, this is a more precise etymology than that given by Plato’s 
student Hermodorus. It also has the merit of attesting that Zarathustra has returned to 
the golden age. Lastly, “gold”, the primary material of the cosmic tree, also means 
“light” in Hebrew, as did phanès to the Greek Orphics. 
200 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, p. 152. 
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Accepting this myth means accepting oriental time, a time of fate 
quite different from the Greek tradition found in both Homer’s 
founding narrative and so-called tragic poetry. This oriental time is 
circular. Yet Hesiod’s presentation of the myth gives no room to 
notions of return, or a circular conception of time. The five races 
follow each other in a linear succession, the concatenation of which 
remains truly obscure. Sorel notes this linearity in Hesiod, asserting 
that the mythology of races is not circular, nor in any sense a 
decline:201 
The logos of the five races is not the account of a decline. It describes 
no increasing moral degradation of humanity, unless it be not wanting 
to understand what Hesiod says. The fifth race, that of  “now”, is not 
explained in its relations with those that precede it, because its 
representation plays with and frustrates diachronic forms and 
synchronic divisions. 
This seems precisely to misunderstand the circular form of this myth. 
The fifth (fourth) race can only come into being through a return to 
the first, thus closing the circle of time that makes possible the coming 
of Zarathustra. The fifth term becomes the first only after the great 
conflagration (palingenesis) that will see the coming of the Messiah 
Zarathustra.202 Some human beings will then be invited to the Isles of 
the Blessed (Paradise), while the rest will return to take another turn 
around the cycle of reincarnations. However, if Zarathustra does not 
come, there will be no fifth race and no hope of any possible return to 
the reign of Cronos and Paradise on Earth. Moreover, in the figure of 
the circle, there is clearly no place for the Saussurian pair diachrony 
and synchrony. It will be for Zarathustra to form the circle and 
accompany human beings to Paradise, a mythology that would 
continue to underpin the soul’s peregrinations in many cultures. 
So is the myth of races circular or linear? Does this fundamental 
conception of the world allow oriental time in, or is there a Greek time 
that can stand up to it? Why are there five races when, in those texts 
that have been preserved, the circular time of the Persians unfolds in 
four stages? This is a fundamental problem, which we shall consider 
first in the work of Nietzsche, in order to grasp his conception of the 
eternal, and then in that of Hegel, in order to understand his vision of 
history. In the first place, we have found a good synthesis of 
                                                 
201 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique. Fragments de discursivité mythique. 
Hésiode, Orphée, Eleusis, PUF, 2000, p. 47. 
202 Cf. Mattéi, Pythagore et les pythagoriciens, PUF, 1993, Chapter 6. 
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Nietzsche’s perspective in his book The Will to Power, in a passage 
we shall quote here:203 
This, my Dionysiac world which eternally creates itself, eternally 
destroys itself, this mystery-world of doubled desires, this my 
“Beyond good and evil”, without goal, unless a goal lies in the 
pleasure of the circle, without will, unless a ring is full of will to turn 
on its own old course for ever around itself and only around itself: this 
my world – who is clear enough to look at it without wishing himself 
blindness? Strong enough, to hold his soul up to this mirror? His own 
mirror to the mirror of Dionysus? His own solution to the riddle of 
Dionysus? And he who should be able to do this, would he not then 
have to do still more? Betroth himself to the “Ring of Rings”?204 With 
the vow of his own recurrence? With the ring of eternal self-blessing, 
self-asseveration? With the will to will it all again and yet again? To 
will back all things which have ever been? To will forwards to 
everything which must ever be? Know ye now, what the world is for 
me? And what I desire, when I – desire this world? 
We can see that, while Nietzsche’s myth of the eternal return was 
influenced by the Iranians, its underlying source remains Greek 
Pythagoreanism, which promotes the figure of Dionysus. It is vital to 
grasp the profound meaning of Dionysus in order to understand the 
myth of races. So Nietzsche believes this mythology is circular and 
consequently that there can be no future in the world (kosmos) other 
than the illustory future advocated by religions. Hegel’s thesis on this 
matter is completely different. For him the world is temporal and 
                                                 
203 Nietzsche, The Will to Power, II, 385. Cited in Some Aspects of the Life and 
Work of Nietzsche, and Particularly of his Connection with Greek Literature and 
Thought, trans. Arthur Harold John Knight, Cambridge University Press, 1933: 
http://tinyurl.com/oknm8xl. A little earlier Nietzsche provided the axiom 
underpinning this argument: “If the motion of the world aimed at a final state, that 
state would have been reached. The sole fundamental fact, however, is that it does 
not aim at a final state; and every philosophy and scientific hypothesis (e.g. 
mechanistic theory) which necessitates such a final state is refuted by this 
fundamental fact”, trans. Kaufman, p. 371. 
204 This theory of the rings can be linked to the character of Nathan the Wise, 
devised by Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) in an attempt to reconcile the 
three monotheistic religions. Lessing tells the story of an Oriental who had a very 
valuable ring, which he wanted to bequeath to his three children, the three 
monotheisms. As he could not cut it in three, he decided to have two copies made, 
so that he could give the same to each of his children. Quarrels broke out over who 
had the original ring, before it was realised that the real ring lies in the heart, the 
religion of the heart. Nathan concludes, “If only I had found in you one more, a man 
worthy of the name!” Lessing, Nathan le sage, French translation R. Pitrou, II, V, 
1993, p. 171. 
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engaged in a process of becoming; it progresses through time. Thus 
there is an existential way out of the concentric circles in his 
Phenomenology of Mind, evidenced by the figure of the sage. But 
what sage might there be at the end of the historical process if not the 
first, Zarathustra?205 Does the concept of parousia imply that when 
the Messiah returns, he will be in possession of all the knowledge that 
has gone before him (sage), like the Magusean Magi in the 
Scriptures?206 Bouton offers a perfect synthesis of this most difficult 
set of questions, the umbilicus of German ideology, which tends to 
connect with the most fundamental conceptions of Ancient Greece:207 
Whereas Greek ethical order is subject to a cyclical history governed 
by “the certain, unwritten law of the gods, which lives eternally and 
the time of whose first appearance no one knows”, Christianity 
enables the emergence of temporal progress, the starting point for 
which is the event of the incarnation. The emergence of the Christian 
religion is accompanied by the birth of eschatological time, rooted in 
historicity – the life and death of Christ – and directed towards the 
fixed future of Parousia and the Last Judgement. The Ressurrection of 
Christ in the community of memory is also a ressurrection of the past, 
a victory over death and time. 
This conception of time and history would be the summum of 
philosophy and The Phenomenology of Mind the punctum remotum of 
the truly conceptual approach, were it not for the fact that this vision 
of the world and this kenotic dialectical logic, which claims to escape 
circles, never escaped anything, not even language. And, moreover, 
both express the vision and logic of Christianity through and through. 
In reality this vision of the world is the definition of the Incarnation 
                                                 
205 Jean-Marie Lardic, considering the endless chain of circles at the end of the 
march of the mind in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind, suggests, following 
Feuerbach, that “If the infinite is the negation of a stage every time, this may seem 
to contradict its affirmative nature, mentioned many times by Hegel. We seem to be 
engaged in a kind of infinite progress, representing the wrong infinity.” L’infini et sa 
logique. Etude sur Hegel. L’Harmattan, 1995, p. 103. And indeed, why should the 
progress of the mind culminate in the spiritual figure of the sage? Why should the 
concrete universal not end in concrete materialism? This was how it was read by 
Karl Marx in a historical reading that was in tune with Hesiod’s myth in a way that 
Hegel’s conception of history, rooted in Christian spirituality, was not.   
206 It was the Maguseans who introduced Iranian eschatological conceptions to the 
Greeks, as we shall see at the end of this section.   
207 Bouton, Temps et Esprit dans la philosophie de Hegel de Francfort à Iéna, p. 
269. 
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repeated in the eucharistic context. We shall cite this synthesis by 
Catherine Pickstock:208 
These words and events only occur in the Church. And we only accept 
real presence and transubstantiation because the giving of Body and 
Blood in the Eucharist gives also the Body of the Church. The 
Eucharist both occurs within the Church and gives rise to the Church 
in a circular fashion. In consequence, a trust in the Eucharistic event 
inevitably involves trusting also the past and future of the Church. In 
receiving the Eucharist, we are in fact receiving an entire historical 
transmission which comprises the traditions of the Church and then 
those of Greece and Israel. This tradition includes the Bible in which 
it is declared that God is in some fashion manifest to all traditions and 
in the physical world as such.  
Our approach will undoubtedly seem cavalier insofar as the link 
between Hegel’s conception and Hesiod, and notably the myth of 
races, is not very clear.209 But it is in fact quite natural if we note that 
Hesiod moulds time around the figure of Cronos, and this 
mythological mould was the motor of the young Hegel’s historical 
vision.210 When Hegel considers time, he always refers to the mythical 
figure of Cronos, on which his concept of time is based. We can see 
this in his Reason in History, from which we will cite the following 
passage:211 
In this way, the Greeks speak of the rule of Chronos or Time, who 
devours his own children (ie. the deeds he has himself produced); this 
was the Golden age, which produced no ethical works. Only  Zeus, the 
                                                 
208 Cf. questions 73-80 solved by Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologica op. cit.. 
The synthesis of these questions is taken from Catherine Pickstock, “Thomas 
Aquinas and the Quest for the Eucharist”, Modern Theology 15, 2, April 1999, pp. 
159-180. 
209 However, we should be clear that the concept of faith remains attached to 
Christianity in Hegel’s philosophy. This is where the analogy between Greek and 
Germanic culture ends: “The very word faith is reserved for the Christian religion; 
we do not speak of the faith of the Greeks or Egyptians, or of faith in Zeus or Apis. 
Faith expresses the internality of the most profound, concentrated certainty.” We 
should also note that the term “religion” enters history following the Protestant 
separation of “reason” and “faith”. In this sense Hegel’s philosophy must clearly be 
placed within the direct line of this religious ideology. See also Bernard Bourgeois, 
L'idéalisme allemand, alternatives et progrès, Vrin, 2000, pp. 79-94. (The preceding 
quotation from Hegel is taken from page 85.) 
210 Bouton, Temps et esprit dans la philosophie de Hegel, Vrin, 2000, pp. 168-169. 
211 Hegel, Reason in History, trans. H. B. Nisbet, Cambridge University Press, 
1975. The French translator of the same text (10/18, 1965) Kostas Papaioannou, 
observes that here, as elsewhere, Hegel confuses Cronos with Kronos, cf. French 
edition, note, p. 215. 
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political god from whose head Pallas Athena sprang and to whose 
circle Apollo and the Muses belong, was able to check the power of 
time; he did so by creating a conscious ethical institution, i.e. by 
producing the state. 
The same is true in The Philosophy of Nature in his Encyclopaedia:212  
But it is not in time that everything comes to be and passes away, 
rather time itself is the becoming, this coming-to-be and passing away, 
the actually existent abstraction, Chronos, from whom everything is 
born and by whom its offspring is destroyed.  
In Hegel’s work Greek time is always linked to the figure of Cronos 
as revealed in Hesiod’s myth of races. For Nietzsche the myth of races 
simply confirms his conception of the eternal return, whereas Hegel’s 
thought reveals that, on the contrary, this myth allows time to unfold. 
How is this possible? 
To understand what is happening behind the scenes in this myth, 
let us start by returning to Plato. For we cannot be sure that Hegel read 
Hesiod directly; he may simply have used Plato’s theories relating to 
him. At any rate, Hegel’s version is highly Platonic. Firstly, Plato’s 
conception of the heavens is far from simple and, while it may be 
circular, it is important to grasp how he understands the spherical 
nature of time. In his Timaeus,213 Plato starts by describing the 
movement of the soul in two different circles: the circle of the same 
(intelligence and science) and the circle of the different, the place of 
opinion. These circles are in opposition, since the circle of the same 
manifests the indivisible (continuity), whereas the circle of the 
different manifests the divisible (discontinuity). Both the circles 
within the soul and the conceptions that gravitate around their 
differences are based on conceptions of the heavens. Plato applies 
conceptions of the heavens to conceptions of the soul; the heavens 
cannot be understood without the soul and vice-versa. So what is 
Plato’s conception of the heavens? Mattéi provides some initial 
information:214 
The heavenly sphere turns towards the right of the universe, while the 
planets move leftwards. Plato in his turn teaches that the circle of the 
same turns horizontally towards the right, while the circle of the 
different turns obliquely leftwards (Timaeus, 36c). 
                                                 
212 Hegel, Philosophy of Nature: Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part 
II, §§ 257-259, trans. A. V. Miller, Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 35. 
213 Plato, Timaeus, 37 a-c. 
214 Mattéi, Pythagore et les pythagoriciens, PUF, 1983, p. 70. 
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So the heavenly sphere turns to the right, implying that it introduces 
the return of the same. This is in tune with the doctrine of the eternal 
return. But the planets turn to the left, thus introducing otherness and 
rendering impossible the return of identical sameness. So in the 
circularity of the time of the heavens the same perpetually rubs against 
the different, as long as the world remains connected to the heavenly 
sphere. Should the world separate from the heavenly sphere, clearly it 
will be caught in a leftward movement towards permanent difference 
and perpetual flux. This perpetual flux later becomes the illusory 
future of Heraclitus, whose thesis Plato adopts.215 The phrases 
“everything is in movement” (panta kineîtai), “everything flows” 
(panta rheî), “everything passes and nothing remains” (panta 
khoreî…), all forged of a piece, describe this mythology.216 However, 
this perpetual flux is also the time of the decline described by 
Hesiod’s myth, after the castration of Ouranos by Cronos – an act with 
serious consequences. Ouranos’s end also ends the balance of the 
heavenly sphere of the same and brings in the oblique difference of 
the world. So this act fatally brings the future with it, in the form of 
the decadence described in the myth of races. In a passage known to 
refer to this myth,217 Plato advances the same idea in his Statesman: 218 
Eventually, this whole set-up had lasted as long as it was meant to and 
there had to be a change; the whole earth-born race had been used up, 
since every soul had fulfilled its quota of incarnations and had fallen 
                                                 
215 Aristotle attests to the influence of Cratylus on Plato: “For, having in his youth 
first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitan doctrines (that all 
sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), 
these views he held even in later years”, Metaphysics, A, 6, 987a 29-b7, trans. 
Barnes. 
216 Aristotle criticises the thesis that “panta kai aei” in his Physics, VIII, 253b 10-
11, trans. Barnes, “The view is actually held by some that not merely some things 
but all things in the world are in motion and always in motion, though we cannot 
apprehend the fact by sense-perception. Although the supporters of this theory do 
not state clearly what kind of motion they mean, or whether they mean all kinds, it is 
no hard matter to reply to them.” See also Topics, I, 11, 104b 21 and On the Soul, I, 
2, 405a 25-28. According to Jean-François Pradeau in Héraclite, Fragments, since 
the work of Kirk these fragments have no longer been recognised as authentic by 
contemporary translators Diels and Marcovich. Pradeau says, “This opinion is 
foreign to Heraclitus in such an indeterminate, simplistic form”, p. 51.  
217 Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, p. 86: “The myth of The Statesman 
can be read as a Platonic reworking of Hesiod’s narrative.” 
218 Plato, The Statesman, 272e, trans. Robin Waterfield, Cambridge University 
Press, 1995, p. 26. 
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to earth as seed as often as had been ordained for it. Then the 
helmsman of the universe released the tiller, so to speak, and 
withdrew to his vantage-point, and both fate and its innate longing 
made the universe start to move backwards.  
Plato presents this myth in two parts. The first part describes the 
golden age and the first race, the second part describes all the stages of 
decadence. After the golden race, the world separated from the 
heavenly sphere and went into reverse. This was also the moment of 
divine withdrawal, which left human beings at the helm.219 But the 
withdrawal was not complete; an observation post remained, seeming 
to indicate that the divine might slip out from the wings and back onto 
the world stage.220 Hegel seems to have put his faith in Plato and used 
this account as the basis for his new conception of history. But does 
Plato’s intepretation of Hesiod’s myth conform to the text itself? The 
contemporary Hegelian Bouton suggests:221 
Plato modified Hesiod’s account of the theogony, turning the simple 
succession from Chronos to Zeus into an endless cycle. As a result, 
the myth of the statesman lays the foundations of a cyclical 
conception of time, which Hegel uses precisely to understand the 
history of ethical life: the oscillation between birth and destruction no 
longer refers to two major periods of the universe, but forms the very 
rhythm of the temporal life of peoples.  
That Plato destroyed much of Greek heritage (Democritus), modified 
a number of conceptions (Heraclitus) and transformed many 
philosophies (Pythagoreanism) has already been demonstrated. 
However, we are not yet persuaded that Plato’s reading of Hesiod is 
too partial in every sense.222 In his discussion Plato peddles several 
                                                 
219 This myth of divine withdrawal (contraction) can be found in the kabbalist 
conception of tzimtzum (tradition). We can see this in Chaim Vital (1543-1620) and 
the Lurianic Kabbalah. In Vital, Ohr Ein Sof (“the light of the Lord”) is linked to the 
world by a straight line that also breathes in the Four Worlds of emanation, creation, 
formation and action. 
220 Nietzsche speaks of the Captain in the Blessed Isles, Anaxagoras mentions the 
helmsman and Plato mentions the presence of the pilot. Here we are in the 
metaphorical register of the representation of Zarathustra, who seems to have come, 
or to be coming, by sea, like the Persians on their malevolent ships. In the world of 
Ancient Greece there was a mythology of the macabre ferry, described by 
Moutsopoulos in his article, “Un instrument divin, la navette, de Platon à Proclus”, 
Kernos, 10, 1997, pp. 241-247. 
221 Bouton, Temps et esprit dans la philosophie de Hegel, p. 86.  
222 Here Bouton is perhaps following the interpretation of Brague, who suggests: 
“Plato transforms a simple succession into a cycle: sometimes Cronos governs the 
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ideas that should give us pause. In the first place, the universe is 
described as naturally (“innate longing”) moving “backwards” – in 
short, “bad”. Moreover, the universe itself is said to have a “fate”. 
Crucially, the relationship of all this to the soul indicates that this 
conception of circular time serves the doctrine of metempsychosis. 
Plato shows that souls constantly fall into bodies and are reborn, in 
other words that they return to the cycle of metempsychoses. Plato’s 
passage, more coloured by Pythagoreanism than it seems, also tells us 
that there is no salvation possible for souls. Sorel suggests, however, 
that souls may be able to save themselves through regular visits to 
places of worship where they can top up their life force – their thûmos 
(vital energy):223 
Conversely, Orphic ceremonies were bound to recall the birth of the 
world, the theogonic struggles and the myth of the tearing apart of 
Dionysus. They retraced the loop linking Dionysus to Phanes, evoking 
the golden age (immortality), its fragmentation (wheel of births) and 
reunification (return to the golden age).   
We shall discuss the relationship between Dionysus and Zarathustra a 
little later on. Here we can note that the presence of Dionysus shows 
that we are in the Orphic register, which will indeed be that of Plato’s 
interpretation. In sum, let us say that the circularity of Hesiod’s myth 
of races is not only possible, in order to retain its Persian origins and 
internal consistency with the cosmic ages, but, crucially, attested by 
Plato’s version, perhaps produced under the influence of Orphism. 
Moreover, we shall find this circular understanding of the myth of 
races in the Neoplatonist Proclus, the last great teacher of Plato’s 
Athens School.224 At least this is what Sorel tells us:225 
A passage from Proclus states that there were two generations 
(geneai) before the race that emerged from the dismembering of 
Dionyus: a golden age under Phanes and a silver age under the 
dominion of Kronos. This succession of ages loses its diachronic, 
contradictory nature when it is associated with the cycle in which the 
end is the beginning. Dionysus is Phanes: the follower of Orpheus 
returns to the golden age at the end of his purification, the silver age 
when he forgets himself in murder, violence always being associated 
                                                                                                                   
entire world, sometimes he only reigns over some places, ‘as is the case now’” ibid., 
p. 86. 
223 Sorel, Orphée et l’orphisme, PUF, 1995, p. 107. 
224 Proclus (412, 485) was the last divine of the Athenian School. After him the 
School split into the Aristotelian tendency of Marinus and the Platonic tendency of 
Isidore. 
225 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique, p. 114. 
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with Kronos. These ages are not anterior to the “current” age. They 
exist solely from the point of view of the purity or impurity of the soul 
presented to Persephone. Temporal linearity is merely a shrinking of 
the mind resulting from ignorance which, in the Greek understanding, 
remains merged with forgetting.  
This all remains obscure. However, Sorel ultimately accepts that it is 
possible to understand this myth as circular and furthermore that such 
an interpretation seems most in tune with the original. Its conformity 
with the myth’s Persian origins indicates that this is the best 
interpretation. So we shall retain the view that there are two possible 
readings of this text, one linear, the other circular, and go on to seek a 
tipping point or fork that might explain this interpretative “biphony”. 
Our focus will be the relationship between justice and time, an 
association of divinity with temporality that must be understood in all 
its subtlety.226  
 
We shall now discuss the well-known myth of ages, which seems to 
have had a monumental impact on both religious and philosophical 
visions of the world, and notably on German ideology. We shall then 
go on to show that Aristotle’s conception of time is entirely 
independent of this mythological tradition. Although De Mundo, 
which uses its conceptions, was formerly attributed to Aristotle, it has 
been clear since the Renaissance that it is totally incompatible with his 
vision of the world.227 
The Golden Age is the first and last age of this circular myth. It is 
the age of Cronos, who is not subject to time. Its men are without 
psukhè and do not engage in sexual reproduction, so this world 
contains no women. Consequently there are no human generations, no 
descendants; the men do not age, but are always young and ultimately 
disappear into a great sleep without even dying. This is the age that 
most corresponds to life in illo tempore. As we have seen in Pindar 
and Plato, this age is also spatially located in the Isles of the Blessed. 
                                                 
226 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique…, p. 114, pp. 52-53. 
227 This treatise is attached to the French translation of Aristotle’s On the Heavens: 
Traité du Ciel, trans. J. Tricot, Vrin, pp. 179-204. In addition to the ideas developed 
in 401b, we find the strange conception at 401a 15, in which God is “called the son 
of Kronos and of Time, for he endures from eternal age to age.” (De Mundo, trans. 
E. S. Forster, Clarendon, 1914). A circular conception of the World is required in 
order to suggest that one could move from one eternity to the next. Tricot thinks this 
treatise offers a good view of the world as it was understood in the 1st century (p. 
IX). 
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These men seem to have complete divine protection; nothing bad 
happens to them, so there are no events, indeed no history, because 
they are in the hands of the highest god. As Brisson suggests:228 
In the reign of Cronos the world as a whole was governed directly by the 
highest god, while its parts were run by his aides.    
Untouched by genital sexuality or death, the two fundamental 
functions of human life, this “Paradise”229 looks like Hell! Not 
entirely though, to the extent that divine protection enables men to 
enjoy great wealth. Like gods, they are free and do not work or suffer. 
And with such riches these peers cannot but be friends. Why bother 
stealing when everything is in everyone’s reach? What need is there 
for laws? Life, sex and material goods are not subject to penury. This 
myth became so important in Athens that, according to Aristotle, it 
even crops up in a proverb describing the tyranny of Peisistratus:230 
Men were often to be heard saying that the tyranny of Peisistratus was 
the Golden Age of Cronos. 
We cannot overemphasise the materialism of this vision of ecstatic 
happiness under divine control. These men have no souls. They do not 
read or philosophise,231 and what is the point of culture when you 
already live in a perfect land of absolute beauty, which no human 
representation could improve? Clearly this is the reign of total 
idleness, since as we know that the closer we get to the divine, the less 
movement there is. However, these men cannot be described as 
animals, since at the start of his narrative Hesiod clearly states that 
they have language. So these are fully men – supermen in the 
Nietzschean sense. But, stripped as they are of Erôs and Thanatos, it 
seems clear that art and culture de facto no longer have any reason to 
exist. So what is left? There is only thought and contemplation. But 
thinking about what? Contemplation of what? There is only thought 
without culture, in other words mathematics and contemplation of the 
                                                 
228 Cited by Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, p. 90, note 40.  Luc Brisson 
also compares these men to a “human flock”. 
229 The English “Paradise” comes from the Latin paradisus, itself derived from the 
Greek paradéisos. This term is thought to come from the Avestan pairi-daeza, 
meaning “enclosure”. This would explain the quest for an enclosed land, the 
conception of Paradise as an island or archipelago. See also Jean Delumeau, Une 
histoire du Paradis, I, Fayard, 1992. 
230 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens XVI, 7, trans. H. Rackham, Heineman and 
Harvard University Press, 1935. 
231 Aristotle, Politics, VII, 15, 1334a 31 and ff., and the Protrepticus, fragment 12, 
as we have seen. 
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starry sky. In our view this is why Zarathustra is said to be the adorer 
of the stars. And it is this conception that is discussed in Aristotle’s 
Protrepticus, from the opening part of which we take the following 
passage:232 
This is the thing for the sake of which nature and the god engendered 
us. So what is this thing? When Pythagoras was asked, he said, “to 
observe the heavens,” and he used to claim that he himself was an 
observer of nature, and it was for the sake of this that he had passed 
over into life. And they say that when somebody asked Anaxagoras 
for what reason anyone might choose to come to be and be alive, he 
replied to the question by saying, “To observe the heavens and the 
stars in it, as well as moon and sun,” since everything else at any rate 
is worth nothing. 
The total materialism proposed by this vision of the golden age 
reflects the fact that the finished man is surrounded by perfection in 
re. For this reason thought, culture and, still more, philosophy and 
spirituality are all unnecessary. All these things are already in the 
thing in itself, in the full sense that Kant gave it,233 in re, if we are to 
follow Leibniz. In the Iranian conception, the universe is perfect, it is 
fundamentally good. However, remaining in the garden of Cronos 
which is the concrete, manifest vision of this state, it is easy to 
understand that it has no room for thought. What is the point of a little 
universe in one’s head (spirituality)? What is the point of a philosophy 
or theory of the world that is merely that world’s pale reflection? It is 
a lack of understanding of this resolutely materialist dimension of the 
oriental Paradise – in this case the Persian vision of the world – 
differing so greatly from the later vision of the Christian Church, that 
apparently leads Vidal-Naquet to say, with a rare lack of finesse:234 
The Paradise of the golden age is ultimately an animal Paradise. 
Humanity, including that of the philosophers, is on the other side, that 
of the cycle of Zeus.  
This conception is followed by Brague, whose work we have cited.235 
Did Hesiod get it wrong? No, as everything is entirely “in actuality” 
                                                 
232 Aristotle, Protrepticus, trans. Hutchinson and Johnson, p. 48.  
233 This is the positive noumena of the Critique of Pure Reason. While man is 
unable to have a vision in God and, a fortiori, cannot have the world in itself, Kant 
as a reader of Leibniz nevertheless defines the contexts of this impossibility. 
234 Cited by Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, p. 92, note 50; see also 
Perceval Frutiger, Les mythes de Platon, 1930, p. 188. Is it not the worst injustice to 
suggest that these men are “animals”, particularly in a commentary on Hesiod?  
235 Ibid, p. 92. The interpretation we contest is as follows: “He is as yet just another 
animal. Man accedes to his humanity through philosophy, and everything suggests 
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or pure to use the concept Aristotle uses to describe the divine, there 
are no more spiritual and intellectual journeys to be made. More 
radically, it can be said that there is no longer any need for the western 
vision of the world. So why on earth do Plato and Aristotle place 
philosophy within this realm? To understand this we must first present 
the heroic age. More precisely, what is the significance of Cronos, the 
guardian of this strangest of ages? Sorel takes up the commentary of 
Heraclitus the rhetorican:236 
Kronos scythes: his epithet anklulomêtês “of the twisted thinking”, or 
“of the curved thinking”, a description attested in Homer, precisely 
gives his cast of mind the curved shape of the castrating sickle. 
Kronos scythes the unhindered fertility of his progenitor, this excess 
of vitality (thaleros) that is paradoxically at once necessary to 
begetting and incompatible with the orderly cycle of life  
The root of the name Ks (with an initial kappa) is said to be ker 
(to cut), which would be consistent with his epithet anklulomêtês.237 
However, it is generally accepted that Cronos was never said to be the 
god of time Xs (khronos ou Chronos, with an initial capital letter) 
by the Greeks, notably Homer,238 and that he is thus unconnected to 
the notion of time s (chronos, all lower case).239 However, Sorel 
notes that while the fusion of the two is not clearly made by the poets, 
it is explained by an examination of the theologians. Between the 4th 
and 5th centuries BCE the term chronos has many different meanings, 
as we have seen in presenting our mosaic of poetry. But as soon as we 
link Cronos with the Orphic god Phanes, all suddenly becomes 
                                                                                                                   
that philosophy is absent from the life of plenty of the time of Cronos, when it 
would have been supremely necessary.” 
236 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique, p. 53. 
237 Sorel, Les Cosmogonies grecques, p. 42. The Greek root ker is also thought to 
be the root of the term kairos.  
238 Homer, The Iliad, IV, 59. 
239 Sorel initially thought that this confusion in Hegel’s philosophy between 
Cronos and Chronos came from the Neoplatonists, as suggested by Romilly (op. cit., 
p. 36), see Les Cosmogonies grecques, p. 83: “It seems a confusion was introduced 
after the event by the Neoplatonist philosophers between the word chronos (with an 
initial khi) and the name of the Titan Kronos (with a kappa), who had in fact never 
signified time. It is certainly the case that the word chronos is never found as the 
subject of a clause in Homer. On the other hand, if we place the expansion of 
Orphism between the 6th and 4th centuries BCE, we are bound to observe that this 
period corresponds to the rise of many conceptions concerning time.” 
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clear.240 Cronos is the guardian of non-temporality, of eternity and 
Tradition.241 This is why his temporal reign is always associated with 
the spatial realm of the Isles of the Blessed.242 To preserve this 
tradition through time and to maintain his role, Cronos swallows 
everything “whole”. He gulps down all his children: Hestia, Demeter, 
Hera, Hades, Poseidon and Zeus. But the castration of his father 
Ouranos ends this golden age and heralds in the silver age and the 
unfurling of time and space. If, as Plato says,243 the name Ouranos 
signifies “contemplation of the higher world, since it is seeing what is 
on high, horôsa ta anô”, then his castration leads to the separation of 
the heavens from the world (or Earth). As we have seen, it is also the 
reason Plato uses to assert that the world henceforth follows an 
oblique, backward course. How did this actually come about? First of 
all, Gaia created steel to make a large billhook, which she gave to 
Cronos the hoplotatos (the youngest). Then, together, they lay in 
wait:244 
But the hidden boy / Stretched forth his left hand; in his right he took / 
The great long jagged sickle; eagerly / He harvested his father's 
genitals / And threw them off behind.  
Laterality is important here because it seems to reflect the conception 
of the world advanced by Plato. Cronos unfurls his left side and takes 
up the billhook with his right hand, before striking the fatal blow with 
both hands. Time seems to open up and simultaneiously close down, 
as though temporality necessarily engendered a sense of guilt linked to 
the deed to be done. Chronos, engendered by Cronos, appears and 
disappears at the same time. It is at this point, it seems, that Cronos 
becomes Chronos, bearer of time. We must understand that Cronos 
undergoes a metamorphosis to become the opposite of what he was 
(Chronos). From the “devourer of time” who prevents time from 
unfolding (Cronos), through this cruel deed he becomes the bearer of 
time for the world (Chronos). Sorel puts it very well:245 
                                                 
240 Sorel, Orphée et l’orphisme, PUF., 1995, p. 49. The god Phanes is derived from 
the Greek phainô, meaning “to make shine”, “to reveal”, “to appear”. 
241 Sorel, Orphée et l’orphisme, PUF, 1995, p. 53. He carries the billhook skêpron 
of sacred individuals, according to the etymology given by Emile Benveniste. 
242 Pindar, Olympian Odes, II, 77. 
243 Plato, Cratylus 396c, cited by Sorel, Les cosmogonies grecques, p. 35. Hesiod 
always gives Ouranos the epithet asteroesis, meaning “starry”. 
244 Hesiod, Cosmogony, ll. 178-182, trans. Dorothea Wender, Penguin, 1976. 
245 Sorel, Les Cosmogonies grecques, p. 42. 
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The castration of Ouranos unleashes an irreversible process: by 
enabling space and time to unfold, it makes the representation of the 
world possible. 
From this moment on, Cronos has two faces: one turned towards the 
heavens and celestial eternity, the other towards human beings and 
temporality. On the one hand he destroys, endlessly re-establishing the 
initial state of things, while on the other he constructs, integrating 
human beings into time and change (Chronos).246 Later the Latin 
authors represent Janus as the two-faced guardian of a door.247 
According to Aubenque, the two faces also appear in Aristotle’s 
synthetic model of time:248 
Time has two faces: as the destroyer of nature, which he erodes and 
undermines through the combined action of heat and cold 
(Meteorology, I, 14, 351a 26 and Physics IV, 13, 222b 19) he is the 
benevolent auxiliary of human action; and while he is not a creator, he 
is at least an inventor, enabling technological progress. (Nicomachean 
Ethics, I, 7, 1098a 24) 
For our own part, we remain cautious on this subject. For while the 
future remains illusory in this mythological model, Aristotle 
conversely suggests that change is no longer an illusion, but that it is 
fundamental to being, at the theoretical level as much as at the ethical 
and political level. It is here that the comparison has to end. On this 
subject Jean Brun rightly suggests:249 
While, for Plato, coming to be is that which turns things and people 
away from the eternal Idea, for Aristotle, conversely, it is through 
coming to be and movement that individuals strive to reach the Being 
that moves them. 
This said, let us return to this conception of the world which, having 
been cut off from Ouranos, moves into a decline in several stages. 
Hesiod relates that as men could no longer use the time of the heavens 
to guide their lives, they became mortal and, crucially, having realised 
they were now freed from the cycles of the higher sphere, full of 
excess (hybris). This is the start of the decline, the second, silver age; 
in short, “the time of men”.    
                                                 
246 The positivity of what is to come (‘à venir’ in French) in the religious context is, 
in fact, its negation (‘a-venir’ in French, with a privative “a”), precisely because 
time is understood as circular.  
247 Chronos is associated not with the Roman Saturn but with Janus, who left the 
memory of the golden age, celebrated in the Saturnalia. The two faces of the door 
are found on Janus’ own face in Ovid’s Metamorphoses. 
248 Aubenque, Le problème de l’Etre chez Aristote, pp. 73-74. 
249 Jean Brun, Aristote et le Lycée, PUF, 1961, p. 26. 
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The Silver Age. Hesiod tells us that this is an inferior race (polu 
kheiroteron), attesting to the state of decline. Cut off from the circular 
time of Ouranos, the men of the silver age seem to lack direction. 
They are completely caught up in an a-kairatic time; they are still the 
children of their own time, whose measure they do not yet have. 
Chronos is a young adult and his world seems wobbly, like a toddler’s 
gait. Hesiod describes men as not living much past their adolescence 
and remaining children for a very long time (“at his good mother’s 
side a hundred years”250), before dying as aged youths. Unlike the 
men of the golden age they suffer many misfortunes, for they do not 
want to adore the gods, nor even to make sacrifices on the holy altars, 
when, Hesiod says, this would seem to be a human duty. They scorn 
the law, which explains their hubris. Thus they are bound to disappear. 
Chronos suffers the same fate at the hands of Jupiter as that he meted 
out to Ouranos. So all in all the silver age is the time of a-kairos and 
hybris that leads to the bronze age. Hesiod then introduces the Bronze 
Age, with the first race of men forged by Zeus himself.   
These men are presented as exaggeratedly bellicose. Benefitting 
from a robust physique that gives them indefatigable power and 
strength, they are frenzied and violent with hearts as hard as bronze. 
These men seem to have become aware of their bodies or, rather, seem 
to have regressed to the point where they can no longer control even 
their own bodies. As for thought and justice, both are out of the 
question in this age. Here we see the full extent of the decline they 
represent. The men of bronze truly are animals and it is in relation to 
them and them alone that we might ask whether they have any 
humanity left. Hesiod states that they are almost men no longer, as 
they “ate no bread”.251 However, Sorel tries to rescue the human 
nature of this race, suggesting that they are the first who truly know 
death:252 
The bronze race open the way to the post-mortem fate reserved for 
almost all the humans to come: falling into the mouldy realm of 
Hades, where they disappear “leaving no names”.   
One thing is certain, the souls of these men do not migrate elsewhere 
after death. They are mortal, in the manner of the animals to whose 
                                                 
250 Hesiod, Works and Days l. 137, trans. Hugh G. Evelyn-White, 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0132 
251 Id. l. 148. 
252 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique…, p. 57. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH INTO PRE-ARISTOTELIAN TIME  
 101 
stage they have regressed. Furthermore, being masters of bronze, they 
are armed to the teeth and think only of war, constantly working this 
metal, which they use even to decorate their houses and for all their 
activities. This is because they are under the control of Ares (Mars), 
son of Zeus, whom Homer described as knowing nothing of justice 
(Themis),253 just like the men of the Silver Age. So they end up killing 
each other and this race dies out all by itself, though mutual murder of 
the entire community. There is something barbarian about them, since 
they slit each other’s throats in a manner typical of way death is 
administered in the oriental world. We might wonder what stages 
could follow, so terminal does this appear. Yet this point marks the 
advent of the race of heroes.  
 
The Heroic Age. Hesiod’s poem is a most delicate undertaking. He 
must now introduce the Greek founding narrative, integrating Homer 
and the Trojan War, without which this myth would not bear the 
colours of the Hellenes. The transition is made by warriors of the 
bronze race, who become masters of arms. Crucially, they also 
become more just and virtuous, which means that at the least they will 
not kill each other, like the men of the Bronze Age. It is these new 
men who must get history back on course. Armed with their extra 
humanity, they set off to fight and are all defeated before either 
Thebes or Troy. Theirs is still a lethal fate, which is simply manifested 
through war. All this seems to mean that death is the lot of this race, 
the lot of human beings, a fact that should never be forgotten. Man is a 
mortal, mortal is man, the mortal man is dead, dies and will die.  
But, crucially, what sets the hero apart from other men is the 
strength to live life in the face of death – a worthy death on the 
battlefield in the epic genre. This is why in the end a few heroes 
become more than demi-gods; they become “blessed”, with a different 
fate from the rest. Sorel explains:254 
Such a cycle, however extraordinary, still requires time to pass and 
hence a negation of the actuality of death. These blessed are not 
subject to the law of Thanatos but, at Zeus’ whim, leave life without 
dying.  
Zeus asks Hermes to take them to the Elysian Fields in the Isles of the 
Blessed, where their souls can enjoy a sweet life of well-earned rest, 
something that seems completely unknown to mortals. However, Sorel 
                                                 
253 Homer, The Iliad, l. 341. 
254 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique, p. 58. 
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notes that none of Homer’s heroes actually has his soul transported to 
the Isles of the Blessed, apart from Menelaus, who brings back Helen. 
This idea seems absurd, poetic, a somewhat featherbrained conception 
we might say today, reflecting the pejorative aspect with which poetic 
activity has been lumbered since being undermined by Plato’s 
ideology. Yet, if this mythology is circular, it is hardly surprising that 
it involves a return to the first phase, in other words the golden age. 
The golden age is the place where the Greeks deploy the heroes, 
which obliges us to accept that even the Greek version proposed by 
Hesiod shows that we are dealing here with circular time. But this is 
not said explicitly. Hesiod seems to be hiding this circular dimension, 
just as he hides from mortals the real destiny of the heroes going to the 
Elysian Fields. We should also note that this vision of heroism makes 
it possible to understand why Plato and Aristotle think that the 
philosopher should be located here. Philosophers are heroes and as 
such it will be up to them to attain the new golden age. It is here that 
we find the fork where the myth’s circularity and linearity separate. 
Linearity says there must be a direct transition from the silver age to 
the iron age, as the fall of man follows a line all the way down, if that 
is where we are going. This means there are only four ages, in 
accordance with the Persian tradition, with the heroic age reduced to 
an intermediate age, a divider separating what goes on into the iron 
age (evil, the iron earth), from all that goes back to the Isles of the 
Blessed (good). Circularity then becomes good, while linearity is evil, 
as Hegel also said. This is the traditional thesis of the negation of 
linear unfolding time, which this myth contrasts with the circularity of 
tradition. However, the irreversible descent towards the iron age is not 
obligatory, heroism makes it possible to close the circle, to avoid 
entering the iron age and thus to return to the golden age. 
 
 
b .  O n  t h e  P y t h a g o r e a n  m y s t e r i e s ,  o r  t h e  
s t r u c t u r i n g  o f  h u m a n  t i m e  i n  s t a g e s  o f  l i f e  
i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  b o d i l y  u n i t y .  
 
Our approach would be hard to understand if we did not say a little 
about the Pythagorean dimension that appears between the lines of the 
version proposed by Hesiod. We do not know whether Hesiod drew 
on an ancient Orphism, perhaps dating back to Cretan culture, or 
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whether he settled for using the Pythagorean conceptions of his own 
time. Moreover, Herodotus (II, 81) regards the Orphics and 
Pythagoreans as equal255 and Aristotle said that the lines of Orpheus 
were not original, as we shall see.256 In short, the Pythagoreans said 
that Zeus coupled with his own daughter, called Persephone or Koré, 
resulting in the birth of Dionysus. This was the start of a new era, a 
reworking of the Iranian doctrine of cyclical time, as Sorel clearly 
states: 257 
The Orphic Dionysus was not a rural divinity but a child-god whose 
initiation coincided with the start of a new cosmic end.   
Indeed it was said that Dionysus would be “the very last king of the 
gods”. The manner in which he is presented, the words with which he 
is surrounded and the ideological charge he carries make him the 
equal of Zarathustra, although he did not have this image for the 
Greeks. A Pythagorean fragment announces:258 
Listen, gods! Here is the man I give you as King!  
The cosmic end he represents is the coming of Zarathustra, the last 
god, the new king, the last of the last for men, but not for the gods. 
However, Dionysus is dismembered by the Titans and his body 
scattered in as many souls as there are human souls. So each soul 
contains a dismembered piece of divine eternity. The memory of this 
event sets each soul on a path (metempsycosis)259 to regain the primal 
                                                 
255 “Pythagoreanism is one of the many mystical sects that developed in Southern 
Italy throughout the 6th century; it had close links to Orphism” adds Schuhl in 
Essai…, p. 242.  
256 What is certain is that Orphism cannot be Egyptian in origin, as there are no 
notions within it that are comparable to that of “metempsychosis”. The source of this 
confusion is a misunderstanding by Herodotus, as stated in a note below. 
257 Sorel, Orphée et l’orphisme, p. 75. 
258 Orphic fragment no. 208. All these fragments were collected in the Orphicurum 
fragmenta edited by Otto Kern, Berlin, 1922, Weidmann, 1972. 
259 Reincarnation is a belief adopted by Plato, Plutarch, Plotinus and Proclus. It is 
rejected, as we shall see, by Aristotle, the Stoics, Epicurus and St Augustine. On the 
basis of two accounts by Diogenes Laertius, it was long thought that the belief “that 
the soul survives death and passes into other bodies” (I, Prologue, trans. Hicks) was 
of Egyptian origin, while Herodotus says: “The Egyptians were the first who 
maintained the following doctrine, too, that the human soul is immortal, and at the 
death of the body enters into some other living thing then coming to birth”, The 
Histories, Book II, chapter 123, trans. A. D. Godley. However, as Sorel rightly 
notes, it was not present in the Egyptian theological conception: “The Egyptian 
initiate mentally performed mutations (kheperou, passage from one form of being to 
another) to get closer to Atum: he was not embodied in any manifest form”, Orphée 
et l’orphisme, p. 81, note 1. However, Xenophanes of Colophon (DK 21b7) and 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 104 
 
Unity (the philosophical concept of the One), thus endlessly striving 
to leave its weighty body behind:260 
The soul, a separate piece of the original puzzle, is imprisoned in a 
body (sôma) as in a tomb (sêma) due to a superhuman event. This 
imprisonment sanctions a stage in the cycle of metempsychoses  
Escape from this cycle can take several years, or may even never 
happen. It is always up to Zeus to decide the outcome of this infernal 
cycle – or so Simplicius tells us in the following passage:261 
The soul is chained to the wheel of necessity and birth, from which 
escape is impossible, according to Orpheus, other than by pleasing the 
gods whom Zeus has empowered to free souls from this cycle. 
While waiting for this event, the soul constantly changes bodies, 
entering and leaving them again.262 So we might wonder about the 
endpoint of the series of reincarnations. In every case it implies that 
human beings must behave in the most just manner possible. This was 
stressed by Plato, who wrote at least six dialogues on the subject:263 
They say that a person’s soul can never die; that sometimes it comes 
to an end – most people call it “dying” – and sometimes it comes back 
into being, but that it’s never destroyed. And that’s why we’ve got to 
live the whole of our lives as religiously as we possibly can.  
So we can see that as long as souls have not escaped the cycle, they 
continue to change bodies, over a long cosmic period. But how can 
                                                                                                                   
Empedocles adopted it (DK 31b117) from the tradition of Orpheus, Pherecydes of 
Syros and crucially Pythagoras, the greatest Greek representative of this conception. 
The belief’s origins remain highly obscure to this day.   
260 Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique…, p. 111. 
261 Sorel, op. cit., p. 93; see also Proclus Hymnes et prières, French trans. H.D. 
Saffrey, Arfugen, 1994, notably chapter IV. 
262 Not every transmigration is metempsycosis, for transmigration can occur from a 
body to some other entity, whereas the term métempsykhosis refers to the passage 
(meta) of the soul (psykhosis) from one body to another, human or animal, but not a 
plant. There can be no transmigration to nothing or another kind of entity except, 
precisely, in the case that concerns us here, in the form of transportation to a place or 
non-place that receives the heroes. So it is the escape from the cycle of reincarnation 
that poses a problem. This notion has been overlaid by that of palingenesis, which 
has often been applied exclusively to the heavens, since being cut in two by the 
Stoics, who rejected its bodily aspect and retained only its cosmic dimension. 
Formed from the prefix palin (return, renewal) and genesis (generation) it signifies a 
real Dionysian rebirth.  
263 Plato, Meno, 81b, trans. Adam Beresford. These six dialogues are the Meno, 
81b-c, which refers to the poet Pindar and his ideal of total knowledge; the Phaedo 
81e-82b; the Republic 615a-621b, which records the myth of Er; the Phaedrus 248d-
e which mentions reincarnation as an animal; the Timaeus 90e, which gives man a 
choice, noted Y by the Pythagoreans, and the Laws 870d-e, 872d-e, 904d. 
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souls escape reincarnation? This is undoubtedly a matter for Zeus 
rather than human beings, though not entirely, at least not in the 
conception adopted by Plato:264 
Now, as the soul combining first with one body and then with another 
undergoes all sorts of changes, either of herself, or through the 
influence of another soul, all that remains to the player of the game is 
that he should shift the pieces; sending the better nature to the better 
place, and the worse to the worse, and so assigning to them their 
proper portion. 
Divine judgement seems to be exerted only in relation to the character 
of human beings, clearly showing that individuals are not subject to a 
divine lottery. Their characters must possess features on which the 
divinity’s judgement can be based. And here the ideal of the Greek 
heroes provides a founding model and mythological precedent that 
requires detailed description. For how should we understand the 
Orphic dimension and with it what Hesiod tells us of the fate of the 
souls of the heroes, which seem able to return to the golden age and 
escape these infernal cycles?  
In the first place, we would suggest that the end of this 
circularity lies in the Isles of the Blessed and eternal spring. This is 
confirmed by the philosopher Iamblichus:265 
What are the islands of the Blessed? The Sun and Moon. 
So there is an end to the infernal cycle and this end seems to have 
some links to the Median mythology of the Persians, whether or not it 
came out of Orphism. There is a mythological montage to be grasped 
here, which still remains obscure. We would then suggest that escape 
from the cycle of reincarnation is well attested within the strict 
confines of Orphism. Escaping the cycle of reincarnation means 
freeing oneself from circular time, “which liberates [the soul] from the 
circle of generation”, as Proclus put it.266 It is also clear that it relates 
                                                 
264 Plato, Laws, 904b6-c1, trans. Benjamin Jowett, 1892: 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/laws.html 
265 Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras, § 82, trans. Thomas Taylor, Inner Traditions 
International, 1986, p. 43. Iamblichus adds that the tetracktys is “the oracle at 
Delphi” and that harmony is “that in which the sirens subsist”. Another fragment 
translated by Schuhl confirms this hypothesis: “Now I come as a supplicant to the 
noble Persephone, so that her grace will send me to the residence that is the seat of 
the blessed”, in Essai…, p. 240. 
266 Proclus, Commentary on the Timaeus of Plato, 42 c., trans. Thomas Taylor, 
Martin Euser (ed.), 2010: 
http://meuser.awardspace.com/NeoPlatonics/33700322-Proclus-Commentary-on-
the-Timaeus-of-Plato-all-five-books.pdf 
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to the idea of the blessed life in the golden age in the reign of Cronos. 
This mythological relationship seems again attested by the following 
Orphic fragment:267 
This is what those who are initiated by Orpheus to Dionysus and Kore 
pray that they may attain, “To cease from the wheel and breathe again 
from ill”. 
We should moreover note that it is on the Pythagorean tablets that we 
find the greatest number of reflections of this conception. These 
tablets were found on the bodies of the dead, either inside or beside 
their tumuli. Most of these texts, for the most part inscribed on bronze, 
begin with a statement of thirst,268 a call for the spring, and then the 
following statement:269 
I am the son of the Earth and the starry Heavens. 
It is only in some of them that we read what we are looking for here, 
an account of exit from the cycles of reincarnation:270 
I flew out of the circle of terrible, crushing suffering, nimble-footed, I 
reached the longed-for crown, I sank into the bosom of the queen of 
the underworld, I descended nimble-footed to the longed-for crown.  
The end of the cycle, the escape from the circle, these are effective 
conceptions that describe the singular change undergone by the 
singular souls of the heroes, which initiates seek to copy as best they 
can to ensure the same destiny for themselves. However, we have yet 
to understand the theoretical model that explains the destiny of these 
heroic souls. On this point the poet Pindar sheds his own light, in a 
                                                 
267 Orphic fragment no. 230, cited by Sorel, Orphée et l’Orphisme, p. 89. 
268 See Schuhl, Essai…, p. 241: “I am dried out with thirst and I am dying, but 
quick, give me the cool water that flows from the lake of “Memory”. And of 
themselves they will let you drink from the divine spring and after that you will be 
in command among the heroes”; is there also a hierarchy of heroes?  
269 Anne Lebris, La mort et les conceptions de l'au-delà en Grèce ancienne à 
travers les épigrammes funéraires. Etude d'épigrammes d'Asie mineure de l'époque 
hellénistique et romaine, Chapter V, “Les séjours de l'immortalité bienheureuse”, 
pp. 61-80, l'Harmattan, 2001. 
270 Giovanni Pugliese Carratelli, Les lamelles orphiques. Instructions pour le 
voyage d'outre-tombe des initiés grecs, Les Belles Lettres, 2003, p. 106; French 
translation of this lamella by Bernadette Leclercq-Neveu. Schuhl’s translation 
replaces “the queen of the underworld” with “Our Lady”: “I flew out of the terrible 
cycle of profound pain, my nimble feet reached the longed-for circle and I nestled 
beneath the breast of Our Lady, queen of here below.” (Kern, II, C, Diels, 66B, 
18).”, in Essai…, p. 240. 
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poetic mission that should be understood in the strict sense of the 
term:271 
“Because only those who've paid Persephone the price, for the pain, 
for the grief, of long ago - theirs are the souls that she sends, when the 
ninth year comes, back to the sun-lit world above. And from those 
souls, proud-hearted kings will rise, and the swift and strong, and the 
wisest of the wise.”   
As the register here is initiatory, this statement should not be 
understood conceptually. We find notions characteristic of mystery 
cults – kings, crowns and men without tasks to perform – all of which 
litter Judeo-Christian writings.272 Escape from the cycles is marked by 
freedom from tasks and attested by the wearing of a crown. This 
became the conception of the Messiah-King, whose royalty lies 
outside the political demain, which is merely one of its manifestations.  
But, has the escape from phases of reincarnation ever been 
identified outside the initiatory sphere that is the vector of its mystery? 
In the work of Diogenes Laertius we find two highly eloquent 
accounts relating to this. The first records words attributed to the 
Ionian philosopher Anaxagoras. The account of Timon seems 
comparatively important for its explicit pairing of hero and Mind.273 
The souls of the heroes, whose ultimate journey we should like to 
discover, seem to form the notion of mind. While this passage refers 
only to a single hero, rather than a plurality, it remains crucial for 
understanding this most obscure of matters:274 
They say too that wise Anaxagoras, / Deserves immortal fame; they 
call him Mind, / Because, as he doth teach, Mind came in season, / 
Arranging all which was confus’d before. 
                                                 
271 Pindar, Threnodies, fragment 133, preserved in Plato’s Meno, trans. Beresford. 
A threnody is a song of mourning. 
272 All these conceptions seem to have been retained by the Jewish tradition. The 
tree of the sephirot has a crown (Kéter) and the ten terms of the Tetracktys also 
appear. See Salomon Ibn Gabirol, Kether Malcouth (la couronne royale), French 
translation from the Hebrew by Paul Vuillaud, Dervy-Livres, 1984 (1953). 
273 On Timon see Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, I1, 9. 
274 Diogenes Laertius, trans. C.D. Yonge, The Lives and Opinions of Eminent 
Philosophers I, 2., available at: 
https://archive.org/stream/livesandopinions00diogiala/livesandopinions00diogiala_d
jvu.txt  
In Diogenes we also find the fragment of Aristotle’s Protrepticus: “When somebody 
asked Anaxagoras for what reason anyone might choose to come to be and be alive, 
he replied to the question by saying, ‘To observe the heavens and the stars in it, as 
well as moon and sun’ p. 48. 
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So we can see that the gathering of all souls to remake the mutilated 
body of Dionysus goes hand in hand with a quest for order. All 
acknowledge that the notion of kosmos comes from the Orphic source 
and notably from Pythagoreanism.275 But it is less historical to 
recognise that this notion, in the sense of organisation, is radically 
esoteric.276 These souls will become the Mind that wanders through 
the air, so we must assume that they are still looking for the way to the 
Isles of the Blessed. But let us go a little further. We seem to be close 
to the root of our questioning. Let us pose one last question: who is 
the hero, also called Mind, who will take on the name Soul of the 
World in Plato and who will later be found in the philosophy of 
Plotinus and others until the philosophy of Hegel? We would suggest 
that in Plotinus’ philosophy, the Soul of the World is paired with the 
notion of Providence via the notion of Mind, with its organising 
intelligence, as promoted by Orphism. Henri Crouzel, an expert on the 
philosophy of Plotinus, offers the following interesting synthesis:277 
The Soul of the World governs the stars, through the intermediary of 
the souls of the individual stars, as we shall see. According to Plato it 
guides everything with reason. It is this soul that produces the 
succession of events, relations of cause and effect, foreseeing and 
knowing what will follow.  
Furthermore, in his Enneads Plotinus gives this Soul of the World the 
name “universal reason”.278 So this linkage of future (Providence), 
reason (noûs kubernétès) and mind (objective time stemming from the 
heavens) cannot be understood independently of its Orphic source. 
                                                 
275 According to Aristotle, this idea comes from Anaxagoras (Metaphysics A, 3, 
984b 15-20 and 985a, 18-19). Simplicius (DK Fragment B12) conveys the idea as 
follows: “Nous has power over all things, both greater and smaller, that have 
<soul>", trans. J. Burnet, text in < > trans. Elpenor, available at:  
http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/ancient-greece/anaxagoras-nous.asp 
276 Pierre Chantraine’s Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque 
(Klincksieck, 1968, pp. 570-571) states that this word shifts from a notion of 
decoration to acquire the meanings of “organisation” and “constitution” in 
Herodotus, before signifying “world” in Pythagoras, Parmenides and Plato, in 
contrast to the world of the elect. Ultimately this gives us the following synthesis by 
Aristotle, who compares the kosmos to an army: “We must consider also in which of 
two ways the nature of the universe contains the good or the highest good, whether 
as something separate and by itself, or as the order of the parts. Probably in both 
ways, as an army does.” Aristotle, Metaphysics, , 10, 1075a, 11-13, trans. Barnes. 
277 Henri Crouzel, Origène et Plotin. Comparaisons doctrinales, Téqui, 1991, pp. 
187-195. 
278 Plotinus, Enneads, III, 3, § 48. 
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The notion of Providence is locked away in an esotericism from 
which it will no longer emerge. We should, however, state that this 
rational providence is good, since it is theoretically established that 
the reign of Zeus is that of intelligence and Good and is the domain 
closest to Ouranos. It is to this esoteric conception that Hegel pays 
tribute in his concept of mind coupled with the notion of a divine plan 
in order to describe historic time.279 However, we are not yet done 
with this mythology that has travelled down the ages. Diogenes 
Laertius gives us a final piece of information on Pythagoras:280 
When [the soul] is strong and settled down into itself, reasonings and 
deeds become its bonds. When cast out upon the earth, it wanders in 
the air like the body. Hermes is the steward of souls, and for that 
reason is called Hermes the Escorter, Hermes the Keeper of the Gate, 
and Hermes of the Underworld, since it is he who brings in the souls 
from their bodies both by land and sea; and the pure are taken into the 
uppermost region, but the impure are not permitted to approach the 
pure or each other, but are bound by the furies in bonds unbreakable. 
The whole air is full of souls which are called genii or heroes. 
Souls are now multiple and split into two kinds, according to the fate 
allotted to them by Zeus. Pure souls go to a beyond that is very high, 
to form the good soul of the world, while the non-heroic souls stay in 
the depths of Tartarus forever, in order to form the bad soul of the 
world. It is quite impossible to describe the notion of the soul of the 
world without stating whether it is good or bad, as that would drain all 
the meaning from this Iranian doctrine. The notion of soul of the 
world is dual – dualist as it would later be said.281 Pure souls wander 
through the Greek heavens, which is why the world is ruled by Good.  
Lastly, it is said that this is explained by the Pythagoreans as 
follows: as Zeus has missed the Bronze Age, he allies himself with 
Metis to obtain her virtues and ensure the advent of Good at the end of 
a worthy titanesque struggle, which leads to the unconditional victory 
of Good in the world, to which the virtues within human beings bear 
witness:282 
Phanes is also Metis, a word meaning the practical or technical 
intelligence (polymêtis) that is indispensable to anyone governing the 
                                                 
279 Hegel, The Philosophy of History, p. 36, trans. J. Sibree and particularly the 
Hegelian slogan: “This plan philosophy strives to comprehend.” 
280 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, VIII, 31, trans. Hicks. 
281 So it comes as no surprise to note St Augustine finds a way out of this dualism 
after reading Aristotle’s Protrepticus, in the version in Cicero’s Hortensius, since 
Aristotle leaves this conception behind from the outset in his philosophical work.  
282 Sorel, Orphée et l’orphisme, p. 54. 
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cosmos. As a proper noun, the goddess, unknown to Homer, is an 
Oceanid in Hesiod, who makes her the first wife of Zeus. Metis has 
the power to change her form (the gift of metamorphosis proper to the 
water gods) the gift of omniscient cunning and shrewd prudence. 
Following the victorious outcome of his struggle to win definitive 
sovereignty, Hesiod’s Zeus swallows his ally to assimilate her virtues.  
Meanwhile the impure souls are bound by the furies in chains so 
unbreakable that they can never return. However, no Greek author 
mentions a hero who has managed to return to the Golden Age, other 
than Menelaus, who brings back Helen. So this mythology raises 
many questions concerning its effectiveness and spread. In any case, 
failing get to the end of this initiatory journey means not ending the 
cycles of reincarnation, and thus falling inexorably back into the Iron 
Age. So, in the absence of the “miracle”, the Iron Age continues to 
receive human beings, in other words non-heroes. Until souls can 
become detached, fulfilling the promise of escape from the cycle of 
reincarnations and closing the circle, they continue to be buried in 
bodies as though in a tomb. This is the terrible inevitability of human 
misery, the weight of the worldy envelope that is in itself damnation. 
The Iron Age is “now” says Hesiod, to make us better understand the 
terrible fate to which we are bound – by the Persians anyway.   
 
The Iron Age. Sappho will open the door to us. The Iron Age is the 
world here below, as the Christian vulgate would say. It is hell on 
earth. Whether the origins of all this are Median or simply Orphic, the 
proselytic message always culminates in a powerful call to belief that 
plays on human weakness. This is how Sappho ends the life of a poor 
Greek woman who lacks religious cultivation:283 
When you are dead you will lie forever unremembered and no one 
will miss you, for you have not touched the roses of the Pierian 
Muses. Invisible even in the house of Hades, you will wander among 
the dim dead, a flitting thing. 
Ordinary mortals, prudent as they should be, are better advised to do 
their duty and take themselves off to a place of worship – those places 
where hope is sold cheap, or at least at a better price than the classes at 
the philosophy schools, which were reserved for the elite, in both the 
Orphic cults and the public Eleusinian cults. So we need to understand 
that Hesiod’s myth gives a framework to religious conceptions that 
were key to the Greek cults and to Pythagoreanism. Hesiod’s myth 
                                                 
283 Sappho, Fragment 63, in Poems and Fragments, trans. Stanley Lombardo, 
Hackett Publishing Company, 2002. 
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was not influenced by Pythagoreanism, he gave it the same 
architecture while stripping it of its mystery. The myth of races 
indicates all the successive stages of Pythagorean initiation.284 This is 
why Aristotle regards this mythology with the greatest irony, as 
reflected in this passage from the Metaphysics:285 
The School of Hesiod and all the mythologists thought only of what 
was plausible to themselves, and had not regard to us. For asserting 
the first principles to be gods and born of gods, they say that the 
beings which did not taste of nectar and ambrosia became mortal; and 
clearly they are using words which are familiar to themselves, yet 
what they have said, even about the very application of these causes is 
above our comprehension.  
Aristotle categorically states that we must distinguish two types of 
human beings: initiates, who are immortal in the sense that they have 
tasted the ambrosia nectar, and the rest, mortals, of whom he is one 
(“us”).286 The former base their theory of the world on irrational 
mysteries while Aristotle seeks out rational principles, which is why 
he has to reject these conceptions as a whole. It seems to us that this 
passage from his Metaphysics is an irrefutable illustration of the fact 
that Aristotle was not an initiate. And from this flow all the 
consequences, notably in relation to his conceptions of the final goals 
(eschato-logy). Aristotle’s “télos” cannot be the same as Plato’s; the 
former is not an initiate, the latter always prides himself on being so. 
It is at this level of analysis that we should understand that Aristotle’s 
temporal conception remains independent of the world of the initiated, 
of any strictly religious eschatology, and of any sacred type of time – 
in short that his conception of time cannot in any way support a 
circular view of human temporality. As for Aristotle’s study of 
Hesiod, we know nothing of it. In Book A of the Metaphysics he 
says:287 
                                                 
284 Schuhl observes, “But after Pausanias (VIII, 37, 5), it is only Onomacritus – the 
chresmologist who lived at the court of Pisistratus and was caught in the act of 
falsifying the prophecies of Musaeus (Herodotus, VII, 6) – who made the Titans, 
whose name he took from Homer, authors of the passion of Dionysos.” op. cit., p. 
230. 
285 Aristotle, Metaphysics, B, 4, 1000a 8-14, trans. Barnes. 
286 For Syrianus ambrosia symbolises the separation of the created world and nectar 
the fact of not being fascinated by things here below, 41.30-42.12. 
287 Metaphysics A, 4, 984b 31-32, trans. Barnes. According to Syrianus, the use of 
obscure language by Hesiod and the theologians can be explained by the fact that 
they are not trying to pass on teaching, but to speak of an inspired path, 42.12-16.  
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How these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority of 
discovery let us be allowed to decide later. 
But it must be admitted that this argument does not appear in the 
discussion of Hesiod in the preserved Aristotelian corpus.288 
 
In short, the Iron Age, said to be the age in which human beings 
currently live out their lives (“For now truly is a race of iron”),289is 
horrible. In the service of the cults Hesiod the mythologist paints it as 
black as possible, masking reality in a veil of shadow cast over the 
world of the present (ideological nûn). In this last stage of decadence 
and humanity’s fall, linear time excludes return, circularity is wrecked 
on the shores of atheism and human beings are condemned with no 
possibility of appeal. Hesiod describes these people as endlessly 
working and shrouded in suffering day and night, at the opposite 
extreme from the golden age they have failed to reach because they 
failed to believe in the gods. Filial relationships, friendship and 
exchange are things of the past. Worse, young people scorn their 
parents and elders, while adults respect neither justice nor law and are 
without virtue. Worse still, honour is paid to vice, rapine, odious tricks 
and calomnies – in sum to Evil. And the wicked do all this without 
any sense of guilt. Darbo-Peschanski offers the following insightful 
interpretation:290 
These people do not die from being suddenly struck by death. They 
die from having no time left. If their children are born old and their 
lineages, stripped of ressemblance, are shattered by disparity and 
produce more continuity, this is because they have lost the impulse to 
change, which enabled them to stretch out the time from their birth to 
their death: not only has the mechanism for the exchange of gifts that 
underpins hospitality, other social relations and those between gods 
and men ceased to operate but justice has become confused with force.   
No salvation without initiation! Without initiation human beings are 
unable to take on their own time, acquire continuity in the world and 
think of the future. All these things are given to them by the cults, 
without which they will fall back into animality, replacing justice with 
force. This is the traditional message of the theologians. However, 
there is an admission of failure on the part of the divinity in Hesiod, 
                                                 
288 Hesiod appears in the following passages of the Metaphysics:  A,  4 ,  984b 23;  
A,  8 ,  989a 10;  B,  4 ,  100a 9.  
289 Hesiod, Works and Days, l. 176, trans. H. G. Evelyn-White. 
290 Darbo-Peschanski, “Historia et historiographie grecque: le temps des hommes”, 
art. cit., pp. 89-114, p. 105. 
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since, like the others, this race will disappear. In bringing justice to 
humankind, at every stage of his creation Zeus seems to get it wrong. 
Once again, he will be obliged to destroy this race that is unaware of 
the functions of his three daughters Justice (Dikè), Peace (Eirènê) and 
Fairness (Eunomia). But is it time that these people lack, or justice? In 
the Cosmogony of Hesiod our mythologist, time precedes justice by a 
long way, since Zeus created the world long before he engendered his 
three daughters, who are precisely a product of this world.291 Besides, 
have any of these four races taken responsibility for justice? 
Absolutely not. The worst of them, the race of the Silver Age, does 
seem to have been the first to concern itself with justice, but this 
concern was rooted in an impossibility that ultimately led to its 
downfall. Can we follow Darbo-Peschanski’s tragic observation?292 
So, in giving human beings Justice, Zeus does not offer them an 
entirely positive gift; instead he renders them endlessly out of step 
with the divine order, while they must seek to reduce this gap on pain 
of death, without the moment of that death being clearly determined. 
So he gives them their own chaotic time, which goes from just to 
unjust deeds and which, because justice cannot be universally 
eliminated, leads to the uncertainty of the hour of death. The human 
future is linked to human actions, it is moved by the impossibility of 
controlling the dyssymetry of justice. So it appears – and this is a 
constant in Greek thought – as a devaluation, not only of divine 
eternity, but also of cosmic regularity.   
Indeed it seems that all these stages are ultimately subject to the same 
observation of divine impotence. The castration of Cronos triggers a 
string of castrations, yet divine law still does not turn human beings 
towards justice, peace and fraternity. They have been granted time in 
the hope that it would have that effect, but seemingly to no avail. For 
Hesiod time is circular and the development of humanity must be kept 
within the framework of the future of the religion he promotes. This is 
also the view of the poet Aeschylus, writing, with very Greek irony:293 
Prometheus:  I took from man expectancy of death. 
Chrorus:  What remedy (pharmakon) found’st thou for this 
malady? 
                                                 
291 Sorel suggests that “The Iron Age was the first to be plunged into the meanders 
of coming-to-be”, in Critique…, p. 63. 
292 Darbo-Peschanksi, “Historia et historiographie grecque: ‘le temps des 
hommes’”, art. cit., pp. 89-114, p. 103. 
293 Aeschylus, Prometheus Bound, ll. 248-251, trans. G. M. Cookson, Oxford, 
Blackwell, 1922. 
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Prometheus:  I planted blind hope (tuphlas…elpidas) in the heart of 
him. 
Chorus:  A mighty boon thou gavest there to man. 
For the castration of Cronos tore human beings from our world’s 
starry sky. It cut us off from the heavens and this is why time is no 
longer possible and no longer brings any justice. Plato would say that 
the world has regressed to a more backward age, as it is no longer 
connected to the good of a universe spinning towards the right. 
Indeed, if we place the myth of races in the context of the narrative as 
a whole, we notice that the story is buried by a magisterial return to 
the correspondence of human and heavenly time. When should we 
plant or harvest? asks Hesiod – we should follow the time of the 
heavens. When should we set sail? The heavens will determine the 
right moment. To each season its own work – spring, summer, 
autumn, winter and even particular days. Aware that humans are too 
limited to follow divine orders, Hesiod urges them to submit to 
heavenly time. Works and Days is an exhortation to tailor human time 
to the divine time of the heavens, so that every action becomes 
measured and human beings are not “all excess”. A break with the 
heavens would destroy the species; it would make justice impossible, 
inevitably leading to a gradual but certain human decline into 
animality. Such is the ultimate lesson that Hesiod would like to leave 
to his brother Perses in Works and Days. This remarkable hymn to the 
adaptation of human time to the divine time of the heavens enable us 
to seize the right moment.294 It is here that the concept of kairos, 
understood as the fruitful adaptation of man to the heavens, becomes 
more solid.295 Every action will be fruitful as long as it is conducted in 
accord with the time of the heavens.  
                                                 
294 The notion of kairos is often replaced by the ideal life of the peasant farmer, 
which is found only as an example in Hesiod’s Works and Days. This might be 
amusing, were the same naïve view of time not also inscribed on the headquarters of 
the UN, in a maxim taken from the philosophy of Marcus Aurelius and translated as 
“Convert the steel of your arms into ploughshares.” To which we might reply, all 
right, but when? The notion of kairos has been debased since the time of the Stoics 
at least, and that is what makes the work of Moutsopoulos so exemplary. 
295 On this see the most recent book by Moutsopoulos, Variations sur le thème du 
kairos de Socrate à Denys, Vrin, 2002. Poseidippus, c. 330 BCE, gave the following 
description of the statue of kairos by Lysippos: “Who and whence was the sculptor? 
From Sikyon. / And his name? Lysippos. / And who are you? Time who subdues all 
things. / Why do you stand on tip-toe? I am ever running. / And why you have a pair 
of wings on your feet? I fly with the wind. / And why do you hold a razor in your 
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We shall conclude our discussion of Hesiod’s mythology by noting 
that circular time is clearly found within it. What this interpretation 
seems to reveal is that this circular time is an invitation to return to 
tradition and the matching of human time to that of the heavens. After 
this, the mythology of the cycles of reincarnation that (heroic) souls 
must seek to close by travelling to the Isles of the Blessed indicates 
that this circular time of the stars can theoretically be a model 
applicable to the movement of the soul. It follows from all this that 
while the circularity of time is advanced, this initiatory or traditional 
thesis places linear time within the framework of a fall, of human 
decline manifested in the five ages and races. It is an unavoidable 
destiny from which human beings can escape only through belief and 
faith. While a Greek circular time did exist, this is not a time of Greek 
doxa; it is not a time that contained the lives of Greek individuals; it is 
the sacred time within which they seem to have had a citizen’s duty to 
place themselves. Ultimately, however, this sacred time had to give 
way to a more analytical, philosophical time. 
 
If Aristotelian time does not adopt this idea of a religious end (télos), 
the resulting questions seem to form an inextricable knot. What time 
could be independent of these sacred notions? With what conceptions 
of the “end” could they counter the religious approach? On what 
source could Aristotle have drawn for his own model of time? Before 
rushing to the corpus to find the various descriptions of time, let us 
note once again that, in every case, time is always dependent on its 
“motor”, which seems a priori to be located at its term, in other words 
in conceptions of the “end”, the télos. This is why we do not think 
Aristotle’s time can be discussed without a consideration of the 
concept of entelechy. Are all sacred dimensions truly absent from this 
concept, as we provisionally assert in the present study? This is far 
from certain. Indeed it may be that Aristotle’s public discourse on the 
end is not entirely in tune with his underlying beliefs. This is another 
                                                                                                                   
right hand? As a sign to men that I am sharper than any sharp edge. / And why does 
your hair hang over your face? For him who meets me to take me by the forelock. / 
And why, in Heaven's name, is the back of your head bald? Because none whom I 
have once raced by on my winged feet will now, though he wishes it sore, take hold 
of me from behind. / Why did the artist fashion you? For your sake, stranger, and he 
set me up in the porch as a lesson.” English trans. W.R. Paton, Love Epigrams, Loeb 
Classical Library, 1898. See Chronos et kairos. Entretiens d’Athènes, 1986, 
introduction by Moutsopoulos, p. 14. 
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important dimension of the constitution of knowledge which we shall 
seek to consider. While a sophist speaks always for the public, the 
various models of real thinkers necessarily have a personal dimension, 
which does not remain private, but reveals the humanity lurking deep 
within the thinking being.   
 
Lastly, it may seem surprising that we have adopted an achronological 
order, considering time in tragedy before turning our attention to the 
epic. However, we have shown that the notion of time is more present 
in epic poetry, which is fuelled by religious conceptions stemming 
from Orphism and Pythagoreanism. This view is strongly supported 
by analysis of Hesiod’s mythology. Moreover, the relationship 
between tragedy and the epic is not explicit in Aristotle’s Poetics.296 
Time should also be analysed in the arts more closely related to it, 
such as music, dance and mime, but we shall leave that to the 
specialists.297 We shall now consider a different source from that of 
the religious tradition described here and adopted by Plato, before 
turning to time as developed in the thought of Aristotle.  
                                                 
296 Aristotle, Poetics, XIII, 1453a 23-39.  
297 Vuillemin lists the time-based arts as music, dance and mime, op. cit., p. 71. 
However, we should treat with caution his suggestion that “epic narrative is purely 
temporal”, p. 81. 
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In the whole range of time past, so far as our inherited records reach, 
no change appears to have taken place either in the whole scheme of 
the outermost heaven or in any of its proper parts. The name, too, of 
that body seems to have been handed down right to our own day from 
our distant ancestors who conceived of it in the fashion which we have 
been expressing. The same ideas, one must believe, recur in men’s 
minds not once or twice but again and again. 
Aristotle, On the Heavens, trans. Barnes, I, 270b 14-19. 
 
 
 
While dichotomy may be comfortable enough as a means of 
categorisation, it remains very distant here from the things it is 
supposed to describe.298 It covers the world in an Apollonian veil 
whose obvious beauty must be resisted.299 For reasons of argument, in 
the first part we sought to show, on the basis of Aristotle’s 
Protrepticus, that there were two kinds of time. The first is initiatory 
and circular in form. A consideration of Greek conceptions of time 
enabled us to link this vision of the world to Pythagoreanism. The 
second kind of time, which the religions describe as illusory and 
contingent, is the linear form, which represents philosophical time. 
The first conception regards the future as illusory, in accordance with 
the model of the circular fall from the religious sphere, whereas the 
second, as we shall show in the present section, seeks to consider 
future time in a positive light. It would be easy to engrave this stone300 
with Homer’s poetry and the names of all the Greek tragic poets. 
Hesiod’s thought has provided us with a pivot between the two 
conceptions. In proposing two readings of the myth of races, one 
circular, the other linear, we have brought these two conceptions 
                                                 
298 Aristotle criticises the dichotomy stemming from division (diairein: diviser) in 
many passages of his work; he even proposes, condescendingly where Plato is 
concerned, that it is an “impotent syllogism”. So it is no surprise that the terms 
Aristotle employs in criticising Plato’s dichotomy are the same as those Nietzsche 
later used to demolish Hegel’s kenotic dialectic, cf. Prior Analytics, I, 31, 46a 31, 
Posterior Analytics, II, 5, 91b 16, Metaphysics, Z, 12 1036b 27 and Parts of 
Animals, I, 2, “Against the dichotomy”. 
299 According to Plato, using dichotomy means leaving harmony behind forever. 
Cf. Mattéi, L’Etranger et le Simulacre, Essai sur la fondation de l’ontologie 
platonicienne, PUF, 1983, p. 204. 
300 A stone is a “sign for the future”, a conception also found in Hesiod’s 
Theogony, ll. 147-210; “vomiting up the stone” means permitting generation in op. 
cit., pp. 172-173. 
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together around the central point of the Heroic Age. We are bound to 
note that the figure of the hero appears in both perspectives. In epic 
and tragic poetry, it is the hero’s task to be a vector of the future for 
the citizens (as Achilles and Odysseus are). Similarly, within religious 
thought the end of the fall301 that is common to all the cults requires 
the intervention of a hero who must go back through the concentric 
circles in order to attain the crown of being himself, with initiates 
seeking to follow Dionysus or Zarathustra down this heroic path.302  
 This knot typical of poetico-philosophical intellectual activity 
must now be loosened by the intervention of an external element, a 
peripeteia as the poets would say; the provision of proof takes rational 
philosophy forward and out of a theoretical impasse. To this end we 
shall briefly consider the Platonic synthesis of Greek ideas before 
describing a current of thought whose remoteness from specifically 
Greek questions we hope to show. By way of transition, we shall 
suggest that, as Plato continues to side with the “Sicilian Muses” 
without giving the “Ionian Muses” their rightful place – to borrow the 
terms of his dialogue The Sophist (242 d) – his thought cannot offer a 
way out of the problem and enable us to engage with the work of 
Aristotle. His work will enable us to bring the religious current to a 
close before considering the Ionian thinking to which Aristotle is 
closer – at least at first sight. However, as we shall see and in line with 
most of the preceding sections, while the religious philosophical 
position is not adopted, ideas from it will be included in Aristotle’s 
model of time. It is for this reason that, once again, a historical detour 
seems necessary. 
 
                                                 
301 This is also the concept of fallenness in Heidegger’s philosophy: “This 
‘movement’ of Dasein in its own Being, we call its ‘downward plunge’ [Absturz]”, 
Being and Time § 38, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, Blackwell, 
1962. 
302 This myth is of Cretan origin, as Nietzsche knew, waiting for his Ariadne in 
tears. Ariadne had torn the constellation of the crown from the sky (Corona 
borealis) and placed it on Dionysos’ head, an end of initiation, a way out of the 
Aegaean labyrinth that introduced human time, Dionysos, a God become man… 
(Giorgio Colli, La Sagesse Grecque II French translation from the Italian by Pascal 
Gabellone and Myriam Lorimy, l’Eclat, 1991, p. 270). 
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a .  O n  P l a t o n i c  i d e o l o g y ,  o r  m y t h i c  t i m e  a s  a n  
a t t e m p t  t o  v e i l  i n i t i a t o r y  t i m e   
 
If we come to the view that our dichotomy is no longer relevant since 
all the Greek conceptions of the day culminate in the figure of the 
hero, we are unlikely to be able to grasp Aristotle’s conception of 
time. It is important to realise that Greek thought is fatally rooted in a 
religious tradition in which most of its philosophical conceptions have 
their source. This is why the concept of time is first conceptualised by 
the guardians of cults, before being taken up by the poets and 
philosophers in sketches of a few heroes and “screen concepts”,303 
which citizens then imitate to obtain a model of time that explains 
their destiny. This view is compatible with Heidegger’s thesis of the 
forgetting of being in the Greek world, where mimesis renders all 
conceptualisation impossible.304 This leads the contemporary 
philosopher Catherine Collobert to say that archaic and classical 
Greek time is of similarly obscure:305 
In archaic and classical Greece time was recognised as the principle of 
forgetting. Pindar, who acknowledged time as the father of all things, 
wrote: “Would that all of time may, in this way, keep his prosperity 
and the gift of wealth on a straight course, and bring forgetfulness of 
troubles”.306 
It seems that everything is hidden in this obscure time of myth, as we 
have seen in relation to the notion of fate which veiled time itself. The 
Greek world seems to have been covered in an opaque veil that 
plunched its inhabitants into a degree of darkness, as Collobert 
suggests:307 
Time covers them in a veil, it ties them to veiling. Beings are fated to 
be veiled by time. Veiling is their fate. 
                                                 
303 The notion of a screen concept has its source in the work of Sigmund Freud and 
describes the work of the imagination when the mind is in the grip of a deep 
resistance.  
304 According to Heidegger, the Greeks interpreted ousia (substance) as parousia 
(pure presence). As we shall see, this thesis undermines the foundations of 
Aristotelianism, according to which substance is engaged in time by an entelechic 
movement, Aubenque, Le problème de l’être chez Aristote, p. 466, note 1. 
305 Catherine Collobert L’être de Parménide ou le refus du temps, Kimé, 1993, p. 
266. 
306 Pindar, Pythian Odes, I, 46, trans. Diane Arnson Svarlien, 1990: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus:abo:tlg,0033,002:1 
307 Collobert, L’être de Parménide ou le refus du temps, p. 267. 
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This conception of time that plunges individuals into forgetfulness is 
an idea arising out of Orphism and Pythagoreanism, as clearly shown 
by a passage of Aristotle’s Physics:308 
In time all things come into being and pass away; for which reason 
some called it the wisest of all things, but the Pythagorean Paron 
called it the most stupid, because in it we also forget.  
The Pythagorean circular conception of time enfolds human beings in 
a kind of veiling of their own existence and in the concatenation of 
cycles of metempsychosis there is no place for individual, subjective 
time that is historical and singular. The initiatory rites push conceptual 
knowledge into the background in favour of iconic visions that lead 
citizens to suspend their judgements in favour of revelations that need 
no explanation. Aristotle confirms this in the rediscovered fragment 
15 of his treatise On Philosophy:309 
Eleusinian rites (for in these he who was initiated into the mysteries 
was being moulded, not being taught). 
Many have compared the projected images of Plato’s myth of the 
Cave with the painted, framed images brought in and displayed as part 
of the Greek cults, particularly that of Eleusis.310 As we have seen in 
Plato, the rejection of reality goes hand in hand with a rejection of 
change and the future, which is relegated to the category of opinion, of 
the body, the dimension that the initiate seeks to reject. So initiation 
was accompanied by a veiling of time itself in favour of a subjective 
time stripped of reason, while the body withdraws to make way for the 
notion of metempsychosis by which it is endlessly extended. A short 
comic episode described by Aristotle in his Nicomachean Ethics 
reveals this initiatory conception of Greek time. Aristotle tells us that 
the poet Aeschylus profaned the mysteries of Greece in several of his 
plays:311 
But of what he is doing a man might be ignorant, as for instance 
people say “it slipped out of their mouths as they were speaking,” or 
“they did not know it was a secret,” as Aeschylus said of the 
mysteries, or a man might say he “let it go off when he merely wanted 
to show its working”, as the man did with the catapult.  
                                                 
308 Aristotle, Physics, trans. Barnes, 222b 17-20. 
309 Aristotle, Ross’s fragment 15, from his translation On Philosophy, in French 
translation in Jeanne Croissant, Aristote et les mystères, 67, 2, 1932, p. 146, quoted 
by Schuhl, Essai…, p. 205 and also by Colli, SG I, p. 109. 
310 Schuhl, La fabulation platonicienne, pp. 46-47. 
311 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, III, 2, 1111a 8-12, trans. Barnes; see also Plato, 
The Republic, VIII, 563c. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH INTO PRE-ARISTOTELIAN TIME  
 123 
These words relayed here by Aristotle describe a slip attributed to 
Aeschylus, who was born in the city of Eleusis,312 and which led him 
to be tried and sentenced by the Areopagus. Why? It was said the poet 
had repeatedly let slip elements of the mysteries in his tragedies. The 
commentator Jules Tricot tells us:313 
Aeschylus was brought before the Areopagus charged with having 
divulged the secret of the Mysteries in several of his tragedies. He 
defended himself by pleading ignorance (which, in the eyes of 
Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, II, 60, 3, shows that he was not an 
initiate). 
This comic episode in a world of tragedy clearly shows that the 
poetico-philosophical mission was merely to water down conceptions 
that lay at the heart of a religion raised to the status of official cult by 
the political regime.314 This is why any conceptualisation of time is 
pointless, as it is simply a circular return to the cult. Whether or not 
the poet is an initiate, the mysteries must remain locked away in the 
holy places and are not to be scattered around the amphitheatres. But – 
and this is of primary importance for us – if conceptions of time were 
necessarily linked to the gods, as shown, for example, by the work of 
Hesiod, how can human time be spoken of without a simultaneous 
revelation of these mysteries? This would seem a very thorny question 
and perhaps explains the absence of any fundamental conceptions of 
time in the Greek thought of the 6th and 5th centuries BCE.315 In sum, 
the more a people’s culture examines its citizens, the more this 
knowledge is stripped of its mystery content and, a fortiori, the more 
its conceptions of time are simplified, hidden and transformed. In the 
end it all culminates in a great forgetting, in darkness. The equilibrium 
of the established social structure depends on this, as shown by the 
intervention of the sages of the Athens Areopagus. It was the 
philosopher Proclus who made us aware of this fundamental aspect of 
                                                 
312 Edouard Des Places, Etudes platoniciennes, 1929-1979, Brill, 1981, pp. 83-98 
(lecture delivered in Aix-Marseille entitled Platon et la langue des Mystères), p. 84. 
See also p. 83: “Of all the Greek mysteries whose secrets were so jealously guarded, 
those of Eleusis had the most profound influence. They were maintained until the 
end of paganism and were already established in the 7th or 6th century BCE.” 
313 Aristotle, Ethique à Nicomaque, note 4 by Tricot. 
314 On the relationship between the Areopagus and the cults, see three passages 
from Aristotle’s Constitution of Athens III, 5; XXIII, 1; LVII, 1. 
315 Where the epic texts are concerned, it is equally clear that while Orpheus guides 
the Argonauts, it completely disappears from Homer’s Odyssey to make way for the 
grey-eyed goddess. 
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the treatment of knowledge. Proclus conceptualises this view as 
follows:316 
The Fathers of these myths produced the visible covering of the myths 
and their figurative aspect as an analogue for the lowest classes, for 
those who preside over the most extreme states of life that are the 
most embedded in physical substance, but to those who aspire to 
contemplate beings they delivered the hidden core, unknowable to the 
common people, as a revelation of the transcendent essence of the 
gods, hidden in unbreakable secret.   
There is no room for manoeuvre here, and no possibility of a 
philosophy of time. The religious elite kept its conceptions close to its 
chest and would divulge them only under cover of mysterious 
revelations. The result was the exclusion of conceptualisation.317 
However, this “hierarchisation” of knowledge is not really confined to 
the Greek world. Generally speaking, what is truly philosophical in, 
for example, Heidegger’s conception of time, if not a pale copy of 
protestant theological conceptions?318 And we know that Luther’s 
theology, to which Heidegger’s thought is linked, only came to 
prominence by ransacking Aristotelian philosophy.319 We could also 
turn this critique against Aristotle’s thought itself: what is there that is 
truly philosophical in his ideas about time? What is the source of the 
borrowings synthesised in his conception? Do they come from 
unknown religions, sects that have remained hidden, or philosophies 
forever sunk in oblivion? Furthermore, theorising about time, 
conceiving of the future and understanding the télos would inevitably 
                                                 
316 Proclus, Commentaire sur la République, dissertation VI, p. 95. Judaism makes 
a distinction between the Ma’aseh Bereshit (account of the creation) and the 
Ma’aseh merkabah (account of the chariot). Moses Maimonides in his Book of 
Knowledge asks, “What is the difference between the action of the chariot and the 
Work of Creation? The works of the chariot were not even taught to an individual 
unless he was a wise man gifted with intelligence. […] Why were they not taught to 
the multitude? Because every man has not the wide understanding to grasp and 
clarify and explain the matters perfectly”, trans. H.M. Russell and Rabbi J. 
Weinberg, Ktav Publishing House, Inc., 1983, p. 11. 
317 Since Tertullian the Greek term mystêria has been translated by the Latin initia, 
which gave us the English “initiation”, and the Greek term mystêrion by the Latin 
sacramentum, sacrament in English. 
318 See Christian Sommer’s book, Heidegger, Aristote, Luther. Les sources 
aristotéliciennes et néo-testamentaires d’Être et temps. 
319 We shall cite only the following choice passage from Luther: “In this regard my 
advice would be that Aristotle's Physics, Metaphysics, On the Soul, Ethics, which 
have hitherto been thought his best books, should be altogether discarded”, cf. 
previous note, p. 27, note 5.  
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require going through initiation, which is why philosophy remained 
the poor relation of religon, tradition and the true wisdom of 
nations.320 So we must retrace our steps, or rather change course and 
steer towards the theologians rather than the philosophers in order to 
get closer to the sources in which time is conceptualised.   
 It is not doing violence to Plato’s work to adopt this perspective. 
We believe that this would be Plato’s own philosophical position with 
regard to time. Refusing to model time (chronos), Plato gives the 
people a religious idea full of hope (s). We could even speak of a 
“religion of hope” in the context of Plato’s work.321 Etymology is 
usually used to underpin this thesis. The Greek term télos (s: 
goal, end),322 which guides the individual fate (to mellon), is a term 
taken from the field of initiation, Marie-Laurence Desclos tells us:323 
We should  not forget that the verb  means to initiate and that 
many derivations of s belong to the vocabulary of initiation. […] 
This meaning is attested in Plato, for example s (Phaedrus, 
251a 2) and s (Phaedrus, 250e 1): “newly initiated”; 
s (Phaedrus, 248e 1, 265b 4): "linked to mystery rites";  
 (Phaedrus, 244e 2; The Republic, II, 365a 1): "initiation into 
the mysteries, celebration of the mysteries”; and of course the verb 
 itself (Euthydemus, 277d 7; Phaedrus, 249c 8; The 
Republic, VIII, 560e 1; Phaedo, 69c 2). Lastly, in Phaedrus, 249c 7-9, 
the philosopher is a man () who, “being continually initiated in 
perfect rites”, “alone achieves real perfection”.   
As future time is the preserve of the cults, there is no salvation for 
Greek citizens outside initiation and it seems the same might be true in 
the philosophical genre, which simply reproduces the same vision. To 
                                                 
320 Need we repeat that in Nietzsche, for example, the conception of the future is 
developed in the chapter “Of the vision and the riddle” of his Zarathustra, from 
which we have cited many extracts? Better still, Nietzsche wanted to found “an 
order of aristocrats, a kind of Templar Order”, see, La naissance de la philosophie à 
l'époque de tragédie grecque, French trans. Geneviève Blanquis, Gallimard, 1969, p. 
18. 
321 André Motte, “Platon et l’idée d’espérance”, in L’Avenir, Congrès des sociétés 
de philosophie en langue française, Vrin, 1987, pp. 295-298, p. 297. Motte states 
that, when he wants to talk about the future, in overlaying this notion with that of 
hope, Plato prefers to place the words in the mouth of Socrates.   
322 Pierre Chantraine, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire 
des mots, pp. 1101-1103. 
323 Marie-Laurence Desclos, “Instituer la philosophie: le temps de la succession 
dans le Parménide de Platon”, in Darbo-Peschanski (ed.), Constructions du temps 
dans le monde grec ancien, pp. 223-252, p. 245, note 76. 
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finish with this initatory aspect that anihilates any possible 
philosophical understanding of the concept of time, let us throw in one 
last piece of the initiatory puzzle.324 Sorel gives us these ultimate 
details that explain what initiation truly involved:325 
The modern translation of télétê as “initiation” is not quite right: the 
grammatical complement of télétê is always tôn theôn or equivalent 
gods, and not tôn andrôn (of men), implying that the term does not 
refer to rites of passage performed on human beings (such as the 
“initiation” of adolescents), but rites fundamentally intended to 
constrain the god by the use of effective formulae. These are delivered 
following a strict observance of the ascetic precepts of the “Orphic 
life”. The télétai of Orpheus are the memory of these incantations that 
put pressure on the god rather than acting on the soul of the believer. 
When uttered perfectly, they lead to victory, symbolised by the crown 
Niké (Victory) placed on the head of the lyre player in the Apulian 
imagery of Orpheus’s descent into the Underworld. This is the 
quintessential Orphic moment. Victory has flown from the open hand 
of Hades.  
We can see that this initiatory approach to time and the future leads to 
the ordeal, with its magical oaths326 and divinatory practices.327 Pindar 
was very clear about this: the cults were the source of all knowledge 
concerning the télos, “which is the end of our life”.328 It is also partly 
following Pindar that the term télos is wrongly thought to signify 
“end” or “goal” in English. Thinking that the goal comes at the end is 
the end of the philosophical goal. While Plato recognised the 
importance of incantation (ordeal) in the life of the Hellenes,329 
without prior study of the liturgical time to which this practice was 
attached, it remains hard to determine its consequences on the 
                                                 
324 We also remember what Kant said about doctrines of emanation: “Now the 
person who broods on this will fall into mysticism (for reason, because it is not 
easily satisfied with its immanent, i.e. practical use, but gladly ventures into the 
transcendent, also has its mysteries), where reason does not understand either itself 
or what it wants, but prefers to indulge in enthusiasm rather than - as seems fitting 
for an intellectual inhabitant of a sensible world - to limit itself within the bounds of 
the latter.” The End of All things, trans. Allen Wood, Cambridge University Press, 
2001, p 228. 
325 Sorel, Orphée et l'orphisme, pp. 25-26. 
326 Cf. Plato’s Critias. 
327 Both Circe in The Odyssey and Hermes the psychopomp had a magic stick 
which, as Vico has shown us, referred to astral divination.  
328 Pindar, Threnody 6, cited by Sorel, Critique de la raison mythologique…, p. 
152. 
329 Plato, Euthydemus, 290c; Theaetetus, 149c, Charmides, 157 and 176b, The 
Banquet, 202e, Laws, X, 933a, 908d, 909d. 
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temporal aspect and notably on its term (télos). Nevertheless, we 
cannot follow Plato when he suggests in his Phaedrus that the 
philsopher is a man who “being continually initiated in perfect rites”, 
“alone achieves real perfection”. This is why Aristotle’s philosophy 
remains the model of western knowledge that seeks to remain 
independent of this initiatory dimension.   
 
However, while Plato’s thought was clearly initiatory, it was 
nevertheless the vehicle for many notions concerning time. So we 
cannot leave out an analysis of time in Plato in order to decide 
whether this heritage had an influence on the singular Greek 
temporality developed by Aristotle. In order to understand why we are 
not going to undertake a long discussion of time in Plato’s work, we 
should like to start by quoting this synthesis by the contemporary 
academic philospher and Plato specialist Jean-François Mattéi, who 
states without demur:330 
None of Plato’s dialogues are explicitly devoted to the time in which, 
before Bergson and Heidegger, Schelling nevertheless saw the origin 
of the journey of philosophy. More precisely, if by “philosophy” we 
understand the rational, critical and argued study of a question whose 
problems are set out in a rigorously conceptual fashion, there is no 
philosophy of time in Plato.  
There is no philosophy of time in Plato, at least not as it would be 
understood following the magisterial work of Aristotle. This is why 
Platonism admits a practical comparison with the religious domain, 
which is not the case with Aristotelianism. Platonic time is mythical 
and not yet philosophical in kind. Mattéi would say that it comes into 
the category of the eikos muthos (likely story).331 However, it is 
possible to consider Platonic time through two different aspects, 
corresponding to the two faces of Cronos, whose establishment we 
witnessed in the mythology of Hesiod. While Platonic time is indeed 
mythical, it can only be an extension of the history of myths for which 
Hesiod’s versions are the touchstone.332 We have seen that Plato 
incoporates Hesiod’s myth of ages into his Statesman.333 On the one 
hand time is seen as constructive, providing a framework for the 
                                                 
330 Jean-François Mattéi, “Les figures du temps chez Platon”, Les Figures du 
temps, PUS, 1997, pp. 29-47, p. 30. 
331 Mattéi, “Les figures du temps chez Platon”, Les Figures du temps, p. 31. 
332 We shall not speak of mythological arché in describing Hesiod’s work since, for 
the theologian poet, the concept was temporal. Hesiod is not Parmenides.  
333 Plato, The Statesman, 272 e. 
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world, on  the other it places human beings in incertainty and erratic 
flux. This two-faced character of Platonic time can also be seen in The 
Republic, as shown by Karel Thein of the University of Prague.334 
Hesiod’s twin aspects are overlaid by the Platonic dichotomy between 
“the complex time of Ouranos” and “the immense time of the 
anthrôpoï”. The time of Ouranos, which is the time of the heavens, is 
total time (pan chronos), of which the time of human beings contains 
only a part (moïra). From the outset this dichotomy warns us against 
the illusion of a temporal totality given to mortals;335 only the reign of 
the gods can embrace all of time. In order to study the structure of this 
still mythical Platonic time, we might turn to his Parmenides, as it is 
in this work that we find the most plentiful occurrences of the word 
chronos: thirty-nine, to be precise.336 Yet this dialogue describes time 
in relation to Being and the One, without ever defining the notion 
itself – which, moreover, is the mark of a mythical discourse from 
which definitions are always absent. For example, it is posited in this 
dialogue that the One is in time, without either Being or time 
receiving even the sketchiest definition. We shall cite a passage from 
this dialogue that is remarkable in this regard, in which the young 
Aristotle joins in the dialectical game with Parmenides:337 
Being belongs to it somehow, if indeed the one is. – Yes. – And is 
‘being’ anything else than participation in being, togegher with time 
present, just as ‘was’ is communion with being together with time 
past, and, again, ‘will be’ together with time future? – So it is. – And 
so, it participates in time, if indeed it participates also in being. 
This development asks, why is the One in time? Because being is 
included in the One, so Being possesses time, since being and 
existence are the same thing. The predicate “time” can define the One 
if (and only if) being and existence are merged. Why? Because it is 
from existence, which is caught up in time, that being takes its 
temporality, which is turn attributed to the One. This raises the 
following question: what kind of time is Parmenides proposing here? 
It is perfectly clear that in not defining any of the terms in his 
development, time can be everywhere and in everything, even within 
                                                 
334 Cf. Karel Thein, Le lien intraitable. Enquête sur le temps dans la République et 
le Timée de Platon, Vrin, 2001. 
335 The term totalitas temporis has been used since Thomas Aquinas. 
336 Desclos, Instituer la philosophie: le temps de la succession dans le Parménide 
de Platon, art. cit., p. 224, note 4. 
337 Plato, Parmenides, 151 e-152b, trans. Samuel Scolnicov. 
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the One. Furthermore, if we say there are two types of time, the 
complex time of Ouranos and the immense time of the anthrôpoi, the 
time of human beings and the time of the gods, does this division not 
undo the equivalence of being and existence in Parmenides’ 
development? We know this would be the thesis of Plotinus, on which 
we do not need to spend time here.338 Furthermore, our second book 
will reveal the need to investigate the reciprocity of this proposition: if 
time can split being from existence, can being and existence not 
reciprocally split time? But such mediaeval considerations can wait. 
Lastly, the Parmenides crucially stresses the notion of the moment, as 
Brague notes.339 These issues are discussed by Aristotle in his Physics, 
as we shall see. At that point we shall also investigate whether the 
view that time was created at the same time as the world really is a 
Platonic thesis and how the two notions fit together.340 In every case, 
this thinking about time is not Platonic, but Parmenidian, and was 
subsequently taken up by Aristotle and the entire philosophical 
tradition.  
It remains the case that while time is not subjected to any 
process of definition in the Parmenides, the same does not seem to be 
true of the Timaeus, a text that sees the emergence of the canonic 
Platonic view that time “is a moving image of eternity”. In this well 
known passage from the Timaeus, Plato uses the term aïon, translated 
since Plotinus as “eternity”. Brague refines the usual translations in 
order to give it a quite different definition. This term, he tells us, can 
be understood as referring to “the world of divine ideas”, “the Verb”, 
“Wisdom”.341 He then proposes the following definitive 
interpretation:342 
When Timaeus says of the heavens, the moving image of the aïôn, 
that it moves according to a number that is aïônios, Plato gives us to 
understand that the mobility of the sky stems from its nature as an 
image and, reciprocally, because both aspects, images and mobility, 
stem from number. The phrase means first that the heavens 
perpetually follow their path and, crucially, that the number by which 
                                                 
338 Cf. Henri Crouzel, Origène et Plotin. Comparaisons doctrinales, Téqui, pp. 
332-341. 
339 Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, 1ère étude, p. 11. 
340 At this stage of conceptual development see the article by Walter Mesch, “Etre 
et temps dans le Parménide de Platon”, Revue philosophique de la France et de 
l’étranger, 2002/2, Vol. 127, no. 2, pp. 159-175. 
341 Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, 1ère étude, p. 19.  
342 Brague, art. cit., p. 67. 
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they are ruled is of the nature of the aïôn, in other words the soul of 
the world whose numerical structure has precisely just been described.  
According to Denis O’Brien, the term aidios could refer to “the visible 
gods”, in other words the heavenly bodies, the stars.343 But is this the 
register Plato draws on in order to think about time and the structure 
of the world that is its matrix? Brague has no doubt that this Platonic 
proposition cannot be understood without recourse to the number 
mentioned in this passage. If time relates to number this is because the 
world was constructed using mysterious numbers in the Timaeus; the 
world continues its progress according to this numerical matrix. 
Analysing the time of the Platonic world thus necessarily means 
determining the nature of the number from which it stems. This is why 
Brague goes on to identify possible numbers: the number of 
constellations, spheres, or heavenly movements, the decade, and so 
on. His article ends here, without settling the question of which 
number it is. We might ask, is it not simply tautological to say, as 
Plato does, that time is in the image of eternal time? Can time be 
defined by time? We can only escape this tautology if we say that 
there are two kinds of time that are qualitatively very different but 
perhaps not quantitatively separate: the complex time of Ouranos and 
the immense time of the anthrôpoi. The time of human beings is in the 
image of the time of the heavens. So it will be for number to tell us 
more about the time developed by Plato and most importantly about 
this dichotomy.  
Human beings cannot acccess the complex time of Ouranos, 
since it is the time of the demiurge and the gods. Through the 
intercession of the Italian Muses, in The Republic344 Plato suggests 
that knowledge of this time is however possible by means of numbers. 
The Muses know “what has been, what is and what will be”; they are 
the guardians of time. The Pythagorean Muses guarded the secrets of 
numbers since if they were to divulge them, the structure of the world 
itself would be revealed to human beings. However, this passage in 
The Republic enables us to conceive of these numbers, since they are 
explicitly described. Jean-Luc Périllié, who works on the Pythagorean 
heritage in Plato’s philosophy, has found in The Republic the 
                                                 
343 Denis O’Brien, “Temps et éternité dans la philosophie grecque”, in Mythe et 
représentations du temps, CNRS, 1985, pp. 59-85, p. 63. 
344 Plato, The Republic, VIII, 546a 3. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH INTO PRE-ARISTOTELIAN TIME  
 131 
mathematical dichotomy underpinning this conceptual division that 
splits Platonic time:345 
There is a period for divine generation on the one hand, embraced by a 
perfect number, and, on the other there is a prime <number> for 
human <generation>.  
In The Republic the perfect number (teleios) is attributed to the gods, 
the prime numbers to human beings. But what kind of number are we 
dealing with in the Platonic universe? Platonic numbers are not 
primarily natural integers, they are integers based on geometry and 
derived in a particular way from geometrical figures. While 
geometrical numbers are quantitative, Platonic numbers, rooted in the 
Pythagorean tradition, are qualitative, as Plato constantly repeats:346 
When I speak of the other section of the intelligible part of the line 
you will understand that I mean that which reason apprehends directly 
by the power of pure thought. 
Plato was trained in mathematics by Archytas and the discipline was 
still broadly based on Pythagorean theories, of which Archytas was a 
great advocate. So it would seem difficult to understand Plato’s 
theories fully without reading Archytas, a mathematician on whom 
Aristotle wrote no fewer than three books, making him the most 
important commentator on Archytas after Plato.347 Given the nature of 
our research, we shall say only a few words on the qualitative 
numbers that give access to the time of the heavens and the gods 
according to the Italian Muses. We know there are two different kinds 
of numbers, which do not, however, seem to have separate natures: 
nuptial number and geometrical number. On this point we follow 
Mattéi, who suggests that the perfect number is linked to geometrical 
number and that they cannot be separated if we are to understand the 
Platonic approach.348 Nuptial number relates to the divine sphere 
                                                 
345 Jean-Luc Périllié, “Summetria des Nombres de la République”, Revue 
philosophique de Louvain, Institut supérieur de Philosophie, 2005, pp. 35-58, p. 43. 
346 Plato, The Republic, 511a, trans. H.D.P. Lee. 
347 Carl A. Huffman, Archytas of Tarentum: Pythagorean, Philosopher, and 
Mathematician King, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 45. The catalogue of 
Diogenes Laertius refers to three books, to which we should perhaps add the 
complementary treatises such as On the Pythagoreans and On the Monad, cf. I, p. 
237. 
348 Mattéi, Platon et le miroir du mythe, op. cit., p. 91. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 132 
 
while geometrical number is part of the human world. This thesis was 
confirmed by Thein:349 
The Muses then describe two “nuptial numbers”, although they 
calculate only the second. The first, perfect number (teleios, 546 b5) 
coincides with the period of divine generation. The Muses are silent 
on “divine begetting” (546, b4), nor do they spend any time on 
calculating the number that presides over it. The second number is 
conversely presented in detail. This is the “geometrical number” 
(arithmos geômetrikos, 546c 6-7) which governs the good and bad 
birth of human beings. 
There is a nuptial number that relates to the divine sphere and a 
multitude of geometrical numbers for an understanding of the sphere 
of human beings. This is also confirmed by the work of Nicomachus 
of Gerasa, author of a book entitled Introductio Arithmeticae, 
translated into Latin by Boethius in the 6th century and, in the 20th, 
into both English and French.350 This mathematician also identifies the 
intelligible number of the domain of the demiurge, and the 
epistemonic number studied by mathematicians. But how might these 
numbers describe time? Might there be an eternal number, the nuptial 
or intelligible number, and a temporal number, the geometric or 
epistemonic number? This number, as described by Nicomachus, is 
not a discontinuous unit in a numerical series or a segment of natural 
or geometrical space. It is351 “a flow of quantities made up of units”. It 
would not be absurd to say that it is through the notion of “flow” that 
number can acquire its temporal attribute. Michel Crubellier gives us 
his commentary on this surprising form of number (the parentheses 
indicate that this is a conjecture):352 
(In the neo-Pythagorean literature on numbers we find descriptions of 
arithmetical number as a flow, in other words a process in which 
original unity emerges by itself and constantly becomes something 
                                                 
349 Thein, “Mettre la Kallipolis en acte: l’équivoque temporelle dans la République 
de Platon”, in Constructions du temps dans le monde grec ancien, op. cit., pp. 253-
265, p. 259. 
350 Alain Petit, “Nicomaque de Gérase”, article in the Encyclopédie philosophique 
universelle, Les Œuvres philosophiques, dictionnaire 1, 1992, pp. 233-234. 
Nicomachus’s  book was translated into English as Introduction to Arithmetic by 
Martin Luther d’Ooge, Macmillan, 1926, and into French by Janine Bertier as 
Introduction arithmétique, Vrin, 1978. 
351 Nicomachus of Gerasa, op. cit., I, VII, 1. 
352 Michel Crubellier, “En quel sens le temps est-il un nombre?” in Aristote et la 
pensée du temps, Le Temps philosophique 11, Université de Nanterre, 2005, pp. 39-
55, p. 52. 
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other than itself – thereby tending, symmetrically, to bring number 
back to continuity.)  
Through the notion of “process” that transposes that of “flow” into the 
theoretical sphere, Crubellier hypothesises that number is a 
construction and thus that the principle of number must be sought in 
its construction itself and not in the product of this construction, which 
is number as it is manifested in space by geometry and in time by 
following series (the constructivist hypothesis in contemporary 
mathematics). Of course, if geometrical number is seen in this light it 
no longer corresponds to the definition provided by Euclid in his 
Elements. For Euclid, number (arithmos) is a multiplicity (plêthos) 
also consisting of units, but this multiplicity is incapable of both 
moving (flow) and alterity by coming out of itself.353 Briefly, we can 
say that while the Greek term arithmos (Greek number) has 
connotations of “structure” and “assembly”, as Brague rightly says,354 
this numerical assembly or structure can be harmonious (ho 
monadikos) and thus eternal, being always in balance, or 
disharmonious and thus temporal. In this light the movement of 
“flow” is simply an attempt by the structure to return to a state of 
balance, to the initial harmony, while geometrical number is unable to 
return to a state of balance because it was not initially harmonised. 
Here we return to the play on words developed by Plato in his 
Cratylus, saying that Cronos is koros, in other words a “plenitude”, a 
harmonious, unmixed envelope (Aristotle would have described it as 
formed of homeomers).355 Koros means both “son” and “child”, 
showing the relationship between Zeus and Cronos and the fact that 
aging is impossible for time, which has been, is and will be, as the 
Italian Muses have it. The harmonious assembly corresponds to the 
                                                 
353 The only common point of these two conceptions is the postulate of a “being” 
produced by discontinuity, which is spatially manifested “as” a unit that is simply a 
geometrical segment. Cf. Ioannis M. Vandoulakis, “Was Euclid’s approach to 
arithmetic axiomatic?” Oriens-Occidens, 2, pp. 141-181, p. 143. 
354 Brague, Du temps chez Platon et Aristote, 3ème étude, p. 137.  
355 Plato, Cratylus, 396b cited by Jérôme Laurent, L’homme et le monde selon 
Plotin, op. cit., p. 142. Plotinus repeated Plato’s word play on six occasions. Here is 
Plato’s text as translated by Jowett: “Kronos quasi Koros (Choreo, to sweep), not in 
the sense of a youth, but signifying to chatharon chai acheraton tou nou, the pure 
and garnished mind (sc. apo tou chore in).” Mattéi is also right to insist on the non-
separation between the nuptial and geometric numbers, without which thought 
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time of the generation of the Gods, while the other figures (schema) 
reflect the multiplicity of human beings. So there is no point opening 
Aristotle’s Physics and going to the part dealing with time without 
having first understood this historical set of concepts.  
In short, if it were possible to reconstruct the perfect 
geometrical number from geometrical number, it would be necessary 
to examine the notion of harmony that seems to make a qualitative 
distinction between the two. The enigma can clearly be moved from 
the analysis of number itself to that of the harmony attributed to it. 
And this means that the notion of harmony should enable us to 
connect divine eternity, rooted in the nuptial number, to the 
temporality of the world, rooted in geometrical number.  
Carl A. Huffman of the University of Cambridge356 finds this 
Pythagorean view that harmony necessarily comes from disharmony 
in a passage from Aristotle’s Physics. Here is Aristotle’s Pythagorean 
thought:357 
For what is in tune must come from what is not in tune, and vice 
versa; the tuned passes into untunedness – and not into any 
undtunedness, but into the corresponding opposite. 
So we should investigate the harmony that Aristotle mentions here in 
order to understand the Pythagorean model adopted by Plato. To what 
model is he referring? Does it stem from a particular field of 
knowledge? Does it denote the world of music, physics or perhaps 
astronomy? To enable us to describe this harmony we have only 
Rose’s fragment 47:358 
Harmony is heavenly, by nature divine, beautiful and inspired; having 
by nature four parts. 
We shall not dwell on the elementary material constitution of the 
supra-lunary world in Aristotle (the four parts are the four elements, to 
which must be added the fifth); we simply wish to note that formal 
harmony is taken from a model of the heavens, which seems to come 
from the Pythagorean heritage. More light may be shed on this 
fragement by comparison with a passage of Aristotle’s Metaphysics 
                                                 
356 Carl A. Huffman, Philolus of Croton: Pythagorean and Presocratic. A 
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357 Aristotle, Physics, I, 5, 188b 12-15, trans. Barnes. 
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that explicitly sets out the fundamental postulate of Pythagoreanism as 
follows:359 
They supposed the elements of numbers to be the elements of all 
things, and the whole heaven to be a musical scale and a number.  
The idea that harmony is taken from an analogy with the heavens as a 
whole seems to be the true Pythagorean heritage adopted by Plato, at 
least if we are to believe Aristotle. The heavens are the model of 
harmony. Later, still in Book A (990a) of his Metaphysics on the 
Pythagoreans, Aristotle states:360  
They observe the phenomena [of the heavens], and use up the 
principles and the causes in explaining these.  
The Pythagoreans spent their time consulting the heavens, observing 
their different parts, noting their obvious changes and determining the 
functions of all their parts. This work is not unlike that of the 
neurologists of today, who seek to define the different parts of the 
brain and to find the bodily parts and functions attached to them.361 
Plato himself, in his Laws (XII, 967e 2) and The Republic (VII, 530d 
8), says that at the time of Archytas, astronomy and harmony were 
“kindred sciences”, offering reliable corroboration of the coherence of 
the present argument. So the Pythagoreans drew consequences for the 
configuration of human beings from the morophology of the 
movements of the heavens. Once again it is an account by Aristotle, 
rather than the writings of Plato, that enables us to understand the 
Platonic conception, which falls entirely within the Pythagorean 
tradition:362 
In one particular region [of the heavens] they place opinion and 
opportunity, and, a little above or below, injustice and sifting or 
mixture, and allege as proof of this that each one of these is a number, 
[and that] there happens to be already in each place a plurality of the 
extended bodies composed of numbers, because these modifications 
of number attach to the various groups of places. 
From this account we learn that there are many different regions in the 
heavens, arranged in a hierarchy. In each region there are many 
diffferent extended bodies already established which, when they come 
together, form heavenly harmony in itself. The configuration of these 
bodies, their form, as the Epicureans would say, results in – visibly – 
                                                 
359 Aristotle Metaphysics, A, 5, 986a, 2-4, trans. Barnes. 
360 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A, 5, 986a, 21-30, trans. Barnes.  
361 The Phaedo also includes the analogy between rivers of fire and the human 
thûmos, which is later housed in the volcanic activity of the Aeolian islands.  
362 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A, 8, 990a, 19-27. 
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different numbers. These regions of the heavens determine aspects of 
human existence. Aristotle lists the human elements that can be 
understood by means of astronomy. In the passage mentioned we find 
a group of them: first opinion, followed by kairos, injustice and then 
sifting and mixture. As most commentators have observed, this 
passage seems either corrupted or trunctated.363 However, it seems to 
echo another passage in Book A, 4, 985b 29, which lists justice, soul 
and reason, and opportunity. Justice and opportunity appear in both 
lists. Time is here, manifested in the notion of opportunity (kairos). So 
the Pythagoreans seem to have thought that human time could be 
understood in the light of astral configurations. Let us recall, first, that 
kairos was the youngest daughter of Zeus, according to the poet Ion of 
Chios. Périllié, in both his doctoral thesis364 and another article cited 
above, has clearly shown that:365 
In tragic culture, kairos was semantically equivalent to summetron. 
And summetron was the basis of Greek harmony. Furthermore, in a 
note by Tricot we learn that kairos was linked to the particular 
heavenly region of the Pleiades.366 So time as a determining factor in 
human lives could be explained by the heavenly region of the 
Pleiades. If we look up to the heavens we soon see five stars in that 
group, but the Greeks knew of seven, which is why the Pythagoreans 
attached the number seven to kairos. However, this does not yet 
explain why there was an analogy between the Pleiades and the notion 
of kairos in Pythagoreanism. Let us try to understand it. David 
Bouvier, in his commentary on Hippocrates’ On Diet and Hygiene 
dating from the late 5th century BCE, suggests that the Pythagoreans367 
used the Pleiades to divide time into the seasons:368 
I divide the year into four parts, the division the most widely accepted 
by people in general: winter, spring, summer, autumn. Winter runs 
from the setting of the Pleiades to the spring equinox, spring from that 
                                                 
363 Cf. Tricot, note 1.  
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equinox to the rising of the Pleiades, summer from the Pleiades to the 
rising of Actarus and autumn from the rising of Actaurus to the setting 
of the Pleiades.  
We shall discuss the notion of equinox later. So we can assume that, 
as the Pleiades made it possible to separate the seasons (time) and the 
notion of kairos had the same common meaning in relation to time (its 
root ker in fact meaning to cut), it was quite natural that the number 
seven, from the seven stars, should act as an analogical shuttle 
between heaven and earth. Whatever the case, we now know that this 
group comprises 1400 stars, which relativises the value of such a 
method, as Aristotle would also observe in his Metaphysics.369  
And the Pleias we count as seven, as we count the Bear as twelve, 
while other peoples count more stars in both.  
Yet it remains the case that the year is divided into four seasons, 
which are in turn subdivided by three in order to give twelve months, 
while the cycle of the moon is divided into four to give weeks of 
seven days. This division is also found in Plato, based on the 
dodecahedron, and in Aristotle’s thought at the constitutional level.370 
So while heavenly harmony was the prime model of harmony and the 
numbered stars gave the numbers, these qualitiative numbers 
remained different from quantative numbers. Aristotle makes this very 
clear when discussing Pythagorean thought in Book A of his 
Metaphysics:371 
For the objects of mathematics, except those of astronomy, are of the 
class of things without movement. 
So here we are given a new criterion to use in distinguishing 
geometrical number from the harmonised nuptial number. 
Geometrical number has no movement, so it can easily be compared 
to Euclidian number. However, the same cannot be said of numbers 
taken from astronomy. Firstly, if these numbers are an assembly of 
parts, they have acquired this property primarily by analogy with 
constellations, as we have seen in relation to the Pleiades. And the 
constellations are harmonious because each is a subset of the set of 
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“the heavens”, which provides the model of harmony. As for the 
question of the movement itself (per se) of these numbers and the 
problem of their relationship to time, we can assume, in the absence of 
any contemporary accounts, that their movement was derived from the 
perpetual movement of the astral spheres, which seemed to make the 
stars appear and disappear endlessly in the sky. For example, the 
appearance of the Pleiades marked the start of summer and their 
disappearance that of winter.372 So if Pythagorean number possessed 
time, in other words if this assembly were composed of moving parts, 
these properties were taken from the heavenly time and movements.  
 However, although the Platonic conception had its origins 
in the Pythagorean tradition, it was far from faithful to it. Aristotle 
criticises Plato on this point, suggesting that he suppressed these 
fundamental qualities of Pythagorean qualitative number by 
considering numbers as separate entities:373 
[Peculiar to him] is his view that the numbers exist apart from sensible 
things, while they say that the things themselves are numbers, and do 
not place the objects of mathematics between Forms and sensible 
things. His divergence from the Pythagoreans in making the One and 
the numbers separate from things, and his introduction of the Forms, 
wer due to his inquiries in the region of definitory formulae (for the 
earlier thinkiers had no tincture of dialectic). 
Judging from this passage of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, it was by 
seeking to introduce dialectics into the heart of his enquiries into 
Nature that Plato stripped number of its properties. We have seen that 
Pythagorean number is a natural entity insofar as its properties are 
identical to those of the constitution of the heavens. By introducing 
dialectics, says Aristotle, Plato modifies the Pythagorean model and 
makes it into an intermediary between sensible things and Forms. So 
we may wonder where the true place of this number is. The place of 
Platonic number is not an ideality, as it is precisely the link between 
Forms and sensible things. Neither sensible, nor ideal, the status of 
Platonic number poses a problem, the source of which seems to be the 
introduction of a notional dialectic. Shortly before the passage cited 
above, Aristotle has also pondered the need for the dyad that 
introduces a dialectical interval:374 
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But positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and 
small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him.  
Aristotle seems to be saying that, instead of bringing intelligibility to 
both number and the understanding of natural phenomena, the 
introduction of dialectics merely makes the issues more complex. For 
the Pythagoreans the infinite was a simple notion constantly related to 
the heavens, whereas the introduction of the dyad seems to push it to a 
level of abstraction which Aristotle visibly does not see as useful to 
the theory. Why oppose great and small, leaving the dichotomy 
endlessly moving and so opening the way to an infinite that seems 
purely illusory?375 Aristotle’s critique seems to offer no concessions. 
In order to grasp this fully, let us turn to the Philebus, in which Plato 
discusses the notion of harmony. This dialogue allows us to note how 
far Plato has moved away from the Pythagorean approach. For instead 
of starting with an analogical model (the heavens, music) to describe 
harmony, Plato begins with the dialectic between the limit and the 
infinite. This tension between the limit (péras) and the unlimited 
(apeiron) creates a mixture (summixis). It is only then that number and 
measure are applied to this mixed entity, an operation which:376 
puts an end to difference and opposition, and by introducing number 
creates harmony and proportion among the different elements. 
Firstly, by introducing the dialectic Plato removes the “physiological” 
dimensions of number, as the Pythagoreans would say, which were its 
specific properties. So it no longer has any properties and becomes a 
pure abstraction. Next he gives number a subordinate status in relation 
to dialectics.377 This is why number is no longer linked to nature, but 
applied to a mixture (summixis) arising out of dialectics. The pair of 
dissonant opposites ends when a number can be applied to them that 
turns them into a harmonious mixture that is geometrically 
commensurate. At this point Anne-Gabrièle Wersinger rightly 
wonders about the place of the tension between the great and small. 
                                                 
375 We might think of Feuerbach’s critique of the limitless dialectic of Hegel’s 
philosophy. 
376 Plato, Philebus, 25d11= 24C6, trans. Jowett. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/philebus.html 
377 The opposite positions of Plato and Aristotle on the status of the dialectic has 
been fairly well analysed by Michel Narcy in his article “La dialectique entre Platon 
et Aristote”, Kairos kai logos, 8, 1997, pp. 1-24.  
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 140 
 
What is the site of this dialectic? What is the true site of the mixture 
obtained in this way?378 
We are bound to ask, what can provide a home or site, sometimes for 
the apeiron and sometimes for the quantitative limit? 
Although Wersinger comes up against the same question as that posed 
by our discussion here, our solutions will be very different. Her 
answer draws on the musical model, centred on the notion of interval. 
We cannot fault her analysis which, moreover, seems to accord with 
Plato’s approach. We thus refer the reader to her book, to which we 
have nothing relevant to add.379 However, from a purely theoretical 
point of view, we do not think that this model is entirely appropriate to 
the question posed. While the musical interval may be one of the 
models describing the functioning of the dialectic, intervals are so 
many and so diverse, that it seems unlikely that the musical interval 
can contain them all. What does a geometrical interval have in 
common with a physical interval, and what does the latter have in 
common with a cosmological interval? In the first place we should 
need to define the  space that contains this interval, if there is one. For 
it is generally agreed that within an interval there is space. But here to 
advance a thesis so charged with consequences, we need a proof. 
Moreover, Aristotle is known, as we shall see, for his refusal to accept 
that there is a space between the bounds of an interval and it is this 
gap, this void, that drives him to seek to define movement itself. For 
Plato the space that is the receptacle of the interval is not the world 
itself (nature) – in other words it is not a physical space, it is mixture 
(summixis). This mixture is invisible and theoretical. Lastly it must be 
understood that Plato’s work on harmonies, which sought to penetrate 
the mystery of music within the cults, led to the dissolution of the 
concept itself. These Platonic analyses diverted fundamental work in 
the field of physics. It remains the case that the mixture, to which 
number and measure are applied, shows that that nature (materia) 
cannot be signata quantitate, as many Mediaeval commentators 
recognised. The mixture itself is the “sign of quantity” and this is why, 
symmetry aside, it is hard to see what could be a sign for number.  
To stay with our investigation, there was a Pythagorean 
dialectics that described physical phenomena, but it was of a physical 
                                                 
378 Anne-Gabrièle Wersinger, La sphère et l’intervalle. Le schème de l’harmonie 
dans la pensée des anciens Grecs d’Homère à Platon, Jérôme Millon, 2008, p. 253. 
379 Wersinger, La sphère et l’intervalle. Le schème de l’harmonie dans la pensée 
des anciens Grecs d’Homère à Platon, pp. 254-270, pp. 296-309. 
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order rather than that of Forms. Plato’s approach to dialectic is similar 
to his approach to number. He literally stripped the dialectic of its 
physiological sense, although this had been the subject of a great deal 
of research within Pythagoreanism. The physiological dialectic of the 
Pythagoreans related to the tension of curves, a model that 
underpinned analogy itself, as Wersinger has rightly noted.380 This 
model is no longer found in Platonic thought. If the Italian Muses 
could still speak, they would still have many secrets to tell us about 
numbers and time, but Plato cut their heads off. Who still knows the 
nature of the dialectic of the Italian Muses? Suprising as it may seem, 
it was Aristotle who brought back this Pythagorean exploration in 
order to describe time, as we shall see when we follow his modeling 
of the concept of entelechy using the analogy of the nose and the 
motor limb. Where the question of the interval is concerned, Aristotle 
is one of the finest heirs of Pythagoreanism, or at least offers a more 
satisfying solution than that of Plato. It was the general 
incomprehension of the musical model, which sought to clarify the 
notion of interval to which number was supposed to apply, that 
enabled the emergence of a suspicion of “idealism” concerning 
number itself. Even after the research into musical intervals, number 
retained this intermediate status between the sensible and intelligible, 
so the thesis of the ideality of Platonic number is unsustainable. 
Platonic number is neither idea nor Form, it is simply the product of 
an abstraction whose place within Platonic thought is impossible to 
determine. So Plato “absolutised” both number and the dialectic, two 
concepts that are necessary in order to grasp time. We can see why, in 
doing this, Plato was no longer able to describe this fundamental 
concept.   
Now, if Plato “absolutised” the Pythagorean model, perhaps in 
order not to reveal what he believed to be mysteries, was his 
conception of the One corresponding to the entirety of the heavens 
also different? We must consider this question in order to determine 
the perfect, nuptial number, the only qualitative number that can 
describe the One. There are two logical approaches to defining the 
entirety of the heavens, one intensive, the other extensive. In the 
intensive approach, the entirety of the heavens is obtained by 
considering an extensive part that can describe the totality. A part of 
the heavens is taken as a zone that can define the quality of the whole. 
                                                 
380 Ibid., p. 279. 
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A fairly reliable account by Stobaeus describes this approach among 
the Pythagoreans. There is said to be a “hearth” in the centre of the 
heavens that makes it possible to grasp the quality of the harmony 
found there:381 
The first composite (entity), the One, which is in the centre of the 
Sphere, is called Hearth.  
This fragment, attributed to Philolaus, seeks to describe a kind of 
“seed” that explains the genesis of the heavens and continues to define 
their real or manifest constitution. Said to provide the matrix of 
harmony itself, this expressive part of the heavens is the One. 
According to the model used by the Pythagoreans, this hearth at the 
centre of the Universe is either the sun, according to the heliocentric 
model, or the Earth in the geocentric model. However, whether the 
centre is the heavens or the Earth, it is crucial to understand how the 
model functions. The model of the hearth of the universe is provided 
by Anaxagoras in his book on Physics, which Socrates described at his 
trial as available to all in the public square.382 Plato made good use of 
the work of this ancient Giordano Bruno,383 modifying its content to 
suit his own purposes, which earned him several accusations of 
plagiarism at the time.384 So we shall pay no attention to the theses of 
the School of Athens, according to which this knowledge was 
inherited from ancient mysteries that the divine Plato collected and 
had been sought in Egypt by the most eminent commentators. The 
astronomical model is condensed in the following authentic 
fragment:385 
Mind took command of the universal revolution, so as to make 
(things) revolve at the outset. And at first things began to revolve from 
some small point, but now the revolution extends over a greater area, 
and will spread even further. And the things which were mixed 
together, and separated off, and divided, were all understood by Mind. 
And whatever they were going to be, and whatever things were then in 
existence that are not now, and all things that now exist and whatever 
shall exist – all were arranged by Mind, as also the revolution now 
                                                 
381 Stobaeus, I, XXI, 8, trans. Freeman. 
382 Lucio Pepe, “Le livre D’Anaxagore lu par Platon”, in Monique Dixsaut and 
Aldo Brancacci, Platon. Source pré-socratique. Exploration, Vrin, pp. 107-128. 
383 This model is explicitly or implicitly discussed by Plato in his Laws, 966d sq., 
the Cratylus, 413c, the Phaedo, 95c sq. and 96 ab and the Philebus, 28 e.  
384 Lucio Pepe, “Le livre D’Anaxagore lu par Platon”, p. 109. 
385 Anaxagoras, Fragment D./K. B12, which we cite here as evidence of a 
Pythagorean approach which is not specific to Plato but reflects his roots in this 
movement, as we shall see in the third subsection, which follows.  
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followed by the stars, the sun and moon, and the Air and Aether which 
were separated off. It was this revolution which caused the separation 
off. 
At the centre of the world there is a turning, whirling movement – this 
is the model of perichoresis. This whirling led to the separation of 
what are here called stars – the sun, moon and the regions of the 
heavens such as the ether. Mind (noûs kubernêtês) makes it possible to 
know the heavens thus formed by turning. Mind knows both the 
separations that created its regions and the stars of which it is 
constituted.  
Clearly, Mind can rule the universe because it knows how it was 
formed. Clearly also, Mind is able to rule the universe because it was 
present at its formation. “Mind took command of the universal 
revolution, so as to make (things) revolve at the outset”, says 
Anaxagoras. So the beginning was inert. It is Mind that gave 
movement to the heavens by propelling them into a particular 
temporality. This is not linear time, since it is constituted by a turning 
movement. Turning is a spatial metaphor that contains the model of 
the temporality of the heavens and thus of the One. Why? Because the 
heavens were inanimate until they were set in motion, and movement 
brought them animation of a primarily temporal nature. This specific 
temporality is not a circular movement because Anaxagoras clearly 
states that “at first things began to revolve from some small point”. So 
the One is not a totality encompassing all its elements, it is the 
infinitely small that spreads intensively in the infinitely large. This 
mode of propagation (to put it in physical terms) or participation (in 
philosophical terms) is still always subject to the model of endless 
turning. So the heavens are understood as infinitely large and this is 
why the Pythagoreans also called them Aîon. Consequently, Mind 
necessarily knows the past, since it was present at the formation of the 
heavens, and the present, since it rules its constitution and the future. 
Lastly it knows the end (the term of the future) of the heavens in 
formal terms, without knowing their material end, since it seems to 
have worked on a material that was already present. For, crucially, 
when Anaxagoras suggests that it began with a very small point, this 
implies, through the notion of size, that this dimension can be related 
to other, larger units already present. So we cannot support the 
interpetation proposed by Wersinger:386 
                                                 
386 Wersinger, op. cit., p. 326. 
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As we have seen, this Mind, noûs, is characterised by the “turning” of 
time in such a way that the beginning coincides with the end. This 
means that the noûs knows everything in advance, and remembers 
everything. As the omniscient viewpoint of the noûs is that of the 
infinite, it is able to determine all viewpoints on a thing. This means 
that instead of abolishing time like Socrates, who absolutised the 
relationship of quantities, Anaxagoras infinitely multiplies this 
relationship according to times. The noûs alone is master of meter. 
While we have already seen that Archytas’s model of harmony was 
the heavens, it goes without saying that the noûs “alone is master of 
meter”. Similarly, if we think that Plato absolutised both number and 
the dialectic, it is hardly suprising to find in Socrates this kind of 
absolutisation of time as a simple consequence. Nor is it a problem 
that the noûs can be described as omniscient, since it is master of the 
meter of the before, after and now. The model of turning alone 
prevents us suggesting that the end coincides with the beginning, since 
that would imply a circle, whereas the whirling model has an 
additional parameter, which is time itself. This implies a primary 
awareness of  limits (péras). Quantitatively, whirling can have a 
spatial term, which is the limit of its extension – movement can meet 
an external obstacle; qualitatively, the material that is set in motion 
can become exhausted, resulting in empty spinning. In sum, both the 
material that is set in motion and the external limit of its movement 
might render the extensional return of the same impossible (n + 1). So 
the curve of the whirling model does not necessairily imply 
circularity, as has been rather hastily suggested. It is entirely 
legitimate to suggest that, according to this model, the world is 
engaged in an extensional temporality, in which time ceaselessly 
grows. As for the initial question of what qualitative number can be 
attached to this conception of perichoresis, clearly it is the number 1, 
the One that would give rise to henological studies. For Mattéi, as for 
Plato and the Pythagoreans, this eternal number is called aïon and can 
be understood in terms of duration:387 
The eternal Number or Aïon is not the suspension of the progress of 
time, but sets in motion the duration of the ages and soul of the world. 
This confirms that the Platonic eternal number, describing the panta 
chronos, enables the establishment of the Pythagorean kosmos and in 
so doing unleashes movement and duration. This duration can be 
measured or marked out by the number of curves in the whirling 
                                                 
387 Mattéi, “Les figures du temps chez Platon”, in Les Figures du temps, PUS, 
1997, pp. 29-47, p. 37. 
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model, each curve representing an “age of the world”, something like 
the strata of ages (years) that can be measured on the cross section of a 
tree-trunk. In setting out this theoretical time, Mattéi also explains that 
in Plato’s Timaeus the world is constructed through the prism of the 
dodecahedron, since all periods of time mentioned in the Phaedo, the 
Phaedrus, the Laws and of course the Timaeus, always consist of a 
totality with twelve parts.388 Plato seems to have understood time 
geometrically, in terms of this twelve-sided figure. This model 
preserves temporal continuity because the noûs does not introduce any 
principle of discretion. For Plato, equally, the noûs does not introduce 
the notion of organisation, which Anaxagoras said it did, as we shall 
see. Armed with this way of understanding Platonic temporality the 
mediaeval monk Joachim of Fiore applied it to historical continuity.389 
This approach seems legitimate if we consider that this model is not 
linear and all its phases,390 which are historical periods, are slotted 
together until the initial event, the birth of Christ.391 Lastly we need to 
examine the source of the model proposed by Anaxagoras and adopted 
by Plato in describing time. While this model has some similarities to 
the Iranian vision of the world, as also described by Hesiod, we cannot 
provide a definitive answer to this question. To do so would require us 
first to analyse the Magusean influence on Greek culture, possibly via 
the Biblical texts.    
 
                                                 
388 Mattéi, “Les figures du temps chez Platon”, in Les Figures du temps, p. 36, see 
also “La généalogie du nombre nuptiale chez Platon”, Les études philosophiques, 
1982, no. 3, pp. 281-303. 
389 Joachim of Fiore’s thesis on time can be presented as follows: “This eternity 
that was in God before all time is entirely unfathomable to we who come to be in 
time. And the wisdom of men is dulled, sense and intelligence fail where, in his 
hidden design, he has tried to create time, which was not for all eternity”, Psalterium 
decem chordarum I, 5, 238 r, this translation from the French translation by Jean 
Devriendt, doctoral thesis, Université de Strasbourg 2, 2001.  
390 We use the term “age” of the World to refer to Hesiod’s model, which had five 
ages according to the circular movement and four according to the linear movement, 
as we have seen. Raising the trinitarian (3) question at this point seems to us highly 
pertinent to an understanding of the history of the Christian church. 
391 If this model were linear there would be a confusion between this and Hesiod’s 
model of the “ages” of the world, so that the Iranian question of evil would ipso 
facto have to be included. We would then have the answer to the question of the 
external limit to the heavens, which would be Evil.   
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In relation to the entirety obtained by extension, it was by working on 
the notion of extensional limit that the Pythagoreans came to grasp the 
nuptial number of concern to us here. This number could be logically 
obtained in two ways: composition and discretion (division). Aristotle 
ponders this in his Metaphysics, following the aforementioned 
discussion of the regions of the heavens, each of which has its own 
qualitative number:392 
Is this number, which we must suppose each of these abstractions to 
be, the same number which is exhibited in the material universe, or is 
it another than this? Plato says it is different.  
Since each region of the heavens has its own number, as we have 
seen, the number of the heavens as a whole could be obtained by 
bringing all these regions together and thus by adding together the 
numbers of all the regions. Aristotle suggests that, for Plato, the 
nuptial number cannot be obtained in this way, that would be a 
different number – the number ten – which has been given a little 
earlier:393 
E.g. as the number 10 is thought to be perfect and to comprise the 
whole nature of numbers, they say that the bodies which move 
through the heavens are ten, but as the visible bodies are only nine, to 
meet this they invent a tenth – the ‘counter-earth’.   
In this passage Aristotle seems to overturn the causal relationship 
between the numbers and the heavens. For the Pythagoreans it was the 
heavens that provided the measure of numbers and not the other way 
round. So it is possible that we are again dealing here with a Platonic 
version of Pythagorean theories. However, Aristotle clearly states that 
the number ten is the extensive limit of the heavens. This number 
includes the nine visible bodies to which must be added the counter-
earth (antichthôn). Brought into the Platonic dialectic, this limit is 
seen in terms of the “many”:394 
10 is many (if there is no number which is greater than 10), or 10,000.   
Here we see the theoretical gain provided by the introduction of the 
Platonic dyad. In relation to our question, it must be understood that 
the tenth term of the number 10 is indeterminate: it is the antichthôn. 
This means that the limit of the universe has not been identified at all, 
because it is dependent on the limit of the number 10 itself, in other 
words on what the antichthôn is. Once the antichthôn has been 
                                                 
392 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 8, 990a 27-30. 
393 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 5, 986a 10-11. 
394 Aristotle, Metaphysics N, 2, 1088b 10. 
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identified, we will know the limit of the number ten and hence the 
limit of the universe as glimpsed by the Pythagorean model adopted 
by Plato. In his treatise On the Heavens Aristotle mentions this 
Pythagorean conception, again referring to the antichthôn. We shall 
cite the entire passage in order to avoid any accusations of distorting 
either the thought of Plato and the Pythagoreans or Aristotle’s reading 
of it:395 
But the Italian philosophers known as Pythagoreans take the contrary 
view. At the centre, they say, is fire, and the earth is one of the stars, 
creating night and day by its circular motion about the centre. They 
further construct another earth in opposition to ours to which they give 
the name counter-earth. In all this they are not seeking for theories and 
causes to account for the phenomena, but rather forcing the 
phenomena and trying to accommodate them to certain theories and 
opinions of their own. But there are many others who would agree that 
it is wrong to give the earth the central position, looking for 
confirmation rather to theory than to the phenomena. Their view is 
that the most precious place befits the most precious thing; but fire, 
they say, is more precious than earth, and the limit than the 
intermediate, and the circumference and the centre are limits. 
Reasoning on this basis they take the view that it is not earth that lies 
at the centre of the sphere, but rather fire. The Pythagoreans have a 
further reason. They hold that the most important part of the world, 
which is the centre, should be most strictly guarded, and name the fire 
which occupies that place the “Guard-house of Zeus.” 
The postulate of Aristotle’s argument is as follows: the extremity and 
centre are both limits, in other words quantity (extension) is dependent 
on quality. For if we have no parts, it is impossible to unify them or to 
posit a set. So a qualitative part can play the role of a quantitative 
extensive limit. Following the Pythagorean model, this expressive part 
is necessarily located in the heavens. So we need to find a region that 
corresponds to this “noble” part of the heavens. This region is igneous 
and called antichthôn by the Pythagoreans. The fire that is at the 
centre of the universe is the “Guard-house of Zeus”. Are there other 
igneous regions in the heavens that are not the sun? The answer must 
be no, only the sun is this igneous region of the heavens. So the sun is 
at the centre of the heavens and the centre of the universe.396 As we 
                                                 
395 Aristotle, On the Heavens, II, 13, 293a. 
396 For a more detailed discussion of this cosmological question, see two books by 
Michel-Pierre Lerner, Le Monde des sphères, I (Genèse et triomphe d’une 
représentation cosmique and II (la fin du cosmos classique), Les belles Lettres, 1996 
& 1997. 
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shall see, Aristotle refutes this argument, suggesting that the Earth is 
at the centre. So the antichthôn is the sun; quantitiatively it is the tenth 
term, but qualitatively the first, since it is an expressive part – the 
“noble” part, as the Pythagoreans would say. So in our view the term 
antichthôn made it possible to conceal the heliocentrism implicit in 
the Pythagorean model. It would also be possible to express this 
conception in geometrical form if and only if the tenth term were not a 
point but a straight line intersecting a three-dimensional form. So 
Pythagoras’ tétracktys can be understood only if we say that there are 
two interlocking three-dimensionsal forms, as the mathematician 
Hamilton has shown (graph theory), the first formed of the three tips 
of the triangles which together form a new summit which is that of a 
tetrahedron. 
 
To sum up this part, we can thus suggest that there is no philosophy of 
time specific to Plato’s thought. Platonic time remains mythical, 
stemming from the eikos muthos. This is why Plato’s approach 
continually returns to its source in Hesiod’s mythology. Furthermore, 
Plato’s continued support for an initiatory vision of philosophical 
activity inevitably rules out any possibility of a new, rational 
interpretation of time, since the initiatory dimension diverts thought 
away from reason through the use of images. Lastly, if we say that 
Plato “absolutises” both number and the dialectic, it becomes clear 
that even concepts that can describe time are rendered inoperable. 
Time can then become an “ideality”, a summary conception adopted 
by the Stoics. As for the nuptial number, the marriage number,397 as 
we have seen, there are two of them, the One and Ten. If only one is 
needed398 it is midway between the two (“the middlemost midle” as 
Plato would say), in other words the number five (“the fundamental 
                                                 
397 Aristotle attests to the existence of a number corresponding to marriage in 
Metaphysics M 4, 1078b 23: “The Pythagoreans had before [Democritus] treated of 
a few things whose formulae they connected with numbers – e.g. opportunity, 
justice, or marriage”.  
398 There is a theoretical problem here. For while Plato states that only the Muses 
know number and that there are Muses on the Italian side and on the Ionian side, 
then, logically, there should be two nuptial numbers. The fact that the nuptial 
number retained by both Plato and the cults (for example at Delphi) is that of the 
Italian sphere clearly shows how far Greek culture leaned to the left from a 
geographical point of view. And if a moving thing continuously leans to the left, it 
will necessarily move in a circle.  
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division”), “that governs the regions of the cosmos” the epsilon at 
Delphi (“Know thyself”), the number of introspection, of the soul’s 
consideration of itself, as Proclus confirms, of man,399 tat tvam asi, in 
other words human beings on a human scale, who are anything but 
eternal, temporal human beings with a time that is personal to them, 
sui generis. 
In order to stay on our philosophical course, from this initiatory 
conception of time and the future adopted by Plato, we shall retain 
only the following etymology: the term télos (s) can be compared 
to the notion of death by homophony with the verb teleutân meaning 
to die. This is the traditional méléthè thanatou translated into French 
by Pierre Hadot as l'exercice de la mort, “the exercise of death”. So it 
would seem that it is possible to access time philosophically without 
entering the domain of initiation, or waiting for the cults or Muses to 
dispense their own vision of the world to us. This access is provided 
by another concept reflecting the truly universal reality of death. 
Death is what all common mortals have in common, as the historian 
Vico showed, making it the primary constituent aspect of our 
humanity. This conception implies that the télos does not naturally 
and necessarily move towards its own end, but that human beings are 
the site of this understanding. The conceptualisation of the télos 
involves an initial understanding of the fundamental aspect of human 
life that is death. So the télos cannot be located at the end of human 
lives, since death brings it into the present. It is here that Aristotelian 
temporality comes into its own and the concept of entelechy takes 
flight. If death can be brought into the present, the concept of 
entelechy becomes possible. As for the mystical path itself, let us 
simply note how Pindar sang of it, with a hint of irony:400 “Blessed are 
all those released from suffering by the sorcery of rites.” It will 
undoubtedly be suggested that our approach is too reductive, since 
Plato adopted many other systems of thought and notably the Ionian 
heritage of Heraclitus. So let us take a look at this Ionian thought that 
Plato sought to erase from history and which Aristotle used as the 
foundation for his truly philosophical argument on time. Clearly 
Ionian thought can set the seal on the divorce between Platonic 
thought and that developed by Aristotle.  
                                                 
399 Mattéi, Platon et le miroir du mythe, op. cit., pp. 95-97. 
400 Colli, La Sagesse Grecque, I, French trans. M.-J. Tramuta, L’Éclat, 1990, 
fragment 131a, p. 127. 
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b .  O n  I o n i a n  a s t r o n o m y ,  o r  t h e  e m e r g e n c e  o f  
c o n c e p t u a l  t i m e ,  o p e n i n g  t h e  w o r l d  t o  f u t u r e  
t i m e  
 
This section will consider Ionian philosophy. This is the last 
discussion we shall devote to the heritage preceeding Aristotle on the 
concept of time. After this, having collected enough historical 
information, we shall tackle Aristotle’s model directly. But it is 
impossible to discuss Aristotelian time without considering the so-
called “Ionian” current of thought, since it is here that we hope to find 
the fundamental issues of time adopted in Aristotle’s thought. We 
shall begin by seeking to define the Ionian vision of the world before 
discussing the thinkers who are its greatest representatives. This final 
historical section will enable us to approach Aristotle’s work by an 
unusual route: the physical theories opposing generation and 
corruption.  
 
Diogenes Laertius begins his history of philosophical sects with what 
seems to be a very strange statement, echoing a theory that philosophy 
was not born in Greece. He mentions many cultures as sources for part 
of the mosaic of knowledge that has been called “philosophy” since 
Pythagoras:401 
There are some who say that the study of philosophy had its beginning 
among the barbarians. They urge that the Persians have had their 
Magi, the Babylonians or Assyrians their Chaldeans, and the Indians 
their Gymnosophists; and among the Celts and Gauls there are the 
people called Druids or Holy Ones, for which they cite as authorities 
the Magicus of Aristotle and Sotion in the twenty-third book of his 
Succession of Philosophers. 
This rhetorical contra argument then allows Diogenes Laertius to 
better use pro arguments to set out the thesis of his investigation, 
which is that philosophy was, of course, born in Greece and those who 
say otherwise are sinning through ignorance. However, this method of 
academic exposition has the merit of giving us information about all 
the cultures that he left out of his philosophical essay. The first to be 
mentioned is the Persian culture, followed by the Chaldean, Hindu and 
lastly the Celtic. The history of philosophy as related by Diogenes 
Laertius, which remained the model for all studies in antiquity, is not 
                                                 
401 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers I, trans. Hicks. 
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the entire history of philosophy. The historical version he presents 
settles for repeating that of Plato presented in The Sophist. In sections 
242d 6-243a 2 of this dialogue Plato divides its historic content in 
two, separating the Muses of Ionia from those of Sicily in order to 
place it in a dialectic that will serve as its motor. Hegel clearly had no 
objection to this. The historical version of Diogenes Laertius is as 
follows:402 
Philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom, has had a twofold origin; it started 
with Anaximander on the one hand, with Pythagoras on the other. The 
former was a pupil of Thales, Pythagoras was taught by Pherecydes.  
Diogenes Laertius may have taken this vision from Sotion’s history, 
or perhaps from Alexander Polyhistor. However, this Platonic division 
is not supported by any argument in Plato’s work. Besides, is it not 
necessary to have a conception of time before adopting a historical 
position? As Périllié so rightly notes: 403 
In Plato this opposition of the Muses remained evasive and 
metaphoric at the very least; in the doxographic schema of Diogenes it 
becomes an opposition between two clearly defined traditions. 
However, it is easy to raise the dialectical veil cast by Plato over the 
history of philosophy if we consider the version given by Diogenes 
Laertius. For while Thales was Anaximander’s teacher, Pythagoras 
was taught by Pherecydes of Syros, and both Pherecydes of Syros and 
Thales of Miletus were thinkers from Ionia. The fact that Pythagoras 
settled in Italy – in the city of Croton which was an Ionian colony, as 
we shall see – is at best a matter of geographical rather than historical 
interest. We could ignore this problem were it not that this division 
later served as a generic demarcation between Plato and Aristotle on 
the one hand and the Ionian school on the other. For Diogenes 
Laertius goes on to attach Plato and Aristotle to the Italian tradition, 
while the Ionian ends in sophism and the Stoic school.404 After this it 
was reasonable for the Aristotelian interpretative traditions to seek the 
roots of his philosophy in the Italian school, completely ignoring the 
Ionian influence by trying to fuse his thought with that developed by 
Plato, notably in the approach of the Neoplatonist current described in 
the introduction to this section.  
                                                 
402 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, I. 
403 Périllié, Symmetria et rationalité. Origine pythagoricienne de la notion grecque 
de symétrie, op. cit., p. 45, note 5. 
404 Ibid. p. 44, see the traditional presentation of ancient philosophy.  
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 152 
 
But let us start with the first overview provided by Diogenes 
Laertius, which we have just cited. While the quantitative plurality is 
also generic, we should note that his judgement by authority begins 
with a reference to Aristotle and notably to a book whose title is given 
as Magicus. If we take the catalogue of Aristotle’s works provided by 
Diogenes Laertius himself, the work cited in his introduction is not 
mentioned.405 Next, we have already shown that it was necessary to go 
back to the Magi in the tradition of Zarathustra to fully understand the 
work of Hesiod. Moreover, this was already known in the Athens 
school, as confirmed by Aristotle himself in a preserved fragment 
from his treatise On Philosophy, cited by Diogenes Laertius406 and 
Pliny:407 
Eudoxus, who wished it to be thought that the most famous and most 
beneficial of the philosophical sects was that of the Magi, tells us that 
this Zoroaster lived 6000 years before the death of Plato. Aristotle 
says the same. 
A little later this historian records that in his treatise On Philosophy 
Aristotle maintained that the Magi were more ancient than the 
Egyptians and that they believed in the existence of the two principles 
of Good (Zeus) and Evil (Oromades), as we have already noted in our 
commentary on the Protrepticus. The compiler Rose placed this 
fragment within the work Ms (On Magic), as does Abdurrahman 
Badawi,408 while the philologist Jaeger included it in On Philosophy, 
on the grounds that this treatise already contained fragments on the 
Magi and that there was no work On Magic in the Aristotelian 
corpus.409 So we shall follow Jaeger in suggesting that this work cited 
by Diogenes Laertius is apocryphal. However, by this we understand 
that the historical version of the philosophical schools proposed by 
Aristotle in his On Philosophy cannot be that proposed by Plato and 
subsequently approved by Diogenes Laertius. Here is the judgement 
of the philologist Jaeger:410 
                                                 
405 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, I, pp. 236-237. 
406 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Eminent Philosophers, introduction, p. 41.  
407 Pliny, Natural History, 30.3. We have used Jaeger’s translation from the Latin, 
op. cit., pp. 134-135. The fragment given on p. 449 is Rose’s fragment 34, 
Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus, p. 50. 
408 Abdurrahman Badawi, La transmission de la philosophie grecque au monde 
arabe, Vrin, 2nd ed. 2000, p. 104. 
409 Jaeger, op. cit., pp. 135-136 and note 25, p. 449.  
410 Ibid. p. 128.  
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He began with the historical development of philosophy. He did not 
confine himself to the Greek philosophers from Thales onward […] 
Contrary to his procedure in the Metaphysics, he went back to the 
East, and mentioned its ancient and tremendous creations with interest 
and respect.  
When Aristotle says in his Protrepticus that philosophy began with 
Pythagoras, as we noted earlier, this is because Pythagoras was 
implicitly linked to Zoroaster, in the same metonymic way that Thales 
was attached to the mythical figure of Kadmos.411 In his Metaphysics 
Aristotle repeats the accepted view that the Ionian current began with 
Thalès:412 
Thales, the founder of this school of philosophy, says the principle is 
water (for which reason he declared that the earth rests on water).  
He also contrasts the Ionian and Italian currents in several passages of 
Book A.413 So a different vision of history is set out only in his treatise 
On Philosophy, a historical study going back to the Eastern influences 
according to our historian and philologist Jaeger. But even here, in 
Aristotle’s academic study, which must have been subject to the 
teaching of the Academy, this lost knowledge must have formed only 
a part of the information he had gathered about the origins of 
philosophy. We can also understand that, as this branch of philosophy 
is placed under the auspices of Zoroaster, it preceded Platonic 
dialectic. So it is doubtful that it was represented by the Italian school 
alone. The Ionian school may also have been influenced by this 
movement. This is indicated primarily by the work of the Ionian 
Hesiod since, as we have seen, his framework was based on Iranian 
conceptions. “Thus spoke  Zarathustra”, thus philosophy unfolds. To 
understand this, we shall provide a few historical details.  
Firstly, Aristotle’s reliable account must be understood in the 
sense of Iranian cosmogony itself. Ohrmazd (the good god, Ahura 
Mazdâ) and Ahriman (the bad god, Angra Manyu) each reigned for 
three thousand years, the equivalent of 6000 years, but this period is 
mythological rather than historical in nature.414 This theological 
                                                 
411 On the techniques of history writing which link men to legendary figures, see 
Karin Mackowia’s article, “Les savoirs de Thalès et de Kadmos. Histoire et 
représentation religieuses en Grèce ancienne”, Annales HSS, July-August 2003, no. 
4, pp. 859-876.   
412 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A, 3, 20-21, trans. Barnes. 
413 Aristotle, Metaphysics, A, 5, 987a 10; A, 5, 987a 32. 
414 See also Jaeger’s analysis in Aristotle. Fundamentals of the History of his 
Development, p. 133. 
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dualism stemmed from the astronomical conceptions we discussed in 
relation to Hesiod and which were later taken up by Plato. Zurvan, 
infinite time, is the supreme God of this Iranian pantheon dating back 
to at least the 12th century BCE.415 So everything would be 
comparatively simple were it not for the reform carried out by 
Zarathustra in the early 7th century BCE., as Brisson describes:416 
However, the reform made by Zarathustra, who must have lived 
around 600 BCE, almost removed Zurvan from the religious sphere of 
ancient Iran, in a manner similar to Mythra. But when Babylon was 
taken by the Persians in 538 BCE, the Iranian priests came into 
contact with the Chaldeans, who were primarily concerned with 
astrology. It seems that it was in this atmosphere favourable to 
syncretism that Zurvan once more became an important divinity and 
Mithriacism emerged. Moreover, it was through these Maguseans that 
the Greeks, notably Eudeumus of Rhodes, encountered the Iranian 
religion.  
Zarathustra’s reform predated the taking of Babylon by the Persians, 
so this reform was not constrained by Chaldean knowledge, as the 
Mithraic synthesis long suggested. Conversely, it places us in the time 
of Thales of Miletus, who died in 545 BCE, and Pherecydes of Syros, 
the two being contemporaries, as an Aristotelian fragment indicates:417 
Socrates had as rivals (so Aristotle says in the third book of his work 
on poetry) a certain Antilochus of Lemnos and Antiphon the 
soothsayer, as Pythagoras had Cylon of Croton; Homer while alive 
had Syagrus, and when dead Xenophanes of Colophon. Hesiod when 
alive had Cecrops, and after death the aforesaid Xenophanes; Pindar 
had Amphimenes of Cos, Thales had Pherecydes, Bias had Salarus of 
Priene, Pittacus had Antimenidas and Alcaeus, Anaxagoras hand 
Sosibus, and Simonides had Timocreon. 
While this fragment clearly indicates that the two thinkers were 
contemporaries, it also seems to suggest a rivalry between two schools 
of which these two seem to have been representatives. For if Thales 
was in competion with Pherecydes, they cannot both be placed in the 
same current. Aristotle also states that Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, 
followed the teaching of Pherecydes:418 
                                                 
415 Cf. Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, La religion de l’Iran ancien, Introduction à 
l’histoire des religions 1. Les anciennes religions orientales 3, PUF, 1962, p. 146. 
416 Brisson, “La figure de chronos dans la théogonie orphique et ses antécédents 
iraniens”, art. cit., p. 48. 
417 Aristotle, On Poets, Fragment 7 in Ross, The Works of Aristotle, XII, Select 
fragments, Oxford, 1952, p. 75 (Colli, 9 [A 7]). Our italics. 
418 Aristotle, On the Pythagoreans, fragment 1 in ibid, p. 134 (Colli, 9 [A 6]). 
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Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchus, who first worked at mathematics and 
arithmetic, but later even indulged in miracle-mongering like that of 
Pherecydes.  
So we might suspect that the Ionian thinker Pherecydes represented 
the so-called “Italian” school of which Pythagoras was simply a link 
in the historical chain. It is perhaps based on this account that 
Diogenes Laertius insistently repeated that Pherecydes taught 
Pythagoras, the only information he gives us on this philosopher:419 
He was a pupil, as already stated, of Pherecydes of Syros, after whose 
death he went to Samos to be the pupil of Hermodamas, Creophylus's 
descendant, a man already advanced in years.  
In his Metaphysics Aristotle places at least two philosophers in this 
so-called “Italian” tradition: Empedocles and Anaxagoras, with an 
explicit reference to the Magi, in other words to Iranian culture, while 
Diogenes sees these two philosophers as belonging to different 
schools, the first Ionian, the second Italian:420 
Pherecydes and some others, make the original generating agent the 
Best, and so do the Magi, and some of the later sages also, e.g. 
Empedocles and Anaxagoras, of whom one made friendship an 
element, and the other made thought a principle. 
After this it is easy to link the rest of this Italian current starting with 
Pherecydes to Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, then Archelaos, then Socrates, 
then Plato, who shed its influence late in life. This filiation sees Italian 
thought move from Ionia to Greece, as Diogenes Laertius suggests:421 
Archelaus, the son of Apollodorus, or as some say of Midon, was a 
citizen of Athens or of Miletus; he was a pupil of Anaxagoras, who 
first brought natural philosophy from Ionia to Athens. Archelaus was 
the teacher of Socrates. He was called the physicist inasmuch as with 
him natural philosophy came to an end as soon as Socrates had 
introduced ethics. 
Let us now turn to Pherecydes. Aside from the fact that he taught 
Pythagoras to analyse numbers, we know little about Pherecydes of 
Syros other than that he supported the Ephesians against the 
Magneisans. Only a single authentic fragment remains refering to his 
philosophy in the Lyceum and, as the luck of history would have it, 
this fragment concerns his philosophy of time:422 
Pherecydes of Syros also says that Zas is always, like Time and 
Chthonia, as the three primary principles … and that Time with his 
                                                 
419 Diogenes Laertius II, 8, op. cit., p. 25. 
420 Aristotle, Metaphysics, N, 4, 1091b 8-10. 
421 Diogenes Laertius, op. cit. II, 4, (Archelaus). 
422 Eudemus of Rhodes, fragment 150, (Colli, 9 [B 3]). 
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own seed produced fire, breath and water … and that of these – 
divided into five regions – was formed another, numerous lineage of 
gods, the one that was called “of five refuges”, perhaps meaning “of 
the five worlds”.  
The supreme God of his philosophy is called Zas and is “always”, 
along with Chronos and Chthonia. It is Cronos who, with his own 
seed, engenders fire, breath and water. After this time unfolds in five 
regions which are the five “ages” of the world in Hesiod’s theogony. 
So this conception is manifestly identical to that set out by Hesiod and 
Iranian in origin. A fragment from the work of Celsus, less reliable 
than the preceding fragment, confirms that Pherecydes was using 
Hesiodic conceptions. This passage describes a struggle between 
Cronos and the serpent Ophioneus, each represented by one of two 
opposing armies:423 
And Pherecydes, who was far earlier than Heraclitus, relates a myth of 
an army drawn up in battle against another army, and says that Kronos 
was the leader of one and Ophioneus of the other; he tells of their 
challenges and their contests, and that they made agreements that 
whichever of them fell into Ogenus should be the vanquished party, 
while the party which drove the other out and conquered should 
possess the heaven.  
For Schuhl this episode is an explicit reference to a passage from 
Hesiod’s Theogony (ll. 820-880) describing a struggle between Zeus 
(Zas) and Typhon.424 Meanwhile Colli links it to the founding of 
Orphism. We shall consider the source of Colli’s confusion.425 In our 
view, these two fragments can reasonably be seen to indicate that the 
thought of Pherecydes of Syros had an identical source to that of the 
theologian Hesiod. Perhaps under the influence of the later Mithraic 
synthesis, Cicero suggested that Pherecydes was the first to assert 
“that the souls of men were immortal” and Pherecydes was later 
described as a “disciple of Zaratas the Chaldean”.426 As we have seen, 
                                                 
423 Origen, Contra Celsum, 6, 42, trans. Henry Chadwick, Cambridge University 
Press, 1965, pp. 357-8. 
424 Schuhl, Essai…, p. 148. 
425 Colli links this struggle between Cronos and Orphion (the serpent, Ourobouros) 
to Cretan culture and thus to original Orphism (I, 382-383, 391-392). We prefer to 
follow Schuhl in suggesting that this symbolism is linked to Pythagoreanism. There 
are, moreover, many representations of divinities stemming from Iranian culture 
showing this serpent in the context of the Mithraic heritage, as Brisson has shown 
(art. cit., pp. 56-57). 
426 Plutarch, De animae procreatione in Timaeo II. Cicero said, “Pherecydes, the 
Syrian, is the first on record, who said that the souls of men were immortal”, 
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however, Pherecydes was working before the Ionian culture 
encountered its Chaldean counterpart, which is not supported by 
history.  
So, at the foundation of this Italian tradition we would place 
the Ionian poet Hesiod, since no other thinker ever depicted Iranian 
culture in so authentic a manner. It will be objected that Hesiod is a 
poet and not a philosopher, but such Platonic distinctions have no 
place in this argument. It is better to say, with Vico, that Hesiod is a 
“theologian” poet and that this Iranian theology greatly influenced 
Ionian thought, giving momentum to the tradition called Italian. 
Lastly, in terms of effective cause, it must be agreed that Hesiod’s 
work gives us far richer information on Iranian theology than the few 
fragments remaining to us of the thought of Pherecydes. Whether or 
not this interpretation conforms with that proposed by Aristotle, it is 
the one we shall follow, since we shall never know whether Hesiod 
was cited in the historical essay Aristotle provided in On 
Philosophy.427 As for Zarathustra’s reform, we need only read the 
Avesta to grasp it in more detail.428 This reform raises the question of 
heroism, whick constantly reappears in European thought from 
Pythagoras, who is its representative. This reform which hypostasises 
initiatory heroism would demand a study in itself and if we continued 
down this path we should find ourselves in deepest theology rather 
than on the path of philosophy.  
So, for want of a hero in this narrative we shall adopt an 
incident.429 For our study, held in a mythical time, constantly returns 
                                                                                                                   
Tusculanes, 1, 16, 38, Colli, 9 [B 5), Schuhl, Essai…, p. 250. In the same tradition 
we should note that Origen, in the work cited previously, also seeks to link the 
episode of the titanic struggle between Cronos and the serpent Orphioneus to 
Egyptian culture: “This is also the meaning contained in the mysteries which affirm 
that the Titans and Giants fought with the gods, and in the mysteries of the 
Egyptians which tell of Typhon and Horus and Osiris.” Contra Celsum, trans. Henry 
Chadwick, Cambridge University Press, 1953. 
427 Jaeger thinks that Aristotle’s history as set out in his On Philosophy mentions 
Hesiod, but no supporting fragment has survived, op. cit., p. 128. 
428 Cf. Jacques Duchesne-Guillemin, Zoroastre, Paris, 1948, a critical study and 
annotated translation of the Gathas. 
429 Considering Aristotle’s conception of the narrative presented in his Poetics, 
Victor Goldschmidt suggests: “The nub involves constructing an inextricable 
situation from which it seems there is no way out – just as a theoretical impasse 
seems to close off all further lines of thought. Nevertheless, one is found that is 
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to its origins in Iranian culture, best represented by Hesiod among the 
Greek studies. So we shall present the so-called “Italian” Hesiodic 
lineage as follows: Hesiod, Pherecydes of Syros, (reform of the 
Iranian cult of Zarathustra, which does not succeed in becoming 
established among the people), Pythagoras, Anaxagoras-Empedocles, 
Archelaos-Socrates, Plato. We have seen that the conception of time 
of both the Athenian Plato and Pherecydes of Syros are rooted in this 
thought. Thought that cannot free itself from this influence will 
stagnate within myth. The Ionian theoretical knot must thus be untied 
by considering another influence. This naturally leads us to speak of 
Thales, historically regarded as the first Ionian philosopher, not 
representative of the Italian school, and as the first sage of Athenian 
time.430 In order to present this philosopher’s thought as well as 
possible, we shall try to determine the strictly Ionian vision of the 
world from which it stems. This vision of the world seems to have 
countered the Italian perspective of Iranian origins, at least judging 
from the aforementioned Aristotelian fragment. While the so-called 
“Italian” current is rooted in Iranian religion, we shall see that the so-
called “Ionian” current could draw directly on a Mediterranean 
religion described as “Orphic”. This current was at least as ancient as 
that which the Persians sought to impose and which the Italian current 
promoted in Greece, notably under the auspices of Pythagoras. So we 
shall start by providing some strictly historical elements.    
 
The Ionian people had their roots among the Achaeans (Aχαΐα: 
Akhaía), the  people behind the Trojan War431), who were themselves 
                                                                                                                   
entirely unforeseeable (herein lies the power of the nub) and yet, looking back, 
plausible and necessary,” in Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote, p. 404. 
430 We should note that this was the branch of philosophy least explored by 
Nietzsche, who stepped into the breach of Iranian studies and identified all the 
consequences of the problem of Mazdaian heroism in a historically correct manner. 
However, he did so to the detriment of the current we wish to discuss, although we 
will concede that, while many Vedic texts were discovered in Nietzsche’s time, 
studies on the peoples of the sea are far more recent. See Les philosophes 
préplatoniciens followed by Les "diadochai" des philosophes, l’Eclat, 1994 
(translated from the German by Paolo D'Iorio, Francesco Fronterotta and Nathalie 
Ferrand). 
431 In talking about the Achaeans Homer sometimes uses the term Argives, which 
identifies the city of their culture, Argos (Aργος), and also Danaans or Dananaans. 
Names used by the different cultures (Egyptian, Hebrew, etc.) who mention this 
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one of the peoples of the sea,432 whose origins remain controversial. 
This origin explains why, in The Phoenician Women433 Euripides says 
that Io (Ίώ: Iố), from whose name the Greek appellation “Ionian” 
derives, was from the city of Argos (Aργος). One of the peoples of the 
sea did indeed settle in Argos around the 15th century BCE, and it was 
at this time that they took the name Achaean.434 The Achaeans then 
founded Thebes (Θήβα), native city of Pindar, the great poet of 
initiation, in Boeotia (Βοιωτία). The historians generally agree that 
Thebes was not founded by the Achaeans but by a “Phoenician” called 
Cadmus (Κάδμος: Kádmos), under whose authority the historian 
Diogenes Laertius places the first philosopher Thales. So what is the 
relationship between Thales and Miletus, Miletus and Thebes and 
Thebes and the Phoenicians? We shall try to understand this in order 
to return to the world view of the Ionians, of whom Thales seems to 
have been one of the foremost representatives. Let us start by citing 
Diogenes Laertius:435 
Herodotus, Duris, and Democritus are agreed that Thales was the son 
of Examyas and Cleobulina, and belonged to the Thelidae who are 
Phoenicians, and among the noblest of the descendants of Cadmus and 
Agenor. As Plato testifies, he was one of the Seven Sages. 
Two of the sources attesting to this lineage, the philosopher 
Democritus and the historian Duris of Samos (whose brother Lynceus 
                                                                                                                   
people include: Danaouna, Denyen, Danunites, Danaoi, Danaus, Danaids and 
Dene. 
432 This group was first identified and named by the archaeologist Gaston Maspero. 
The Achaeans (Akhawaska) were identified within it by Emmanuel de Rouge in 
1861 and the hypothesis was confirmed by the discovery of the Egyptian papyrus 
Harris, which mentions them.   
433 Euripides, The Phoenissae, ll. 680-685, trans. E.P. Coleridge: “Thee too, 
Epaphus, child of Zeus, sprung from our ancestress, I call on you in my foreign 
tongue; all hail to thee! hear my prayer uttered in accents strange, and visit this land; 
‘twas in thy honour thy descendants settled here, and those goddesses of twofold 
name, Persephone and kindly Demeter or Earth the queen of all, that feedeth every 
mouth, won it for themselves; send to the help of this land those torch-bearing 
queens; for to gods all things are easy.” See also ll. 640-660, 795, 800, 805-820. 
434 Later, in 710 BCE, they knew where they were going and sailed further, arriving 
in southern Italy, where they founded the famous city of Croton, where Pythagoras 
went into politics, with more success than Plato in Sicily (Strabo, VI). The Odyssey 
(VI, VIII, XIII) also shows that the Phoenicians had trading posts in the Ionian 
islands, notably one in Corfu run by the Phaeacians (οiΦαίακες: hoi Phaíakes). 
435 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers I, p. 51 (Thalès), trans. Hicks. 
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had been a pupil of Theophrastes), have not been preserved.436 So we 
must examine the one we still have, which is the historical enquiry by 
Herodotus, which is regarded as the most reliable. This historian will 
enable us to remove this apparent contradiction:437 
The family of the Gephyraeans, to which the murderers of Hipparchus 
belonged, according to their own account, came originally from 
Eretria. My inquiries, however, have made it clear to me that they are 
in reality Phoenicians, descendants of those who came with Cadmus 
into the country now called Boeotia. Here they received for their 
portion the district of Tanagra, in which they afterwards dwelt. On 
their expulsion from this country by the Boeotians (which happened 
some time after that of the Cadmeians from the same parts by the 
Argives) they took refuge at Athens. The Athenians received them 
among their citizens upon set terms, whereby they were excluded 
from a number of privileges which are not worth mentioning. 
This historical confusion is cleared if we say, with Herodotus, that in 
the meantime the Achaeans had changed their name to become the 
people he calls the Gephyreans. Herodotus states that, in the first 
place, the Achaeans were driven out of the Peleoponnese. After this 
historians such as Diogenes Laertius thought they had settled in 
Eretria, which is why they were long thought to be Greeks and that 
Ionia was an Eretrian Greek colony.438 But Herodotus says that his 
research enables him to show that in fact these people came directly 
from the Achaeans and had settled in Boeotia in order to found the 
city of Thebes. Then, driven out of Boeotia in turn, some of them took 
refuge in Athens, without it seems ever mixing with the Athenians, 
while the rest seem to have gone to the city of Miletus.439 This 
historical clarification would be of little importance did we not know 
that when they migrated to Boeotia, the Achaeans took with them 
                                                 
436 Cf. Duris of Samos, Chronicles, Book II, for the preserved epitaph referring to 
Pythagoras: “All wisdom is summed up in me. He who seeks to praise me should 
rather praise Pythagoras, for he is the foremost on Greek soil. In saying this I speak 
the truth.” Under the influence of his brother Lynceus, this pupil of Theophrastus 
advocated an approach to history through the acts of great men, relegating historical 
rigour and the linear time used by historians to a secondary level. 
437 Herodotus, Histories, trans. George Rawlinson, 1858-60, 5, 57, LVII. 
http://classics.mit.edu/Herodotus/history.html 
438 Karin Mackowia, “Les savoirs de Thalès et de Kadmos. Histoire et 
représentation religieuses en Grèce ancienne”, Annales HSS, July-August 2003, no. 
4, pp. 859-876, p. 868. Mackowia sees Eretria as a symbolic space for the 
intermediate assimilation of a knowledge that is not Greek. 
439 Véronique Suys, “Le culte de Déméter Achaia en Béotie. Etat actuel des 
connaissances”, L’Antiquité classique, 63, 1994, pp. 1-20, p. 6. 
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three elements  that were fundamental to the knowledge called 
“Greek” or “pan-Athenian”: their own story of the Trojan War, 
alphabetic writing and the cult of Demeter, which gave rise to the cult 
of Eleusis. These are no small things. In terms of our own analysis, it 
was also the research of the Ionian thinkers that produced the first 
philosophical principle describing time. This is a colossal heritage 
whose full measure should one day be recognised. It is now well 
established that the Achaeans (Phoenicians) brought alphabetic 
writing to our western civilisation.440 Concerning their real history of 
the taking of Troy, we now know that the Athenians did not take part 
in this war. It was the tyrant Peisistratus (600–527 BCE), sponsor of 
the first edition of The Iliad and The Odyssey, who placed this story 
under Hellene colours and in so doing falsified the list of combatants 
by adding the Athenians. In this regard the episode narrated by 
Herodotus reveals a climate of extreme tension between Athens and 
Thebes. Indeed Herodotus relates that the Gephyraeans killed 
Hipparchus. Hipparchus and his father the tyrant Peisistratus were 
responsible for the versification of not only all of Homer’s work, but 
also that of a supposed Orpheus said to have come from Thrace to 
found Orphism. While the Greeks assimiled the Gephyraean story of 
the Trojan war without fuss, the same cannot be said of their worship 
of Demeter. On this subject Schuhl says:441 
But according to Pausanias (VIII, 37, 5), it was only Onomacritus – 
the chresmologue who lived in the court of Pisistratus and was caught 
in the act of falsifying the prophecies of Musaeus (Herodotus, VII, 6)  
who made the Titans, whose name he took from Homer, authors of the 
passion of Dionysus. 
Herodotus relates that Lasus of Hermione caught Onomacritus in the 
act of tampering with the sacred springs of “Great Athens”, then under 
construction, for which he was driven out by Hipparchus. Aristotle 
                                                 
440 Herodotus, Histories, trans. Rawlinson, 5, 58, LVIII: “Now the Phoenicians 
who came with Cadmus, and to whom the Gephyraei belonged, introduced into 
Greece upon their arrival a great variety of arts, among the rest that of writing, 
whereof the Greeks till then had, as I think, been ignorant.” The Phoenician 
alphabet, which originated in Byblos, was discovered on a sarcophagus of a king of 
Byblos dating from the 12th century BCE. The Phoenician origins of our alphabet are 
no longer in any doubt. All the references to contemporary studies on this matter can 
be found in Mackowia, “Les savoirs de Thalès et de Kadmos. Histoire et 
représentation religieuses en Grèce ancienne”, art. cit.. 
441 Schuhl, Essai…, op. cit., p. 230. 
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mentions this falsification in his treatise On Philosophy442 and 
subsequently criticises Orphic ideas on two more occasions.443 What 
credit should we give to Aristotle’s refusal to accept Orpheus and 
Orphism in general? And why did Tatian and Clement, two important 
fathers of the Church, also reject this mythological figure?  
The simple answer is that Macedonian culture, from which 
Aristotle emerged, was closest geographically and historically to the 
peoples of Thrace, whom they drove further north. Clearly Aristotle 
had never heard of Orpheus or the oracles of the supposed Musaeus, a 
term apparently referring simply to the people of the Musoï, the 
Mysians. So the question that remains unanswered is where did all this 
initiatory content, placed under the aegis of Musaeus or Orpheus, 
actually come from? If the source was not Thracian culture, to what 
culture should this knowledge be linked? In order to unravel all this, 
we need to return to the conflict between the Athenian tyranny of 
Peisistratus and the Cadmaeans of Thebes, whose Phoenician origin is 
recorded by Herodotus, as we have just indicated. The first certainty is 
that, at the end of this confrontation, the Cadmaean priestly class had 
acquired an unlimited concession over the cult of Eleusis. Two 
Cadmaean families (the Eumolpides and the Kerykes) controlled the 
cult of Demeter, as confirmed by Aristotle in his Constitution of 
Athens.444 So the religious tradition of the “Phoenicians” (or more 
globally of the peoples of the sea) was preserved in the cult of 
Demeter Achaia at the shrine of Eleusis. This is convincingly shown 
by the inscription found on the Parian marble.445 Musaeus was the son 
of Eumolpos and Eumolpos is the name of the Achaean family in 
charge of the mysteries of Eleusis (Eλευσίνια Μυστήρια). So Musaeus 
can no longer be linked to the Thracians, as Aristotle suggested. Colli 
says:446 
                                                 
442 Aristotle, On Philosophy, Ross Fragment 7, G. Colli, 13 [A1] = Herodotus, 7, 6. 
443 Aristotle, De anima, I, 5, 410b 28-30: “This problem affects the doctrine in the 
so-called Orphic poems as well; for he says that Soul, being carried by the winds, 
enters from the universe into living creatures when they inhale,” trans. S. Burges 
Watson, Living Poets, Durham, 2014, 
https://livingpoets.dur.ac.uk/w/Aristotle,_On_the_Soul_1.5,_410b27?oldid=2488. 
The same quotation can be found in Generation of Animals, II, 1, 734a 18. 
444 The two Cadmaean families that ran the cult of Eleusis were the Eumolpidae 
and the Kerykes, Cf. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, XXXIX, 1. 
445 This marble discovered in Paros is a chronicle of the events of Greece, 
Inscriptiones Græcæ, XII, 5, 444, FGrH II, no. 239.  
446 Colli, La Sagesse grecque, I, p. 45. 
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The Parian marble tells us that it was Eumolpos, son of Musaeus, who 
instituted the mysteries in Eleusis.   
If Musaeus is the father of Eumolpos, as irrefutably attested by this 
historical inscription, the legend ascribing a Thracian origin to the 
mysteries of Eleusis, a legend probably established by the poet Olen, 
collapses.447 The Achaean origin is moreover corroborated by a 
further clue. Demeter still bears the epithet “Achaia” or Aχαΐα 
(Akhaía), Αχαΐα (Akhaía), a reference to the Greek region north of the 
Peloponnese known as Achaïe, a name derived from the Achaeans 
(Aχαιοî: Akhaioí). So one source of Orphism, and by no means the 
least, would seem to be the cult of Demeter, of Achaean origin.448 As 
for the legendary figure of Orpheus, it is harder to know how to locate 
his legendary status within history itself. At most, we can make a 
supposition. The committee set up by Peisistratus had a member 
called Orpheus of Croton. Should we add his name to the list of 
forgers among whom the historians have already placed Onomacritus? 
We do not know.   
 It remains the case that Orpheus, a founding figure of the cult 
established by the tyranny of Peisistratus, was later used to push back 
the religion of the Achaeans. There are two identified fragments that 
reflect the meeting of Dionysus, of Iranian origin, and Demeter, of 
“Phoenician” origin. This struggle is played out within the city of 
Thebes itself. Let us first listen to Pindar’s lament:449 
Was it when you raised to eminence the one seated beside Demeter of 
the clashing bronze cymbals, flowing-haired Dionysus? 
This fragment of Pindar shows that it was the poet’s task to make 
Dionysus the equal of Demeter, which suggests that Dionysus was 
less important or more recent. In any case, Demeter definitely 
preceded Dionysus. While Colli tells us that the second fragment has 
been identified, the process of attribution remains uncertain:450  
Had I the lips of Orpheus and his melody / to charm the maiden 
daughter of Demeter  
                                                 
447 This legend is said to come from Olen the Lycian, who was the first to dedicate 
a hymn to an Achaea in Delos and to suggest that this Demeter Achaea had come 
from the land of the Hyperboreans, according to Pausanias V, 7, 8. See also Suys, 
“Le culte de Déméter Achaia en Béotie. Etat actuel des connaissances”, L’Antiquité 
classique, 63, 1994, pp. 1-20, p. 7.  
448 As we have seen, it was Onomacritus who linked the passion of Dionysos to 
Homer’s story of the Titans.  
449 Pindar, Isthmian, 7, 3-5; Colli 3 [A 3]). 
450 Colli, 4 [A 13]. 
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This second fragment confirms the analysis based on the first. There is 
a mention of the forcible bending of hymns to Demeter in order to 
adapt them to Dionysus. In the rest of Greece in this period, the cults 
nevertheless tried to maintain the presence of both Dionysus and 
Demeter. At least this is what Suys suggests:451 
For example, during the haloa, the sacred festival of the grape harvest 
in December, the two divinities were jointly celebrated. In Corinth the 
temples of Dionysus, Demeter, Core and Artemis all stood in the same 
sacred enclosure (I.G.IV, 2003); in the Nymphon of Sicyon were the 
statues of Demeter, Core and Dionysus (Pausanias, II, 11, 1); at 
Thelpusa in Arcadia a shrine was dedicated to Eleusinian Demeter, 
Core and Dionysus (Pausanias, VIII, 25, 2). 
It is possible that in some of the Greek cults these two figures were 
maintained without Dionysus taking precedence over Demeter. This is 
confirmed by an inscription of the Roman period (I.G.VII, 1867), 
found in Thespiae. The inscription mentions a certain Flavia, lifelong 
priestess of Demeter Achaia, “descendant of those who established the 
cult of Dionysus”.452 But Demeter was not worshipped in the cult at 
Delphi, since once Dionysus had taken precedence over Demeter in 
Thebes he became dominant at Delphi. At least this is what Schuhl 
tells us:453 
Apollo could hold back the flood only by channelling it: in Delphi 
itself he had to allow Dionysus part of the space he had himself 
conquered from Python. The year there was shared between these two 
powerful gods, whose statues stood side by side on the pediment of 
the temple. 
So we begin to see that Pythagoreanism was a religious movement 
whose aim was to fuse the cults. Indeed we have already found two of 
these: the Iranian cult of Zurvan the starry and the Achaean cult of 
Demeter Achaea. This was religious syncretism in the service of pan-
Hellenism and the tyranny of Peisistratus.454 
 
                                                 
451 Suys, “Le culte de Déméter Achaia en Béotie. Etat actuel des connaissances”, 
L’Antiquité classique, 63, 1994, pp. 1-20, pp. 12-13. 
452 Suys, op. cit. pp. 6 and 13. 
453 Schuhl, Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque. Introduction historique à 
une étude de la philosophie platonicienne, PUF, 1949, p. 223.  
454 Schuhl also says: “The delirium of the Sibyl is no more properly Hellenic in 
origin than Dionysian enthusiasm. It was introduced into Greece by a religious 
propaganda movement, which we know only by its results,” in Essai sur la 
formation de la pensée grecque. Introduction historique à une étude de la 
philosophie platonicienne, PUF, p. 138. 
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Where our study is concerned, this religious syncretism prevents us 
from having a clear view of the primary source, the Achaean source 
and its cult of Demeter. So analysis of the Eleusian cult alone may 
enable us to clearly separate and distinguish the Achaean cult from the 
Iranian. By analysing this cult we can gain a sufficient idea of the 
strictly Ionian world view, in other words the conception that predates 
Pythagorean religious syncretism. However, this will not solve our 
primary problem. How can we connect Thebes, founded by the 
Achaeans, to Ionia, of which Miletus (Μίλητος: Mílêtos) is the largest 
city? Today it is believed that Miletus was founded between 1077 and 
1044 BCE by inhabitants who had come from Pylos, a tradition dating 
back to Strabo:455 
Miletus was founded by Neleus, a Pylian by birth. The Messenians 
and the Pylians pretend a kind of kinship with one another, according 
to which the more recent poets call Nestor a Messenian; and they say 
that many of the Pylians accompanied Melanthus, father of Codrus, 
and his followers to Athens, and that, accordingly, all this people sent 
forth the colonising expedition in common with the Ionians.  
The role of Neleus (Νηλεύς: Nêleús) as founder of Miletus is also 
attested by Homer.456 Like the Argives, the Pylians were confused 
with the “Phoenicians” by another historian, Diogenes Laertius:457 
[Thales] was admitted to citizenship at Miletus when he came to that 
town along with Nileos, who had been expelled from Phoenicia. 
Herodotus also suggests that “Thales [was a] man of Miletus, of 
distant Phoenician stock”.458 Despite the efforts made by Homer and 
Solon to assimilate this culture, it all seems to show that the Achaeans 
(Pylians and Argives) were not assimilated by the Greeks, who still 
regarded them as “Phoenicians”. Solon bears a heavy responsibility 
here for failing to unify the Athenian cults with that of Eleusis. The 
priestly families were closer to the Dorians of Megara than to those of 
Athens. While Solon was able to annex them on the pretext that they 
spoke the same language and by clearing their debts, the same cannot 
                                                 
455 Strabo, Geography, XIV, 1 - Ionia. Trans. Horace Leonard Jones, Loeb. 
456 According to Homer, Neleus was born to Tyro in Thessaly and married Chloris, 
daughter of Amphion, King of Orchomenus. He is said to have reigned in Pylos in 
Messenia. 
457 Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers I, p. 51 (Thales). The 
etymology of this city is said to be Nileus = Miletus. 
458 Herodotus, 1, 170, 3, Colli, 10 [A4]. 
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be said of the Eleusinian cults, as Louise-Marie L’homme-Wéry 
notes:459 
So the presence of Dioclese in the Hymn to Demeter, Aglaulus in the 
Ephebic Oath and Poseidon in the cult served by the Athenian branch 
of the Eleusinian clergy indicates a Demeter resistant to the absorption 
of Eleusis into the Athenian city, despite the efforts approved by 
Solon to unify the cultures of Eleusis and Athens.   
Indeed, Pausanias confirms that, following the war between the 
Athenians and Eumolpus’s Eleusinians,460 the Eleusinians were 
subjugated in every way except for the celebration of the mysteries.461 
The Athenians continued to call them the “Phoenicians”, showing that 
the fusion was political only and not cultural. Furthermore, Herodotus 
says that in his day the Athenians of Hellene descent (the Greeks) 
were still ashamed to be called “Ionians”.462 On the other hand the 
collaboration between the priests of Eleusis and Megara gave rise to a 
new current of philosophy, the Megarian School, which later came 
closer to Plato’s Athens School. Epimenides of Phaistos was tasked 
with providing the Athenian Eleusinian cults with a semblance of 
mysteries, which underpinned the initiation of Plato.463  
 
In short, whether Thales had his origins in the first wave of 
immigration to Ionia, that of the Pylians, the one carried out by Neleus 
as recorded by Diogenes Laertius, or a migration of Thebans as 
                                                 
459 Louise-Marie L’homme-Wéry, La Perspective éleunisienne dans la politique de 
Solon, Droz, 1996, p. 130. 
460 Thucydides, II, 15, 1: “Some of them had also their particular wars, as the 
Eleusinians who joined with Eumolpus against Erectheus [King of Athens].” Trans. 
Thomas Hobbes, http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Thuc.+2.15 
461 Pausanias I 38, 3 op. cit. p. 54. 
462 Herodotus, Histories, I, 143. 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0126%
3Abook%3D1%3Achapter%3D143%3Asection%3D3 
463 See L’homme-Wéry, p. 102: “Epimenides’ action to calm the tense relations 
between Eleusis and Athens in the aftermath of liberation by founding the 
Eleusinion en astei duplicating the Mysteries in the Athenian astus, confirms that he 
also established civic and corybantic mysteries on the model of those of Eleusis.” 
Was Plato an unwitting ammoros? Whatever the case, this Athenian casting of the 
Mysteries is open to question, since it was not in the interests of the priests of 
Eleusis to reveal their mysteries to the Athenians in the context of a political peace 
treaty that in no way obliged them to do so.    
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maintained by Nietzsche,464 since the Pylians and Argives were 
Achaeans, it makes no difference to the origins of Thales, who 
remains fundamentally Achaean in both cases, in other words 
Phoenician, if we understand this to mean the civilisation that is more 
prudently described today as that of the “peoples of the sea”.  
Michel B. Sakellariou, in his vast work Migration grecque en 
Ionie, does not accept the defeat of Solon, although he is aware that 
the assertion that the Greek cities of Ionia were Greek colonies was 
the result of Athenian propaganda that began with Solon.465 He begins 
by refusing to accept that Achaea was the “metropolis” of all the 
Ionians466 and goes on to deny the presence of Achaeans in Ionia, 
although the two peoples spoke the same language. He prefers to place 
their origins exclusively in Boeotia (p. 242), thus turning Solon’s 
argument against the Ionians (p. 491): 
Consequently, at this time no city in Ionia seems to have received 
colonists from the great “Achaean” centres. This fact, always 
assuming that it is not due to gaps in our documentation... 
The Parian Chronicle clearly states that “Neleus colonised Miletus and 
all the rest of Ionia” (p. 41) and, according to Diogenes, Neleus came 
from Phoenicia (p. 42) – Pylos to be precise, according to Homer 
Pherecydes (p. 43) and Strabo (p. 146). Herodotus describes even 
Ionians from Pylos as “pure” Ionians (I, 147). Yet Sakellariou prefers 
to see a Mycenean influence that is not mentioned in any text. He also 
refuses to accept the presence of “sea peoples” in either Ionia or 
Achaea (p. 467).467 So, in the current state of knowledge,  the absence 
of any real historical and archaeological evidence makes it possible to 
uphold all kinds of theses, none of which can be disproved. So while 
Greek history may never permit the untangling of this web, we should 
read the history of other peoples, as suggested by the Ionian 
Herodotus when he mentions the history of the Medes. This account is 
                                                 
464 Nietzsche, The Pre-Platonic Philosophers, trans. Greg Whitlock, University of 
Illinois Press, 2000, p. 23: “This family therefore at one time migrated from Thebes 
to Ionia.” 
465 Sakellariou, La migration grecque en Ionie, Institut français d’Athènes, 1958, p. 
14.  
466 “The thesis that made Achaea the metropolis of all the Ionians is found in a 
small number of accounts”, p. 27.  
467 Yet, 138 times in the Iliad Homer says that the Achaeans were Danaans or 
Argives. Why even Herodotus should state that the Achaeans had driven out the 
local populations (including the Danaans) when the Achaeans were precisely the 
people known as the “sea peoples” also remains inexplicable. 
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in our view the most reliable and will underpin our historical reading. 
Herodotus states that the conflict between Greece and Asia was started 
by the Phoenicians (I, 1): 
The Persian learned men say that the Phoenicians were the cause of 
the dispute. These (they say) came to our seas from the sea which is 
called Red, and having settled in the country which they still occupy, 
at once began to make long voyages. Among other places to which 
they carried Egyptian and Assyrian merchandise, they came to Argos, 
which was at that time preeminent in every way among the people of 
what is now called Hellas.  
So the Phoenicians did first settle in Argos before migrating, some of 
them to Ionia via Athens, others via Thebes, and apparently directly in 
the first case. Herodotus says several times that these Phoenicians 
were originally from Syria (according to Homer, I, 116). He even 
locates Syria precisely between Arabia and Egypt (II, 5):  
The road runs from Phoenicia as far as the borders of the city of 
Cadytis, which belongs to the so-called Syrians of Palestine. From 
Cadytis (which, as I judge, is a city not much smaller than Sardis) to 
the city of Ienysus the seaports belong to the Arabians; then they are 
Syrian again from Ienysus as far as the Serbonian marsh, beside which 
the Casian promontory stretches seawards. 
This is the now accepted place of the “sea peoples”. For this reason, 
historically, when the Greeks spoke of the “Phoenicians”, they were 
always referring to the Achaean Ionians. This is why we must be 
cautious before advancing that the Ionians are Greeks and Thales is 
the founder of a Greek philosophy. Politically speaking, this is 
undeniably true, but it is doubtful from a philosophical perspective. 
The philosophy developed by Thales is not Greek, its origins are 
Achaean, Phoenician.  
This confusion has been broadly fostered by the mythology of the 
seven sages (σοφοί) of Ancient Greece, relayed by Diogenes Laertius. 
But this mythology was unknown to the Greeks of the 6th and 5th 
centuries BCE. It is the work of later historians. It is thought to have 
been initiated under Egyptian influence468 by Demetrius of Phalerum 
                                                 
468 It seems that Demetrius of Phalerum is the source of the mythology of the seven 
sages, as recorded by Plutarch. According to Colli (II, p. 121) he wrote a collection 
on this subject, The Register of the Archons, and no other authors are known to have 
written on this mythology before him. On this subject see also Nietzsche, The Pre-
Platonic Philosophers, p. 13, pp. 24-25. 
HISTORICAL RESEARCH INTO PRE-ARISTOTELIAN TIME  
 169 
(350-282 BCE), pupil of Theophrastus, and based on Plato’s 
Cratylus,469 a tradition later adopted by Plutarch.  
As for how to understand the Achaean world view, we could 
also ask Sanchuniathon, historian of the Phoenicians. A Greek 
translation of his book in the Phoenician language was made in the 
time of Porphyry by Philo de Byblos, entitled Sacred History.470 But 
this would not advance our investigation, since Philo states that this 
text already mentioned a book on the Magi entitled Persica, which 
took up the Iranian conceptions we discussed earlier in relation to 
Pythagoreanism.471 So we do not think that Sanchuniathon can 
provide a basis for an understanding of the Ionian world view, since 
his work already seems to be a synthesis of many influences. His 
historical study was a real and imaginary religious syncretism, 
according to Eusebius of Caesarea via Philo of Byblos.472 On the 
notion of time, it tells us that this culture’s god El was the master of 
time and “Father of the Years”, and that he had supplanted Ouranos. 
So El would have been the famous Greek Kronos.473 But in fact it 
seems that this was an attempt at syncretism on the part of 
Sanchuniathon. El did not precede Ouranos. Why oppose two worlds? 
This is why we cannot agree with the bold thesis advanced by André 
Mercier at a conference in Athens on Greek time:474 
                                                 
469 Plato, Cratylus, 343 a-b. It was Socrates who introduced a list of sages that 
stopped at seven. This is another Platonic legend. 
470 The fragments were preserved by the Church Father Eusebius of Cesarea. On 
this subject see the work of Edward Lipinski, notably his book Dieux et déesses de 
l’Univers phénicien et punique, Peeters, Brill, 1995, p. 60, note 12. 
471 Cf. the work of Joseph Bidez. 
472 For example, the cult of Byblos is already a syncretism of the Phoenician and 
Egyptian gods. There is no Earth-Mother figure, but there is a “Lady of Byblos”, 
linked to Astarte and Amon, the great God of Thebes; Lipinski, Dieux et déesses de 
l’Univers phénicien et punique, p. 72, pp. 90-91. And then the epic of Gilgamesh 
which originated here (Byblos) retains traces of the influence of the Babylonian 
religions on this culture. 
473 Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparatio Evangelica, I, 10, 18, also relates that Philo of 
Byblos had made Persephone the daughter of Kronos who died a virgin, whereas in 
the Greek tradition she is the daughter of Zeus and Demeter, which is not a suitable 
historical symphysis. However, it is true that it is hard to understand how Demeter 
could have been coupled with Zeus. The historical realities show rather that the 
Achaeans (Demeter) never mixed with the Greeks (Zeus).  
474 André Mercier, “Discours de synthèse de l'entretien d’Athènes”, 1986, in 
Chronos et Kairos, Vrin, Diotima, Institut international de philosophie, 1988, pp. 
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The God El of the naturist Phoenician myths dating back to the second 
millennium BCE is said to be the Master of Time, “Father of the 
Years” as well as father of the other gods and of human beings. And 
Philo of Byblos relates that El had supplanted Ouranos, to the point 
where he identified him with Kronos (written with a kappa), and we 
know today that there were parallels between the mythology of the 
Ras Shamra texts and that governing the mysteries of Eleusis. 
Meanwhile the Sidonians, who date to the first half of the first 
millennium BCE, placed Time above all things, as noted by 
Damascius in the 6th century CE, on the basis of Aristotle’s pupil 
Eudemus. 
Instead we should return to the sources preserved by the priests of the 
cult of Eleusis to get a clear idea of the Achaean cult independent of 
all these religious influences. Why? Because while the history of 
peoples constantly changes, that of cults is not subject to the same 
hazards of time; it is not subject to the time of heroes or of conquests. 
Despite the recent discoveries of the Thebes tablets, we know very 
little of the cult of Demeter Achaea.475 At the most we know that in 
Eleusis Demeter Ma-ka (known by that name by Aeschylus476) is 
placed before Zeus (o-po-rei, the protector of fruit) and that their 
daughter is Kore (ko-wa). But Demeter still has the epithet “si-to” 
(), indicating the link with the agrarian world, which also appears 
in the use of all the flours that spring from the belly of the Earth, and 
notably the barley flour used in religious services. The chosen animal 
of this rite is the crane, which acts as a herald. In our view this 
semantic field could refer back to the Earth-Mother. Such is, 
moreover, the etymology of the name Demeter itself: Δημήτηρ 
(Dêmếtêr) derives from Γῆ Μήτηρ (Gễ Mếtêr), “Mother Earth” or 
Δημομήτηρ (Dêmomếtêr) “Mother of the Earth” and δῆμος / dễmos, 
“the earth or the land”. Both the ritual of the cult and the etymology of 
Demeter suggest to us that Ionian thought is rooted in the cult of 
Demeter the Mother Earth. This enables us to provide a historical 
counterweight to the influence of the Italian current of Iranian origin. 
                                                                                                                   
66-73, p. 67. Mercier is the author of a book on time that we have been unable to 
consult: El tiempo, los tiempos, y la filosophia, Mexico, 1985. 
475 Cf. Jean-Louis Perpillou, “Les nouvelles tablettes de Thèbes. (Autour d’une 
publication)”, Revue de philologie, de littérature et d’histoire anciennes, LXXV, 
2001/2, pp. 307-315. The reference works are the series launched by Eleni 
Andrikou, Vassilis L. Aravantinos, Louis Godart, Anna Sacconi, Joanita Vroom, 
Thèbes. Fouilles de La Cadmée. I and II, Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici 
Internazionali, Pisa – Roma, 2006. 
476 Aeschylus, The Suppliants, 80-892.  
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It is the endless rebalancing of these two currents, of East and West 
that, in our view, constitutes the meaning of Pythagorean inspiration 
itself. So there is no mystery in the land of Greece, we can leave that 
to the bourgeoisie who need it to establish a status that has no 
meaning, or to scholars in search of recognition.   
 
For our part we still have to insert this historical vision into our 
investigation. The agrarian dimension of the cult of Demeter and the 
semantic register of the Mother Earth mark a lexical field associated 
with fertility. The Mother Earth is always represented with an outsized 
belly and is potentially boundlessly fertile. But this potential fertility 
is not human. She does not give birth to a monster, but to the earth 
itself, in other words to fertility. The fertility of the world is its ability 
to keep engendering itself, like Cronos in the myth of races. The 
notion of fertility is intimately linked to that of time. To impregnate is 
to ensure the permanence of the world in time. It is eternity over time. 
From this we can understand that the cult of Demeter Achaea was a 
cult of fertility, and this fertility was intimately linked to the specific 
time of the heavens. In many places around the Mediterranean the 
Mother Earth has also been found with a distaff representing a 
machine to measure the time of the heavens, as we saw in relation to 
Penelope’s distaff.477 It is this fertility that gives rise to “physics” and 
to the strictly Ionian philosophical exploration of “generation” and 
“corruption”. Here again, this thesis is confirmed by Aeschylus, who 
perfectly describes the immanent Ionian time that is the complete 
opposite of Iranian transcendent time. Here is what he says in Seven 
against Thebes:478 
...and Mother Earth, your beloved nurse. For welcoming all the 
distress of your childhood, when you were young and crept upon her 
kind soil, she raised you to inhabit her and bear the shield. 
And more theoretically in The Libation Bearers:479 
                                                 
477 Schuhl, La fabulation platonicienne, op. cit., p. 77; cf. also Charles Picard, Le fil 
d’Ariane dans le merveilleux, la pensée et l’action, 1952, pp. 125-128. 
478 Aeschylus, Seven against Thebes, 17-20, trans. Herbert Weir Smyth: 
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0014 
Cf. L. Lupas and Z. Petre, Commentaire aux Sept contre Thèbes d'Eschyle, vv. 17-
20 n. 
479 Aeschylus, The Libation Bearers, trans. Herbert Weir Smyth:  
http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0008%
3Acard%3D106  
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...and Earth herself, who gives birth to all things, and having nurtured 
them receives their increase in turn. 
Ionian time is immanent and constantly recalled to this immanence by 
the cycle of generations. In our next book we shall investigate in more 
depth, following the work of Gérard Naddaf, whether the Ionian world 
view presented here is indeed that adopted in Aristotle’s Physics. 
However hypothetical the Achaean world view identified here 
may be, it still makes it easier to understand the distance between the 
Italian vision of philosophy and that of strictly Ionian origin. The 
Italian vision is subject to the Iranian God Zurvan Akarana, who is 
infinite time (aiôn). Because infinite time is immeasurable to humans, 
the only possible response to it is heroism. This heroism involves 
stages of initiation leading back to the initial phase, as indicated by the 
knowledge assimilated by Pythagoreanism. Hegel seeks to follow this 
path, but is unable to reach its term because he has not been initiated. 
Conversely, the Ionian vision of the world, as it appears in the cult of 
Eleusis, deals with questions directly related to the Earth, fertility and 
generation. The opposition here is not between good and evil but 
between things that grow and things that do not. The question of evil 
is not fundamental to the Ionian perspective, unlike the Iranian. This is 
why we would suggest that Aristotle’s work is of Ionian inspiration. It 
is this world view that seems to have been transposed into Ionia and it 
is no coincidence that it was precisely Ionia that saw the emergence of 
true philosophy rooted in the analysis of fertility, of things that live 
and grow, of the physical. Indeed, throughout Aristotle’s work, he 
constantly calls the Ionians the physicists physiologoï, (physiologues) 
in contrast to the theologians = théologoï, (theologues).480 So we can 
now grasp the full meaning and historical depth of this description and 
contrast it with the Italian thinkers. The substantivised term “physics” 
comes from the Greek feminine adjective physikè (φυσικη). It is 
derived from the root phyô meaning “grow”, “develop”, and thus 
signifies generation and growth – in other words the world’s fertility, 
whose guardian in the Mediterranean had always been the Mother 
Earth. A physical analysis of generation can be applied to anything 
                                                 
480 On this fundamental Aristotelian opposition, see the talk delivered at the 
University of Nanterre in February 1998 by John A. Palmer, entitled, Aristotle on 
the Ancient Theologians and published in the American journal Apeiron, pp. 181-
205. The opposition between these two currents is not purely rhetorical. While 
Thales was the first thinker to express himself clearly, he was also the first to 
explore the physical world in the fullest sense of the word.  
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that has life, from plants to human beings. It is a subject intimately 
linked to time, for it is in time that reasons must be sought for the 
growth of things that grow (generation) and the diminishing of things 
that diminish (corruption). Lastly, we note that, since Pythagoreanism 
brings the Ionian and Italian sources together, the Pythagoreans can be 
both physiologoï and théologoï. All this means that the théologoï 
cannot be linked to Pythagoras, because there were Pythagorean 
physicists. It is better to link the so-called “Italian” school to Hesiod, 
as we suggested earlier. Conversely, some Ionian physiologoï became 
theologians.  
This said, the fact remains that the first philosopher was 
Thales, an Ionian thinker and physiologoï. It was from this current that 
Aristotle drew his conceptual investigation of time; this is why we 
have taken care to research its world view. While Aristotle can be 
located within this school, we shall see that he also took on the 
Pythagorean theological influence. For this reason we would not place 
Aristotle’s work within either the so-called “Italian” school, or the so-
called “Ionian”. For where physical questions are concerned, it was 
natural for Aristotle to base his thinking on that of the Ionians based 
on Thales; conversely, for questions relating to the soul, it is hardly 
surprising that he should turn to the théologoï. Still, it is the Ionian 
source that will offer us a way out of Platonic time, the time imposed 
by Hesiod, in order at last to see Aristotelian time in all its splendour. 
Having outlined the Ionian world view, we shall now consider the 
historical accounts that can fill it in. So we shall begin by presenting 
the contribution of Thales and his students Anaximander and 
Anaximenes, before considering the Aristotelian approach to time, 
which owes much to Ionian thought.   
 
Nietzsche gives the following presentation of the Ionian philosophy of 
its founder Thales, which can still serve as a conceptual introduction 
to this current, despite the notable historical differences we have 
mentioned:481 
Being a mathematician and astronomer, he had turned cold against 
everything mythical and allegorical, and if he did not become quite 
sober enough to reach the pure abstraction “all things are one”, instead 
remaining at a concrete expression of it, he was nonetheless an alien 
rarity among the Greeks of his time. The highly conspicuous Orphics 
                                                 
481 Nietzsche, Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks, trans. Marianne Cowan, 
Regenery Publishing Inc., 1962, p. 42. 
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perhaps had the capacity of comprehending and thinking abstractions 
without concrete aids to an even greater degree than Thales did. But 
they succeeded in expressing it only in allegorical form. Pherecydes of 
Syros, too, who is chronologically and in several empirical concepts 
closer to Thales, hovers with his utterances in that middle region in 
which mythology and allegory are wedded. He dares, for example, to 
compare the earth with a winged oak which hangs high in the air with 
wide-spread pinions and which Zeus, after his conquest of Chronos, 
covers with the magnificent robe of honor on which he himself has 
embroidered all the lands and waters and rivers of earth. Compared 
with such obscure allegorical philosophizing, barely translatable into 
the realm of visibility, Thales is a creative master who began to see 
into the depths of nature without the help of fantastic fable.  
For the Ionians explored a philosophy based on rational first 
principles, rejecting allegory and myth. The gods were not excluded 
from this philosophy, as reflected by the fragment of Thales preserved 
by Aristotle, which says that:482 “All things are full of gods”. 
However, the Ionians seem to have sought to introduce action into 
their relationship to the world, making contemplation a secondary 
form of human activity. Alongside tool-based geometry (the compass) 
and astronomy (the analemma) and first principles (water, fire, 
infinity), this philosophy undeniably established a rationality based on 
demonstration to the detriment of contemplation.483 Simplicius put 
this very well in his Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics:484 
                                                 
482 Thales of Miletus, Fragment D-K A22. This fragment is taken from a quotation 
from Aristotle’s De anima 411a 7-8. The whole reads: “Some say that soul is 
diffused throughout the whole universe; and it may have been this which led Thales 
to think that all things are full of gods”, trans. Arthur Fairbanks, The First 
Philosophers of Greece (London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1898). See also 
Generation of Animals, III, 762a 21 which states the Pythagorean consequence that 
everything is full of souls. Cf. also Plato, Laws, 899b: “will any one who admits all 
this venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?” (trans. Jowett). 
483 The term principle (arché) seems to have been introduced by Anaximander, 
according to the preserved fragment fr.2 of Opinions of the Physicists by Aristotle’s 
student Theophrastus: “Of those who say that the element is one, in motion and 
infinite, Anaximander son of Praxiades of Miletus – the successor and disciple of 
Thales – said that the infinite was both the principle and element of the things that 
exist, and was the first to use this name for the principle.” Colli, La Sagesse grecque 
II, pp. 175 and 247. Simplicius’ commentary is also based on the book by 
Theophrastus (p. 304). See also Pierre Pellegrin’s introduction to Aristotle’s 
Physics, p. 12 and of course Book Delta of Aristotle’s Metaphysics which, according 
to Pellegrin, adopts the fundamental aspects of Ionian physics, notably the positivity 
of coming to be. The arché is described as “That from which (as an immanent part) 
a thing first arises”, 1013a 3-10, trans. Barnes, op. cit., p. 1599. French commentary 
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Thales is traditionally the first to have revealed the investigation of 
nature to the Greeks; he had many predecessors, as also Theophrastus 
thinks, but so far suprassed them as to blot out all who came before 
him.  
While the greatest advances were made in physics, so much so that, as 
we have just seen Aristotle constantly refers to the Ionians as the 
“physicists” in his Physics,485 they also made other notable advances, 
crucially in astronomy. Moreover the distinction between the 
astronomy of the heavens and earthly physics is not found in the 
Ionian world, in which phusis refers to the universe as a whole. Their 
research seems to have had a certain influence on general conceptions 
of time, of which there is no trace in the so-called “Italian” world.486 
While the understanding of time is always linked to the heavens, what 
can be gained from the “Phoenician” knowledge of the stars, which 
the Ionians enhanced, and how does it overturn conceptions of time 
and the future in the Greek world?   
Until the 5th century BCE the Athenian world had no instrument 
that could measure time. It was not until the dawn of that century, 
with the introduction of the clepsydra by the Ionian Anaxagoras487 that 
the Athenians could at last measure time in their assemblies.488 We 
also know that in this period they had no unified calendar.489 Later the 
Athenians had only limited use of the gnomon which, according to 
Herodotus, came from the Babylonian culture:490 
Just as they had no coherent system for counting years, so the Greeks 
had no uniform monthly calendar. But here in addition to reasons of a 
                                                                                                                   
Métaphysiques. Livre Delta, trans. M.-P. Duminil and A. Jaulin, PUM, 1991, pp. 
131-135. 
484 Simplicius, Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, 23, 29, fr. D-K 1-80. 
485 Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics, A, 3, 983b 21; b 6 ff.; On the Heavens, B, 13, 
294a 28; Politics, I, 11, 1259a 10. 
486 Unfortunately, the division between rational Ionians and irrational Pythagoreans 
is not so simple. It would mean ignoring the eschatological dimension of Chaldean 
culture, which is present in Ionian thought after the fall of Babylon. 
487 According to Aristotle, Problems, XVI, 8 914b, it was Anaxagoras who 
invented the clepsydra used in the Athenian courts, cf. also Empedocles, 21B 100.  
488 Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, LXVII, 2 and 3. 
489 In 264 BCE Timaeus of Tauromenium suggested using the Olympiads to 
measure years. This was a late initiative to measure time. Before this the Athenian 
year began in the summer, as did the Olympic, the Dorian year began in autumn and 
the year in Argos at the spring equinox. So there was no unified calendar in Greece. 
Moreover, the Pythia used this state of affairs to adjust her predictions at will, cf. the 
comic episode of the Delphic oracle’s advice to Cylon (636). 
490 Bouvier, art. cit., p. 121. 
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political and religious order there was a technological explanation. In 
the early 5th century Greece had for some hundred years been using 
the gnomon, a blade fixed to a sundial whose shadow, by its angle and 
length, makes it possible to measure the position of the sun on both its 
daily and annual journeys, thereby indicating not only the hours of the 
day but also the periods of the year, notably the summer and winter 
solstices that punctuate the solar year. 
There were two types of gnomon at this time, the geometric gnomon, 
which was a measuring square, and the solar gnomon.491 The solar 
gnomon functioned as follows: to measure time during the day, the 
blade projected its shadow onto a dial following the movement of the 
sun. At midday the shadow curved to its shortest, then lengthened 
until sunset. But we should note that this projected shadow also made 
it possible to understand the obliquity of the zodiac and thus to make 
annual measurements of the time marked by the stars, since the 
shadow’s length varied with the seasons. In this way the Athenians 
were able to identify the solstices of summer (the shortest shadow) 
and winter (the longest shadow).492 These things are the most that can 
be gleaned from this very limited instrument. Yet the Ionians already 
had a full technical knowledge of time at least after Thales. So it was 
natural that they should have developed the first theories on time.  
In order to make new discoveries in physics and astronomy, at 
least two additional kinds of knowledge are required. The first is the 
information gathered through travel, giving greater knowledge of the 
world,493 and the second is geometrical modelling based on the 
construction of new instruments. The Ionian school was active in both 
areas.   
Where the first was concerned, the need to navigate around the 
Mediterranean for trade obliged the Ionians to develop their 
knowledge of the heavens and stars and of the world in general.494 
                                                 
491 According to Schuhl the gnomon came to Athens via Lydia: “The same route 
must have brought the polos and gnomon, the spherical and flat sundials which, 
according to Herodotus, the Greeks obtained from the Babylonians – along with the 
division of the day into twelve hours – and which Anaximander introduced to 
Sparta”. Essai sur la formation de la pensée grecque. Introduction historique à une 
étude de la philosophie platonicienne, PUF, 1949, p. 179. 
492 Arpád Szabo and Erkka Maula, Les débuts de l’astronomie, de la géographie et 
de la trigonométrie chez les Grecs, French translation from the German by Michel 
Federspiel, 1986, pp. 33-35. 
493 This was the first criterion for attributing the title of “sage”. 
494 Homer had the greatest scorn for these “Phoenician” traders. In The Odyssey 
XV, 411 we read: “One day the island was visited by a party of Phoenicians – 
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While the Greek captains plotted their course by the Great Bear, the 
Ionians advised them to follow Ursa Minor as a more precise, if less 
splendid means to find the North Pole.495 It was also trade that led the 
Ionians to develop a relationship with numbers. In the world of 
commerce number is important for exchange and became a key aspect 
of this culture, as Eudemus of Rhodes explains: 496 
Just as among the Phoenicians the necessities of trade and exchange 
gave the impetus to the accurate study of number, so also among the 
Egyptians the invention of geometry came about from the cause 
mentioned. 
It was again trade that obliged these experienced sailors to go beyond 
the limits of the known Greek world. By inching their way along the 
African coast, they made one of the greatest discoveries in all of 
Antiquity.497 As they descended the Libyan coast,498 they realised that 
                                                                                                                   
famous sailors, but greedy rogues – with a whole cargo of trinkets in their black 
ship”; see also XVII, 428-430. Plato (Republic, IV 436a) also criticised this 
relationship to trade. Lastly, we know that it was the “Phoenicians” who brought the 
Hebrews the nose piercings and bracelets that were melted down to make the golden 
calf, not to mention the trade in cedar wood for the Egyptian cults.  
495 The source is Callimachus and recorded by Diogenes Laertius, I, 1, op. cit. 
trans. Hicks. Colli (p. 121) confirms it and gives the following references to the 
corpus of Phoenician studies: Arat., Phaen. 37-39 and Guthrie, I, 5, in op. cit., II, p. 
290. So the source is reliable. (The North Star, nurse of Zeus, was then called 
Cynosoura). 
496 Eudemus of Rhodes, History of Geometry, fragment 133, trans. Glenn R. 
Morrow, cited by Colli, La Sagesse Grecque II, 10b5a, DK-11A11, p. 139. 
497 The first voyage of the “Phoenicians” to distant lands took place in 617 BCE 
and was organised by the Egyptians. The later voyage of Hanno took place in 425 
BCE. A Greek version of the periplus entitled “Narrative of the voyage of Hanno, 
King of the Carthaginians around the lands beyond the Pillars of Hercules” was 
engraved on plates hung in the temple of Kronos in Athens.   
498 The term Libya does not designate the area covered by the Libya of today. 
Herodotus is using a generic term by which the Ionian geographer Hecataeus of 
Miletus referred to Africa. For Herodotus, beyond the region of the dunes, which 
linked the pillars of Herakles to Thebes, there are only three peoples: the Atlanteans, 
the Alarantes and the Garamantes. Beyond these dunes the world was unknown, 
which may explain why he was unable to accept the eyewitness accounts of the 
“Phoenicians” concerning a country that must have been Gabon, if we follow the 
current line of the equator to the African coast. Moreover, Pliny also says “Libya” 
refers to Africa in his Natural History V, 1-8: “Africa was called Libya by the 
Greeks, and the sea in front of it the Libyan Sea,” and the historians agree that the 
end of the expedition was the gulf of Guinea, which is the precise location of Gabon. 
Lastly, in his Meteorology Aristotle confirms that Libya was indeed Africa, I, 13, 
350b 10. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 178 
 
the sun had changed sides; this was the first historical discovery 
relating to the equator. It is formally attested by the historian 
Herodotus, who refused to accept it, so revolutionary did it seem:499 
Significantly, he rejects the accounts of a polar night and rules out the 
accounts of the Phoenicians who, on a voyage around Africa, 
observed that the position of the sun became inverted after crossing 
the equator: “They record a fact which I find unbelievable, though 
others may believe it: sailing round Libya, they said they had the sun 
on their right.” IV, 42. 
It seemed the seasons might not be identical over the entire oecumène; 
worse still, they were inverted, as the Scythians had previously told 
the Greeks, at least in the time of Herodotus.500 So was the sun not at 
its solstice in Athens at the same time as in the rest of the known 
world? This is what the Greeks of this time, gazing into the navel of 
their Orphic cults, could not accept.501 Worse, this discovery would 
discredit the work of Homer, who still believed that the world ended 
at the Pillars of Hercules. It was a considerable time before the 
Athenians were able to assimilate all of Ionian knowledge – the denial 
of Herodotus is incontestable proof of that. Moreover the geographer 
Strabo says that it was not until the time of Anaximander that a map of 
the world was finally shown to the public, perfectly illustrating that it 
took several centuries for Ionian thought to become a part of Athenian 
culture:502 
Anaximander was the first to publish a geographical chart. Hecatæus 
left a work [on the same subject], which we can identify as his by 
means of his other writings.  
                                                 
499 Bouvier, “Temps chronique et temps météorologique chez les premiers Grecs”, 
art. cit., p. 134. 
500 Pliny in his Natural History says in 2, 186-187: “In consequence of the daylight 
increasing in various degrees, in Meroë the longest day consists of twelve 
æquinoctial hours and eight parts of an hour, at Alexandria of fourteen hours, in 
Italy of fifteen, in Britain of seventeen. Anaximenes the Milesian, the disciple of 
Anaximander, of whom I have spoken above, discovered the theory of shadows and 
what is called the art of dialling, and he was the first who exhibited at Lacedæmon 
the dial which they call sciothericon”, English trans. John Bostock, cited in Colli, La 
Sagesse grecque II, p. 221. 
501 The navel of the world was a stone found in Delphi. In the same period 
Anaxagoras’ disciple Archelaos of Athens was still trying to describe the Earth as a 
disk in order to explain why the time of sunrise changes, as do the stars when we 
move. See Schuhl, Essai, p. 341. 
502 Strabo, 1, 1,11, DK 12A6, trans. Hamilton and Falconer, cited by Colli, op. cit., 
II, p. 181.  
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Similarly Plutarch gives us a short synthesis in Lives of the Noble 
Grecians and Romans, not recorded by Diogenes Laërtius, which 
should be viewed with the greatest caution, although it offers a perfect 
illustration of our argument:503 
For he who the first, and the most plainly of any, and with the greatest 
assurance committed to writing how the moon is enlightened and 
overshadowed, was Anaxagoras; and he was as yet but recent, nor was 
his argument much known, but was rather kept secret, passing only 
amongst a few, under some kind of caution and confidence. People 
would not then tolerate natural philosophers, and theorists, as they 
then called them, about things above; as lessening the divine power, 
by explaining away its agency into the operation of irrational causes 
and senseless forces acting by necessity, without anything of 
Providence or a free agent. Hence it was that Protagoras was banished, 
and Anaxagoras cast in prison, so that Pericles had much difficulty to 
procure his liberty; and Socrates, though he had no concern whatever 
with this sort of learning, yet was put to death for philosophy. It was 
only afterwards that the reputation of Plato, shining forth by his life, 
and because he subjected natural necessity to divine and more 
excellent principles, took away the obloquy and scandal that had 
attached to such contemplations, and obtained these studies currency 
among all people. 
Plato’s influence in this synthesis may make us smile. However, 
overall it is likely that it was by reconciling Ionian thought with 
Athenian religiosity, as Plato manifestly did, that this philosophy had 
a chance of being accepted in Athens. For at this time the Athenians 
called the Ionian physicists meteorolesches, in other words those who 
talk about the meteors and in so doing seek to drive the gods from the 
City. This fusion of the sciences, technical skills and Greek religion is 
sometimes cited as the reason for Plato’s use of myth.504 However we 
shall see that the way out of this conflict would be quite different for 
Aristotle. It was a profound analysis of the sciences and technical 
skills that enabled him to found solid principles as a basis for a real 
philosophy and theory of time. 
                                                 
503 Plutarch, Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, “Nicias”, trans. John 
Dryden. 
504 Schuhl, La fabulation platonicienne, p. 16: “Windelband sees the myths as 
reflecting an effort to associate the religion of mysteries with Ionian physics”, a 
thesis contested by Perceval Frutiger [1930] but which we retain, while stating that it 
is only one aspect of the use of myth.  
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This happened gradually, according to the practical importance 
of discoveries, such as those on eclipses for the art of war,505 on the 
stars for the art of navigation, and so on. As Aristotle says in his 
Nicomachean Ethics, the Athenians could see the importance of these 
theoretical and technical developments only when they were 
applicable to concrete action:506 
From what has been said it is plain, then, that wisdom is knowledge, 
combined with comprehension, of the things that are highest by 
nature. This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them 
have wisdom but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of 
what is to their own advantage, and why we say that they know things 
that are remarkable, admirable, difficult and divine, but useless, 
because it is not human goods that they look for. 
Here we can grasp the distance between the Athenian and Milesian 
worlds. While the Greeks subjected technique to human profitability, 
the Milesians believed in the powers of technical competence. For 
them it could be an end in itself, a view the Greeks were too religious 
to accept. Indeed technical discoveries were incorporated into the 
constitution of the city of Miletus. Aristotle relates in his Politics that 
Hippodamus, who had also drawn the plan of the port of Piraeus, 
bestowed honours on inventors:507 
He also enacted that those who discovered anything for the good of 
the state should be honoured. 
Nothing of this kind was ever advocated by the Athenians. They had 
the greatest disdain for inventions, technical advances and progress  in 
general. They were prevented by the search for religious harmony 
from giving any place to the possibility of novelty and technological 
change, to progress or the future in general. There is a fascinating 
discussion of this subject in the Platonic corpus. In The Republic, 
when Glaucon asks Socrates if all new things are to be seen as false 
according to the Greek play on words kainos = kénos (new = empty), 
Socrates makes the following highly revealing answer:508 
                                                 
505 Eclipses of the moon often triggered battles, such as that against the Syracusians 
that Plutarch relates in this passage, following Thucydides. Understanding lunar 
phenomena was an art of war, which is why astral studies eventually became 
necessary to Athens and Anaxagoras’ book became better known after the death of 
Nicias.  
506 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI, 7, 1141b 2-8, trans. Barnes. See also the 
commentary by Colli, S.G. II, p. 283. 
507 Aristotle, Politics, II, 8, 6, 1268a. 
508 Plato, The Republic, trans. Jowett, 414 b8-C7. 
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Nothing new, I replied; only an old Phoenician tale of what has often 
occurred before now in other places, (as the poets say, and have made 
the world believe). 
Socrates is telling us that new things always come from the 
“Phoenicians” (Ionians), as is the case now and always will be as long 
as Athenian society has not abandoned its religious categories.509 And 
this is why the poets were dangerous, for it was they who preserved 
the real history of the Athenian state. The Athenian politicians and 
philosophers were not interested in technical skill and so were never 
able to assess the real use of knowledge that came to them from 
adjacent cultures. This may be why their purely theoretical research 
was never corrected, for example in relation to the revolution of the 
Earth. While Plato upheld the “Pythagorean” thesis that the Earth 
made a single revolution, notably to explain the alternation of night 
and day,510 unbelievably, in his On the Heavens Aristotle followed the 
Ionian error:511 
But there are some, Anaximander, for instance, among the ancients, 
who say that the earth keeps its place because of its indifference. 
Motion upward and downward and sideways were all, they thought, 
equally inappropriate to that which is set at the centre. 
Although this thesis, probably taken from Thales, is criticised later in 
On the Heavens, it is ultimately accepted, with the consequences we 
know. No star has movement per se, no star is self-propelled or it 
would simply wander (planètos).512 Like the other stars, the Earth has 
its place on a sphere on which it turns, in the model of Eudoxus.513 In 
other words, the movement of the stars results entirely from the 
spheres to which they are attached. However Aristotle follows Thales 
                                                 
509 As we have seen, when Plato wanted to talk about the future, he placed all these 
conceptions in the mouth of Socrates. Aristotle twice cites the Phaedo in his 
Metaphysics and, in a rare enough event to be worth mentioning, they are the same 
two phrases: “In the Phaedo the case is stated in this way – that the Forms are 
causes both of being and of becoming”, A, 9, 991b 3 and M, 5, 1080a 2. 
510 Aristotle, On the Heavens, II, 13, 293a 20-23: “The Italian philosophers known 
as Pythagoreans take the contrary view. At the centre, they say, is fire, and the earth 
is one of the stars, creating night and day by its circular motion about the centre.” 
The model of the Earth turning on its own axis is set out in Plato’s Timaeus (893c) 
and, in Schuhl’s view, experimentally tested by the potter’s wheel, La fabulation 
platonicienne, p. 95. 
511 Aristotle, On the Heavens, II, 13, 295b 11-14. At II, 8, 289b 5 Aristotle says: 
“We take it as granted that the earth is at rest.” 
512 Aristotle, On the Heavens, II, 8, 290a 32-35. 
513 Cf. Pierre Duhem, Le système du monde, I, op. cit., p. 130. 
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in refusing to accept that the Earth turns on itself. On the contrary, the 
circular movement it makes takes it towards the centre.514 In this 
model it is the sun’s sphere that explains the daily movement over the 
Earth from east to west via the south every twenty-four hours.515 So 
Aristotle is using the model of Eudoxus of Cnidual, in tandem with 
remarks from Eudemus of Rhodes, whose task it was to gather the 
Academy’s astronomical data. This error was not corrected by the 
astronomer Callippus, nor even by Sosigenes. For that it was 
necessary to wait until Aristotle’s pupil Theophrastus sent his own 
pupil Strato of Lampsacus to the court of Ptolemy I in Alexandria and 
one of his successors, Aristarchus of Samos, objected to this enormous 
error peddled by Aristotle’s philosophy, as related by a historian of the 
Alexandrian school:516 
Aristarchus of Samos, who perhaps possessed some traditions of the 
School of Croton, did the science of the heavens a great service. The 
old theory that the sun moved round the earth had been re-established 
on Aristotle’s authority, and contrary to the opinion of Pythagoras. 
Aristarchus did all he could to bring back the bolder, and truer theory 
of the movement of the earth.   
We do not know what role may have been played by the priests of the 
cult of Demeter Achaea in maintaining the geocentric model. But as 
the heliocentric model rejected by the Areopagus underpinned the 
other Pythagorean thesis of Iranian origins, which placed the sun at 
the centre of the universe, it is understandable that the books of the 
time could not mention it.517 We have seen that it was one of the first 
questions that the members of the Areopagus put to Socrates at his 
trial, to which Socrates simply replied that all of these things were 
already contained in books in the public square and, that being so, that 
they were themselves responsible since they should have prevented 
their distribution.518 It remains the case that the Athenians’ inability to 
                                                 
514 At 295b 20-21 Aristotle says, “The observed facts about earth are not only that 
it remains at the centre, but also that it moves to the centre,” and lastly on this point, 
II, 14, 296b 21-22: “The earth must be at the centre and immovable”.  
515 Cf. Tricot’s commentary on Book , 8 of Aristotle’s Métaphysique II, note 2, p. 
691 of the 1962 edition. 
516 Jacques Matter, Histoire de l’école d’Alexandrie comparée aux principales 
écoles contemporaines, vol. 2, 1844. On p. 178 he says, “Strato of Lapsacus spent 
some years at the court of Ptolemy I, sent there by Theophrastus who had been 
called there and had wanted to oblige the prince by giving him one of his pupils.” 
517 Matter, Histoire de l’école d’Alexandrie…, p. 184. 
518 So what does it mean to be an Aristotelian in relation to astronomy? If we 
remain more Aristotelian than Aristotle himself, the geocentric model can be 
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identify the right theory was due to their lack of interest in technical 
skills. Meanwhile we can confirm that the “Phoenicians” living in 
Ionia, the Milesians, contributed many practical techniques, concrete 
facts and theories true and false that enabled the Ionian philosophers 
to develop a conception of the world that was closer to reality.  
We shall now consider geometry, the second dimension 
necessary to make new discoveries in physics and astronomy, and the 
one underpinning the Greeks’ first real conception of the world. It is 
often said that Greek geometrical knowledge came from the 
Egyptians. However, the greatest geometrical theorem is attributed to 
Thales and bears his name, as Aristotle confirms in his Prior 
Analytics.519 Analysis of the shadows of the pyramids may have 
provided its explanation, but this theorem should probably be 
attributed to the knowledge of the “Phoenicians” who had not yet 
settled in Ionia. Moreover, this is confirmed by Plutarch who, in his 
Banquet of the Seven Sages, emphasises the admiration of the 
Egyptian king Amasis, who was literally dumfounded when Thales 
conducted his demonstration to measure the pyramids.520 Plutarch 
returns to the basis of the theoretical model a little later:521 
Fixing your staff erect at the point of the shadow which the pyramid 
cast, two triangles being thus made by the tangent rays of the sun, you 
demonstrated that what proportion one shadow had to the other, such 
the pyramid bore to the stick. 
So Thales, who was then on a visit to Egypt with the Greek Solon, had 
merely applied the theorem to the pyramids. Its source may well not 
be the measurement of the pyramids, or architecture at all.522 We learn 
                                                                                                                   
retained as the one that he truly upheld. If we think that this error was corrected by a 
pupil of Aristotle’s, being an Aristotelian involves accepting the future of this school 
and thus accepting the heliocentric model. 
519 Aristotle confirms that this theorem, found in 1, 5 of Euclid’s Elements, was 
based on the work of Thales, cf. Prior Analytics, 41b 13-22. 
520 Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Sages, 2, 147a-b. Cf. the slightly different 
versions of the pyramid-measuring story in Diogenes Laertius l. 27 and Pliny, 
Natural History 36.82. Plutarch himself attributes the tyrant’s remark to Bias at De 
Adulatore et amico 61c; c.f. the much longer version at De Genio Socratis 578d. 
521 Plutarch, Banquet of the Seven Wise Men, 2, DK-11A21, trans. Roger A.M. 
Davis, in Plutarch’s Morals. Translated from the Greek by Several Hands. 
Corrected and Revised by William W. Goodwin, with an Introduction by Ralph 
Waldo Emerson. 5 Volumes. (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1878). Vol. 2. 14 
April 2015. http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/1212#Plutarch_0062-02_1551 
522 Solon travelled twice with Thales to consult the sages and astronomers of the 
Egyptian court in the city of Sais, in Diogenes Laertius, op. cit., I, p. 59. In his 
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from Aristotle’s pupil Eudemus of Rhodes (a highly reliable source) 
that this theorem must have been devised to establish the position of 
ships at sea:523 
And Eudemus, in his History of Geometry, attributes this theorem to 
Thales. He states that the way in which he calculated the distance of 
ships on the sea made the use of this theorem indispensable. 
So Thales’ theorem may have been devised to improve the nautical 
skills of the “Phoenicians”. Moreover, nautical knowledge reappears 
in the Middle Ages, with the development of Jacob’s staff, of which a 
few examples still exist.524 According to Aristotle in his Metaphysics, 
Egypt was the cradle of geometry and mathematics:525 
This is why the mathematical arts were founded in Egypt; for there the 
priestly caste was allowed to be at leisure.  
This being so, it is possible that the “Phoenicians” simply took the 
culture of geometry from Egypt to the shores of Miletus. We shall 
follow Aristotle in granting Thales his just deserts.   
Secondly, all mythologies had accepted that the world was 
spherical (ex: Homer’s shield, the serpent/river Ophis/Okeanos). 
However, the idea that this circularity could be represented by a circle 
within which the world, understood as space, could be conceptualised 
geometrically, remains an Ionian contribution. We have seen that it 
was this conception that enabled the making of geographical maps. 
Still more crucially, the notion of the circle and its attributes made it 
possible to conceptualise the functioning of the world. For the 
gnomon could be combined with geometry to give the analemma, 
which at last enabled the development of more rigorous theories about 
the world. We should also note that, while the Athenians were aware 
of the seasons, with the gnomon they could not identify the tropics or 
equinoxes, let alone the ecliptic, as Alain Ballabriga rightly notes:526 
The concept of equinox implies the complete representation of a 
spherical earth and a celestial sphere with its equator, tropics and 
ecliptic plane. These notions are little attested before the time of 
                                                                                                                   
Constitution d’Athènes (XI), Aristotle makes no mention of Thales, simply saying 
that Solon was away for ten years.   
523 Eudemus of Rhodes, History of Geometry, fragment 134, DK-11A20, 
corroborated by fragment 135: “…according to Eudemus, it was Thales who first 
discovered…”. 
524 Colli, op. cit., II, p. 290 gives us a strange demonstration of the use of the 
Jacob’s staff. 
525 Aristotle, Metaphysics A, 1, 981b 23-24. 
526 Alain Ballabriga, “Le Soleil et le Tartare, l’image mythique du monde en Grèce 
archaïque”, cited by Bouvier, art. cit., p. 134. 
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Philolaos (late-5th to early 4th) and were not part of a developed 
mathematical system until Eudoxus, so they are entirely anachronistic 
in the 6th and even in the 5th.  
The ecliptic plane is a strictly geometrical notion requiring the 
hypothesis of a spherical Earth. The ecliptic must necessarily be an 
inclined plane to explain eclipses of the sun and moon. For this reason 
we do not believe that Thales was able to predict the year of the 
eclipse of 28 May 585 BCE, as recorded by Diogenes Laertius.527 At 
best he might have been able to demonstrate the reasons for the 
phenomenon,528 since it seems that it was only under Anaximander 
that the analemma, which makes such predictions possible, was 
actually constructed.529 While the equator dividing the world in two 
may be accepted as a theoretical hypothesis in the time of Thales, 
alongside that of the tropics, the analemma remains the instrument 
that demonstrated that the theory worked in practice.530 The analemma 
is the meeting point of the gnomon and geometry. It was the building 
of this tool that enabled the Ionians to provide irrefutable proof of 
their ongoing construction of the universe. Michel Serres gives the 
following description of this revolution:531 
From Anaximander on, apparently, Greek physicists knew that these 
readings indicated certain occurrences in the sky. The light from 
above describes on the earth or on the page a pattern which imitates or 
represents the forms and real positions of the universe, through the 
intermediary of the stylus. 
                                                 
527 Diogenes Laertius, Vie, doctrines et sentences des philosophes illustres, I & II, 
trans. Robert Genaille, Garnier Flammarion, 1965, translator’s note p. 269. Colli 
does not regard this attribution as definitive, in op. cit., II, p. 291, and most other 
specialists have their reservations.   
528 The account of this eclipse, mentioned only insofar as it marks the beginning of 
a war, is once again from Eudemus of Rhodes. According to fr. 143: “Eudemus 
observes in his History of Astronomy that Thales predicted the eclipse of the sun 
which took place at the time when the Medes and the Lydians engaged in battle”, D-
K I, 74-75, trans. Sir Thomas Heath. 
529 Szabo and Maula, Les débuts de l’astronomie, de la géographie et de la 
trigonométrie chez les Grecs, French translation from the German by Federspiel, 
1986, p. 36. The authors note that Anaximander may have been the inventor of the 
analemma. This hypothesis is confirmed by Michel Serres (ed.) A History of 
Scientific Thought: Elements of a History of Science, Blackwell, 1995, trans. Ros 
Schwartz and Daffyd R. Roberts, p. 79. 
530 Aristotle assimilated the notions of the equator and tropics and had clearly 
mastered them as reflected in his Meteorology, I, 7, 345a 3-8. 
531 Serres (ed.), A History of Scientific Thought, p. 79. 
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The Ionians represented the Earth as a point at the centre of a circle, 
usually drawn on the ground. Through this point they passed an 
oblique axis with the two tropics of Cancer and Capricorn.532 By 
monitoring the daily and annual movement of the shadow cast by the 
stylus, they were able to say which sign of the zodiac the sun was in533 
and, through continual approximation, to identify the position of the 
planets.534 Far from seeking to provide an exhaustive explanation of 
the methods and world view that this tool made it possible to develop, 
we mention this technology in order to note a particular phenomenon 
that stemmed from it and which remains crucial to a reasoned 
understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy, notably his binary conception 
of the coming to be of time in terms of generation and corruption. For 
we shall see that Aristotle could not have adopted this conception 
without an initial understanding of the particular phenomenon of the 
ecliptic. We are seeking to set all the technical elements in place in 
order to grasp the importance of this discovery.   
But before proceeding down this path, we must first engage in a 
historical discussion of Thales’ successor Anaximander and his 
philosophy of time. How can we understand Anaximander’s 
conception of time independently of all these Ionian technical and 
astronomical discoveries? This question is particularly important as 
his was the first Greek conception of time to be preserved.535 Here is 
what Goldschmidt has to say about it: 536 
One of the most ancient texts on the power of time, the fragment of 
Anaximander, sees the alternation of generation and corruption as 
subject to the “fixed order of time”.537 The idea that these alternations 
                                                 
532 The Astronomy of Eudemus of Rhodes contains an account seeking to attribute 
the discovery of the obliquity of the zodiac to Oenopides: “Oenopides is thought to 
have been the first to discover the obliquity of the zodiac and the period of the Great 
Year”, cited by Mattéi, Pythagore et les pythagoriciens, p. 43. 
533 Here we are following Mélanie Desmeules, “L'analemme d'Anaximandre à 
Ptolémée”, Le Gnomoniste, vol. 8, 4, December 2001, p. 8. 
534 It is said that the astronomer Oenopides placed a bronze table in the shrine at 
Olympia, showing the movements of the stars throughout a cycle of fifty-nine years 
representing one Great Year. 
535 A single fragment on time is attributed, with very little certainty, to Thales: 
“The wisest, time, for it brings everything to light”, in Diogenes Laertius, I, 35. The 
same is true of the fragment “know thyself” and the famous “Meden agan”, which 
are attributed to all the so-called Sages. 
536 Goldschmidt, Temps physique et temps tragique chez Aristote, p. 85. 
537 Translation by Harold Cherniss. 
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are regular constitutes Anaximander’s “most important legacy”538 to 
later Greek thought; it appears among the Presocratics, such as 
Heraclitus, Empedocles and on to Alcmaeon […] and it is even 
incorporated into the philosophy of Aristotle (De gen. and Corr., I, 3, 
317b 33 sqq.), with an explicit reference to time (II,10, 336 b10), 
reflecting the cosmic “order” (b12). 
This fragment of Anaximander is the first fragment on time preserved 
by our philosophical heritage and must thus be treated with particular 
care. It is as follows:539 
The Non-Limited is the original material of existing things; further, 
the source from which existing things derive their existence is also 
that to which they return at their destruction, according to necessity; 
for they give justice and make reparation to one another for their 
injustice, according to the arrangement of Time. 
This fragment first appears in Simplicius’ commentary On Aristotle’s 
Physics. Simplicius also noted it in the work of Aristotle’s pupil 
Theophrastus, entitled Doctrines of the Physicists, of which Book I is 
now available in a French translation at the end of Colli’s book, which 
we have cited several times.540 Colli assumes that Aristotle had this 
fragment in his possession, but this is not attested by any 
commentator.541 If we put it back into its context, in which 
Theophrastus is talking about Anaximander’s philosophy, we have:542  
He says [the principle arche] is neither water nor any other of the so-
called elements, but some other, unlimited nature, from which come to 
be all the heavens and the world-systems within them [quotation] he 
speaks of them in these rather poetic terms.  
In the light of this it must be said, firstly, that this fragment describes a 
first principle that precedes even the physical elements (water, fire, 
etc.). It is a principle that describes nature, but a nature that is “other” 
than that of classic physics and must be linked to the notion of the 
                                                 
538 According to Cherniss. 
539 Simplicius, Commentaire sur la Physique d’Aristote, 24, 18, in Colli, La 
Sagesse grecque II, p. 155 (D-K I 89), this English translation by Freeman. For the 
ancient commentaries, see Harold Cherniss, Aristotle’s Criticism of Presocratic 
Philosophy, New York 1964, Baltimore, 1935, pp. 376-377. 
540 Theophrastus, De physicorum opinionibus. Libri primi fragmenta, in Colli, La 
Sagesse grecque, II, pp. 245-260. 
541 Ibid., p. 295. 
542 Theophrastus, Doctrines of the Physicists, in op. cit., p. 247, also p. 175. This 
translation by John Palmer, “The World of Early Greek Philosophy”, in James 
Warren and Frisbee Sheffield (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Ancient 
Philosophy, Routledge, 2014, p. 8. 
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“unlimited” (apeiron).543 In conceptual terms this principle generates 
the relationship between heavens and worlds. We are in a context of 
manifest polytheism within Ionian culture, of which it would be 
wrong to see the Ionian Democritus of Abdera as the sole spokesman. 
Democritus’ thought is undoubtedly the core of Ionian philosophy, a 
resistent core that never allowed itself to be mixed with the Italian 
thought of Athens. The split between the two was such that Plato was 
obliged to erase it from the historical landscape in his history of 
philosophy. If Aristotle had not rescued its memory, it seems more 
than likely that this thought would have been lost. In short, Ionian 
philosophy is polytheist, as this fragment shows, and within its 
framework there are several worlds and even several heavens. This 
came as no surprise to Simplicius, who makes the following 
comment:544 
For those who supposed the worlds to be infinite in number, like the 
associates of Anaximander and Leucippus and Democritus and 
afterwards those of Epicurus, supposed them to be coming-to-be and 
passing away for an infinite time, with some of them always coming-
to-be and others passing away; and they said that motion was eternal. 
In this commentary Simplicius has the merit of silencing a common 
error which asserted that worlds in the Ionian universe were infinite. 
This relates to the problem of the translation of the term apeiron. 
Those who see this term as strictly quantitative make the same 
mistake as Giordano Bruno, asserting that there are several infinite 
worlds at the same time. But this does not seem to be the thesis 
maintained by the Ionians, for whom worlds were infinitely multiple 
becase they succeeded each other in time. The universe as they 
understood it was thus subject to the repetition of birth and destruction 
over time. Because the universe was in motion, it was possible to 
apply the principle of generation and corruption to its movement. So 
we need to clarify the fragment of Anaximander in order to see 
whether Simplicius’ comment does indeed describe the universe as the 
Ionians saw it. Can heaven be subject to a principle of which it seems 
                                                 
543 We shall return to this concept of apeiron. However, we should be clear that in 
this perspective the notions of the infinite and of time are consubstantial, as Aristotle 
explains in his Physics.   
544 Simplicius, On Aristotle’s Physics, 1121, 5 (and 12), ed. G.S. Kirk and J.E. 
Raven; cf. also Commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo, 615, 13 “as it seems, he 
posited infinite worlds and that each of the worlds is generated from such an 
element, which is infinite”, cited in Anthony Preus (ed.) Essays in Ancient Greek 
Philosophy VI: Before Plato, State University of New York Press, 2001, p. 52.  
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itself the guarantor? Is there not already a Chaldean influence in this 
theory, and a new latent eschatology close to that of Heraclitus?545 
For the moment we shall remain focused on the fragment of 
Anaximander, while retaining from Simplicius’ comment the idea that 
it is movement that makes generation and corruption possible. While 
the fragment seems to contain a principle that is crucially important 
for an understanding of the march of time in which the world is 
engaged, how can we grasp the foundations of this principle? We shall 
start by looking at a different translation of the fragment and by using 
common sense:546 
The original sources of existing things are also what existing things 
die back into “according to necessity”; for they give justice and 
reparation to one another for their injustice, in accordance with the 
ordinance of Time.  
While this fragment is attributed to Anaximander, it seems that the 
principle itself is earlier, since the sage Solon had already brought it 
into the public sphere in the time of Thales rather than Anaximander. 
Herodotus’s history places the words in Solon’s mouth, as follows:547 
Learn this first, that for the affairs of men there is a revolving wheel, 
and that this in its revolution suffers not the same persons always to 
have good fortune. 
Herodotus also names Solon as the author of a magisterial 
philosophical analysis addressed to Croesus on human equality before 
time, the vector of which seems to be the Ionian principle we seek:548 
Crœsus, thou art inquiring about human fortunes of one who well 
knows that the Deity is altogether envious and apt to disturb our lot. 
For in the course of long time a man may see many things which he 
would not desire to see, and suffer also many things which he would 
not desire to suffer. The limit of life for a man I lay down at seventy 
                                                 
545 Simplicius’ analysis was perhaps influenced by the approach of Heraclitus in 
fragment DK, 30: “This ordered universe (cosmos), which is the same for all, was 
not created by any one of the gods or of mankind, but it was ever and is and shall be 
ever-living Fire, kindled in measure and quenched in measure”, trans. Freeman, 
Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers. 
546 Anaximander, DK, 12 B 1. See Conche, Anaximandre. Fragments et 
témoignages, PUF, 1991, pp. 175-176. 
547 Herodotus, Histories, I, 207, 10, cited by Goldschmidt, op. cit., p. 135, this 
translation The History of Herodotus, parallel English/Greek, trans. G.C. Macaulay, 
[1890], at sacred-texts.com. Goldschmidt goes on to analyse the impact of this 
conception on the various popular representations of the wheel of fortune, pp. 136-
137.  
548 Herodotus, Histories, I, 32, cited by Darbo-Peschanski, art. cit., pp. 106-107, 
this English translation by G.C. Macaulay. 
AN INTRODUCTION TO ARISTOTLE’S METAPHYSICS OF TIME 
 190 
 
years: and these seventy years give twenty-five thousand and two 
hundred days, not reckoning for any intercalated month. Then if every 
other one of these years shall be made longer by one month, that the 
seasons may be caused to come round at the due time of the year, the 
intercalated months will be in number five-and-thirty besides the 
seventy years; and of these months the days will be one thousand and 
fifty. Of all these days, being in number twenty-six thousand two 
hundred and fifty, which go to the seventy years, one day produces 
nothing at all which resembles what another brings with it. Thus then, 
O Crœsus, man is altogether a creature of accident. 
In this analysis Solon is looking for a human limit,549 the end of 
human lives. Having found this limit, he has all of human life in his 
hand, in the place of the parcae or the gods. He can then divide this 
totality in two, each part bringing “nothing at all which resembles 
what another brings with it”. One brings its share of benefits and 
happiness (generation), the other horrors, torment and misery 
(corruption). This division is made possible only in the light of human 
time as a whole, which is why Solon says that life is a matter of 
accident. In sum, overlaying generation and corruption there is an 
objective time that smooths out human events in order to give each 
individual equal shares of what they are owed. Temporal justice is 
thus equality (A=A). In giving individuals their share of happiness and 
misfortune, objective time delivers justice or, rather, equality. So 
throughout their lives, human beings are subject to positive generation 
and negative corruption in an egalitarian fashion. In relation to global 
time, which constantly reasserts its function, all human beings are thus 
equal. There is something in these conceptions of time developed by 
Solon that is not reducible to the arbitrary nature of divine will 
seeking to do justice in a religious universe. There is no divine justice, 
but there does seem to be a principle of equality, the true nature of 
which is given us by the fragment of Anaximander. While this 
incontestably is a fragment of Anaximander, the conception of time 
developed within it cannot be specific to him, since it was previously 
expressed by Solon. We can assume that it was during his travels to 
Egypt that Thales told him of this Ionian principle. However, we 
should recognise that this is manifestly a new conception of time, in 
which it seems that cycles (periods: périodos) have acquired a new 
meaning. The cycle is no longer seen as a repetition of the same (the 
                                                 
549 The time limit also becomes the spatial limit of the Athenian city. At the end of 
a famous poem, Solon says: “But I stood firm, like a boundary stone between two 
armies”.   
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eternal return of the mythologies), but it seems that within a given 
stretch of time there must be a principle of balance implying that 
corruption is equal to generation and vice-versa. This is no longer the 
return of the same to its eternal beginning that we find in the Iranian 
religious tradition; here time as a whole seems to oscillate in order to 
maintain a balance between generation and corruption. But what is 
this Ionian principle that governs all of physics, leaving behind the 
elements that are its foundation? At this level of analysis our technical 
discussion of “Phoenician” astronomy using the Ionian technology of 
the analemma, can provide useful conceptual support. 
While it was Anaximenes, teacher of Parmenides, who first 
discovered that the moon received its light from the sun, it was his 
teacher Anaximander, contemporary of Empedocles, who used the 
discoveries of astronomy to develop formulations that could overturn 
all mythologies. Let us start by following the reliable account of 
Simplicius in his Commentary on Aristotle’s De Caelo:550 
Let these things, he says, “be studied on the basis of astronomical 
works”. For there, demonstrations have been given about the order of 
the planets and their sizes and distances. Eudemus recounts that 
Anaximander was the first to have given an account of their sizes and 
distances […]. The sizes and distances of the sun and mon have been 
figured out before now, the first impulse to their apprehension being 
taken from eclipses (and it is likely that Anaximander also discovered 
these things). And the first impulse for the apprehension of the sizes 
and distances of Mercury and Venus was taken from their conjunction 
with the sun and moon. 
This first account teaches us not to take lightly the astronomical 
research of the period. The calculation of the distance between the 
planets shows that Ionian astronomy had already made considerable 
progress. This account also reveals that astronomical knowledge 
focused on research into the eclipses; this is our first point, which will 
provide a basis of the development to follow. Next, we must be 
satisfied with Aristotle’s many comments on this subject and, more 
globally, on this Milesian school. In his treatise On Generation and 
Corruption he reviews the philosophers of Ionia, of both the strictly 
“Ionian” and “Italian” tendencies, and notes the most recent 
theoretical advances with the philosophy of Anaxagoras and the 
                                                 
550 D-K 1 86 in Simplicius, On Aristotle. On the Heavens; trans. Ian Mueller, 
Bloomsbury, 2009, p 11; Aristotle, On the Heavens, 291a 29, cited by Colli, La 
Sagesse grecque II, p. 179. 
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Eleatics. Those wishing an exhaustive account should refer to the start 
of the treatise.551 
We, meanwhile, will go directly to the passage regarded by 
Goldschmidt as a commentary on the fragment of Anaximander, as we 
have seen above. This is a passage of great importance, since Aristotle 
was seeking to find the effective causes of generation and corruption. 
It is precisely by studying the Ionian astronomical conceptions that he 
comes to the following crucial view:552 
We assert that motion causes coming-to-be. 
 
While, in his Physics, Aristotle starts by positing that the phenomena 
studied are engaged in a process of change, there is no evidence to 
reinforce what seems to be his basic postulate. This is why it is 
necessary to read On Generation and Corruption in order to grasp his 
subsequent thoughts on physics. It is in this text that Aristotle sets out 
his reasons for adopting this position, in a tone unusual for him. That 
he says “we assert” clearly shows that this is a major thesis that 
involves his entire philosophical undertaking. What motion is 
Aristotle referring to? And how does this thesis shed light on the 
Ionian thesis on time advanced by Anaximander? Is it the linear 
movement we find in the Physics, which implies that the elements 
change rather than happen, insofar as they are not created? It is clear – 
and we shall return to this – that in the context of non-absolute 
generation, of physics, mobile things change, but do not happen. We 
are dealing with a model in which changes affect elements that “are” 
absolutely and do not need to happen insofar as they are already 
present in Nature. For from the Ionians onwards, there is no longer 
any need to describe and create the elements. The natural elements are 
present, they exist in Nature, they do not have to be engendered. At 
the most they can be mixed to provide combinations, as in the model 
of Democritus. This is the register of physics rather than cosmogony 
or mythology, in which, as we have seen, the gods create the elements 
by waving magic wands. The elements change, they do not happen. 
Conversely, in the passage we are studying, generation and corruption 
are absolute. This is not a question of physical change, but of overall 
physical happening. What is the basis of the division between 
generation and corruption? Why this dichotomy? Are these conceptual 
                                                 
551 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, I, 1-2, trans. Barnes. 
552 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, II, 10 336a 25, trans. Barnes. 
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opposites or conflicts that are natural and perceived by the senses? In 
addition, and more globally, how can this dichotomy give rise to the 
thesis that “motion causes coming to be”? Is the world suddenly 
engaged in time, making the emergence of an open future inevitable? 
This is how we could describe in a roundabout way what is involved 
in the development to follow. Is the physical world engaged in time? 
If it is, firstly, what is the movement that explains its coming to be? 
Secondly, why is this process binary (generation and corruption)? Can 
we lift this principle out of the world of dreams in order to find its 
scientific foundation?553 Can we get away from the illusory Athenian 
sacred future in order to understand unfolding time as it seems to have 
been developed by the Ionians? 
Aristotle presents an explanation of this principle in a passage 
that we should like to cite in its entirety because it magnificently 
illuminates the source of an intellectual principle that would later be 
called “mechanics”. We should note that it relates to the particular, 
observed and modelled movement between two astral bodies, the sun 
and the Earth, and called the ecliptic.554 The passage in question 
provides the endpoint of a discussion of the continuity of time. Time 
is said to be cyclical to maintain its continuity and total non-
corruption, and it is precisely this continuity that implies that the 
future is possible:555 
                                                 
553 Perhaps we can lift this principle out of “dreams” as Aristotle says, to find the 
basis of a movement called dialectic in Hegel’s philosophy? But this movement 
cannot be reduced to either the sensory conflicts (hot and cold) which Empedocles 
wrongly transposed into the conceptual order, or to the conceptual opposites (A-inv. 
A), other than in the principle of identity which supports the principle of logical non-
contradiction) which Hegel wrongly projects onto sensory conflicts. (If the dialectic 
is circular, in other words encased in language, in a conceptual logic as Hegel said, 
then dialectic is no longer possible). Let us cite Aristotle: “But the third principle 
must be present as well – the cause vaguely dreamed of by all our predecessors, 
definitely stated by none of them”, On Generation and Corruption, II, 9, 335b 8-9. 
554 The discovery of the inclination of the ecliptic is attributed, unreliably, to 
Oenopides, an Ionian of Chios and a successor to Thales. According to Schuhl, “A 
slightly younger contemporary of Anaxagoras, Oenipodes of Chios, may have 
discovered the inclination of the ecliptic. This would have solved the difficulties that 
seem to have preoccupied Anaxagoras. Oenopides fixed the length of the solar year 
as 365 and 1/3 days and that of the Great Year as 59 years. For Cleostratus, who 
introduced the signs of the Zodiac around 520, it was eight years and nineteen years 
for Meton, who expounded his theory in 432 with much success”, Essai…, p. 336. 
555 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, II, 10, 336a 31-35- 336b 1-10. 
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This explains why it is not the primary motion that causes coming-to-
be and passing-away, but the motion along the inclined circle; for this 
motion not only possesses the necessary continuity, but includes a 
duality of movements as well. For if coming-to-be and passing-away 
are always to be continuous, there must be some body always being 
moved (in order that these changes may not fail) and moved with a 
duality of movements (in order that both changes, not one only, may 
result). Now the continuity of this movement is caused by the motion 
of the whole; but the approaching and retreating of the moving body 
are caused by the inclination. For the consequence of the inclination is 
that the body becomes alternately remote and near; and since its 
distance is thus unequal, its movement will be irregular. Therefore, if 
it generates by approaching and by its proximity, it – this very same 
body – destroys by retreating and becoming remote: and if it generates 
by many successive approaches, it also destroys by many successive 
retirements. For contrary effects demand contraries as their causes; 
and the natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy 
equal periods of time. 
While the theologians portray the future as an illusion the better to 
maintain the sway of their traditions, astronomy counters 
mythological conceptions that enclose time in a circle and refutes such 
religious mythologies. Both really and apparently, the sun’s distance 
from the Earth is not constant. And, through ontocentrism, we 
understand that the same is true of human beings in relation to their 
time and also of the other creatures on Earth. Generation can be 
understood to occur when the Earth nears the sun and corruption when 
the two move away from each other. But, more crucially, through an 
anthropocentric analogy, this model brings the realisation we have 
seen expressed by the sage Solon, that when it comes to human affairs 
time can no longer be the indefinitely regular and circular repetition of 
identical sameness. Time has phases, which explains its necessary 
irregularity. These phases are periods (periodos) and are subject to the 
two great phases of generation and corruption. These two phases are 
themselves integrated into an overall cycle, as Aristotle indicates: “the 
natural processes of passing-away and coming-to-be occupy equal 
periods of time”. Here we return to the order of time in the quotation 
from Anaximander, who says of the two phases “for they give justice 
and make reparation to one another for their injustice, according to the 
arrangement of Time.” To invert Jaeger’s proposition, this is not:556 
                                                 
556 Jaeger, Paideia, The Ideals of Greek Culture, Volume 1, Archaic Greece: the 
Mind of Athens, trans. Gilbert Highet, Oxford University Press, 1945, p. 160, cited 
by Anna Kelessidou, “L’avenir chez les présocratiques de Thalès à Démocrite”, in 
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The immanent compensatory process in human life [that] induces him 
to believe that nature too with its forces and oppositions is subject to 
an immanent rule of law like mankind, and that it is this rule of law 
which regulates coming-to-be and passing-away throughout creation.  
On the contrary, it is natural (physical) activity that subjects human 
life to a reliable principle on the basis of which decent men such as 
Solon can proceed. Nietzsche, Rohde, Jaeger here and later Colli have 
all seen this fragment of Anaximander as a kind of “decree of justice” 
applied to the world.557 They see it as the sphere of religion or more 
strictly justice (dikè-adikia) found in the natural approaches of the 
Ionians. But these interpretations seem to be totally incompatible with 
Ionian thinking as we have just depicted it. We would answer that, had 
Solon based his action on such transcendental conceptions of justice, 
the Athenian democracy might never have seen the light of day. The 
notion of religious justice has been replaced here by that of physical 
equality, and it was the astronomical discoveries that paved the way 
for the vision of the world set out in Anaximander’s fragment. 
However, we do concede that these interpretations reflect a possible 
Greek reading that does not necessarily correspond to the approach of 
Ionian philosophy itself. We have already mentioned the fact that the 
Greeks paid no attention to purely technical discoveries unless they 
contributed to the good of the city. There is still a problem related to 
what Aristotle says in his Constitution of Athens about Solon, whose 
words he records:558 
My witness to this before the judgement of the future will be the great 
mother of the Olympian gods, dark Earth; I took up the markers fixed 
in many places – previously she was enslaved, but now is free. 
                                                                                                                   
L’Avenir, actes du Congrès des sociétés de philosophie de langue française, Vrin, 
1987, pp. 250-253, p. 251. See also Jean Brun, Les Présocratiques, PUF, 1968, p. 
45. Meanwhile Heidegger’s interpretation desperately cuts all ties between this 
fragment and cosmology, culminating in a highly arbitrary semantic analysis. Cf. Off 
the Beaten Track trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, Cambridge University 
Press, 2002 (French ed. Chemins qui ne mènent nulle part, trans. W. Brokmeier, 
Gallimard, 1962, p. 430). 
557 I refer to Colli’s enumeration of these interpretations, SG II, pp. 293-295. These 
commentaries culminate in a pessimistic interpretation of the world, particularly in 
Nietzsche, whereas, of course, we see here the founding principles of future time. 
Meanwhile Colli seeks to interpret this fragment in the light of the Orphic influence, 
but this commentary leads to the disappearance of time itself.   
558 Solon, fragment 24, in Aristotle, Constitution of Athens, XII, 4, trans., J.M. 
Moore, reprinted in, Aristotle: The Politics and the Constitution of Athens, Stephen 
Everson (ed.), Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 218. 
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Here Solon links three notions that corroborate the traditional 
interpretations of the fragment of Anaximander. First, the relationship 
between time and justice manifested in the court of the future;559 
secondly the fixed markers referring to the debts accumulated by the 
Athenians, which Solon clears, thereby freeing them of the past and 
enabling them to go forth into the future; thirdly, these things are done 
under the eye of the “great mother of the Olympian gods”. But, in 
concrete terms, is it time, the gods and justice that have reimbursed 
the future Athenian citizens? No, it is the class “in generation” that 
has reimbursed the “corrupted” class, in other words the class of the 
dispossessed. By cancelling this financial debt, which severely 
restricted the future of the Greeks, Solon gave them new impetus. In 
sum, like the first cosmological sphere, Solon restablished the balance 
between the kakoi (poor Athenians close to evil) and the agathoi (the 
rich seeking good). In discussing Solon, Vico mentions a similar 
situation in ancient Italy. The plebeians (the class in corruption) 
challenged the patricians (the class in generation) with the assertion 
that all are equal in the eyes of Jupiter, in relation to the time of the 
heavens:560 
Here is the civil history of the phrase: Jupiter omnibus aequus, from 
which the scholars conclude that all minds are equal, and they take 
their differences from the different organisation of bodies, and the 
divergence of civil education. A just appreciation of their own merit 
led the Roman plebeians to demand that the patricians allow them to 
enjoy civil liberty, and gradually change the republic’s aristocratic 
constitution into a popular constitution.  
We are all equal in the eyes of Jupiter, we are all equal in the eyes of 
universal time, we are all subject to generation and corruption. So 
Solon locates time on the side of justice in order to thank the gods. 
The same is true of Anaximander, who gives thanks to the gods for 
having discovered such a fundamental principle. However, it remains 
the case that this Ionian principle, taken up by Aristotle, is not a 
postulate. Firstly, it is an analogy based on the functioning of the 
heavens. Secondly, future time is not demonstrated. Its existence is 
                                                 
559 This is Jaeger’s interpretation: “When Anaximander proposes this image as an 
explanation of the coming-to-be and passing-away of things in the natural world, he 
is obviously thinking of their very existence as dependent on a state of having-too-
much, for which they must make amends by ceding to others the things they now 
enjoy. A very similar idea appears in Heraclitus when he says that ‘these live the 
death of those, while those die the life of these’.” Op. cit., p. 35. 
560 Vico, Science nouvelle, trans. idem, Gallimard, p. 152.  
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taken from the probability that the world will continue. If the 
continuity of the world cannot be maintained, the future collapses. If 
the continuity of the world is certain, the future becomes probable. If 
the continuity of the world is probable, the future becomes merely 
possible. Lastly, if the continuity of the world is only possible, the 
future also becomes possible, but its probability becomes more or less 
impossible. Is this a necessary and sufficient reason to accept that, in 
adopting this model, Aristotle was forced to be a philosopher of 
continuity? At this stage in our study we shall leave this question 
open.  
To return to Aristotle’s discussion, we must note the following: 
generation occurs when the sun and Earth are closer, and corruption 
when they move apart. We shall see in greater depth in the context of 
physics that generation and corruption explain “change”. It remains 
the case that, scientifically, this continuous, twin movement is 
irregular and liable to stop. For, when phases of greater luminosity are 
registered on the gnomon, the stars seem to stop and go backwards, 
then stop again and continue their regular course, later described in 
technical terms as “stations” and “retrogradations” of the stars. The 
information obtained via the gnomon leads to reservations regarding 
the model’s reliability. For if a star temporarily stops moving, what 
guarantees that this stationary state will not be permanent? The same 
question arises in relation to Aristotle’s physics, in which elements 
can pause but never definitively stop until they reach their télos. And 
when a star temporarily reverses direction, what ensures that its 
probable course will never depart from its sphere? There is here a kind 
of tautology which consists in suggesting that, because the course of 
the stars is continuous, the world cannot stop, when the very definition 
of the continuity of time is taken from these same stars. In this model 
the guarantee of the world and the permanence of time are provided 
by the motion of the heavens. The movement of the stars and sun 
along the ecliptic are subject to a different movement, that of the 
“motion of the whole”. It is this movement that explains why 
increasing generation cannot be unlimited, since it is constrained by 
corruption, and vice-versa. This general motion that gives movement 
to the stars enables time always to be. So it is clear that ultimately 
universal time retains the property of smoothing out and balancing the 
two phases and thus of enabling the renewal of change through this 
balance itself. For generation and corruption do not balance 
automatically, the cancelling of negative and positive does not 
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produce a zero; it is only in relation to universal time that everything 
is balanced. It is the “motion of the whole” that plays the role of the 
analytical medium term. If there is a fixed order of time, it is that of 
the sphere of the sun in relation to our own sphere of the Earth. The 
global cycle of time is thus not absolute – it is not a circle in which 
human beings are imprisoned. It is the inclination of the ecliptic that 
allows us to understand that there is a non-linear time, with 
fluctuations that fall into the two phases of generation and corruption. 
Schuhl says – and it is a view we share – that this principle is “a very 
important philosophical discovery” that gives being its permanence.561 
This is also shown by Empedocles, whose fragment on the elements 
we shall cite:562 
In turn they get the upper hand in the revolving cycle, and perish into 
one another and increase in the turn appointed by Fate. […] But in so 
far as they never cease their continuous exchange, in this sense they 
remain always unmoved (unaltered) as they follow the cyclic process. 
However, Aristotle says in his Physics that Empedocles and 
Anaximenes563 reduced this Ionian principle to condensation and 
rarefaction, considerably diminishing its scientific importance. 
Generation can indeed be understood in terms of the addition of 
elements and corruption by their subtraction, in such a way that the 
reference to the ecliptic is no longer necessary. The inclination of the 
ecliptic, which is a scientific fact, can be replaced by the interplay of 
the One (which replaces the entire sphere of the heavens) and the 
multiple (which replaces the changes arising out of the sun’s course 
along the ecliptic), as described in the following passage:564 
They are of the opinion that the primary substances are not subject to 
any of the other motions, though the things that are compounds of 
these substances are so subject: the processes of increase and decrease 
and alteration, they say, are effects of the “combination” and 
“separation” of atoms. It is the same, too, with those who make out 
that the becoming or perishing of a thing is accounted for by “density 
                                                 
561 Schuhl, Essai…, pp. 299-300. However Schuhl accepts that this principle is a 
projection of the social sphere onto the natural sphere, and so, as we have seen, does 
Colli (p. 300).   
562 Empedocles, fr. 26, cited by Schuhl, Essai…, p. 299. 
563 See Colli, La Sagesse grecque II, p. 331, for the relationship between 
Anaximenes and Empedocles on this subject.  
564 Aristotle, Physics, 265b 28-32, in The Works of Aristotle, ed. W.D. Ross, trans. 
R.P. Hardie and R.K. Gaye, Clarendon Press, 1930; cf. Colli’s commentary, SG II, 
pp. 311-312. 
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and “rarity”: for it is by “combination” and “separation” that the place 
of these new things in their systems is determined.  
But in that case it becomes necessary to find new ways to explain 
these changes; friendship then explains the agglomeration of elements 
(generation) and hatred their separation (corruption). In his Rhetoric 
Aristotle suggests that this approach should be regarded as poetic, 
since it manifests a flagrant incomprehension of the Ionian principle 
set out by Anaximander.565 So we need to stay close to Anaximander’s 
version on pain of losing ourselves in sophistry. In his On Generation 
and Corruption Aristotle ends his demonstration by positing that this 
principle is likely, since it is attested by observation, but he never 
provides any scientifically-obtained evidence, even in his Posterior 
Analytics.566 
For although this principle was one of the most trustworthy in 
Aristotle’s day, since, alongside geometry, eclipses provided the most 
convincing example in support of the universal science contained in 
his Posterior Analytics, we do not find there the scientific argument 
that underpinned it in the Ionian world. Aristotle first states that the 
eclipse is a phenomenon on which the certainty of knowledge cannot 
be faulted. He then uses it to support his philosophical approach (the 
four causes), since the eclipse is a sign with a tekmêrion:567 
Evidence for this: on finding that [the sun] is eclipsed we stop; and if 
from the start we know that it is eclipsed, we do not seek whether it is. 
When we know the fact we seek the reason why.  
Later on Aristotle suggests that seeking the “reason why” is the same 
as seeking “what it is”. For this it is necessary to find a middle term. 
The pattern of eclipses involves three elements: the Earth, sun and 
moon, and whether one is on the Earth or the moon, the reason why is 
equivalent because the phenomenon is universal (there is always an 
eclipse of the moon in the first case and of the sun in the second).568 
Geometry then takes over in chapters 3-7 in order to define the 
                                                 
565 “Such people are apt to put that sort of thing into verse. Empedocles, for 
instance, by his long circumlocutions imposes on his hearers; these are affected in 
the same way as most people are when they listen to diviners, whose ambiguous 
utterances are received with nods of acquiescence – ‘Croesus by crossing the Halys 
will ruin a mighty realm’”; Aristotle, Rhetoric III, 1407a 33-40, trans. W. Rhys 
Roberts. 
566 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption II, 10, 336b 16-20: “And there are 
facts of observation in manifest agreement with our theories”, trans. Barnes. 
567 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, B, 2, 89a 25-29, trans. Barnes. 
568 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, B, 2, 89b-90a, trans. Barnes.  
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quiddity of the being of the phenomenon, after which the eclipse 
returns in Book 8 to question the value of the judgement of the 
existence of what is by accident in order to produce a syllogism.569 
But what can the middle term tell us about what an eclipse is? The 
meeting of geometry and the gnomon having produced the analemma, 
the information obtained using this instrument should guarantee what 
is being said, but Aristotle shuts himself away in his syllogistic theory, 
never mentioning practical approaches. Later on he again uses eclipses 
to distinguish demonstration “of the bare fact” from demonstrations 
through “the reasoned fact”:570 
And the earth’s being in the middle is explanatory of the eclipse, but 
the eclipse is not explanatory of the earth’s being in the middle – so if 
the demonstration through the explanation gives the reason why, and 
the one not through the explanation gives the fact, you know that it is 
in the middle but not why. 
If we are on the moon, it is no longer the earth that is in the middle 
during an eclipse, such that the demonstration of the fact is not a 
demonstration of the reason why. But while it is clear that the 
demonstration through the “explanation” requires the use of 
syllogisms, on what can we base the judgement of existence if not in 
this case on practical knowledge obtained by technical means? 
Without the discovery of the analemma would it have been possible 
to conceive of the existence of change? This brief detour allows us to 
begin to mark out the distinction between the physical judgement of 
existence and the logical judgement of quiddity. To suggest that 
Anaximander’s principle is based on a judgement of the existence of 
the ecliptic leading to the induction that the movement of time is 
always binary, thus giving us the division between generation and 
corruption, still indicates nothing of the being of time. In other words, 
this demonstration of the unfolding of time through fact still says 
nothing about its quiddity. For example, if, once plants have grown, 
they always diminish, we can suggest “de facto” that time has passed. 
Except that, as Aristotle says in the aforementioned passage using the 
example of leaves falling from the trees, it is not time that makes the 
leaves fall; we should instead seek the elementary material cause.  
We shall address these theoretical questions in our next book, 
as it is impossible to deal with these problems without considering 
the layers of interpretation they have historically received. We shall, 
                                                 
569 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, B, 8, § 93a.  
570 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, B, 16, § 98b. 
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however, set out a few more markers here. It is generally thought that 
the concept of existence is not present in the Aristotelian corpus and 
that the division between being and essence was made by St. Thomas 
Aquinas in his De ente et essentia.571 For Aquinas ousia was the 
equivalent of essence. Access to existence takes two forms: singulars 
and the soul. As there is no generic access to singulars, it is 
impossible to place existence in any category. This allows Aquinas to 
dispense with reason the better to bury existence beneath the 
intelligence underpinning his notion of the soul. He follows Averroës 
in saying that species can ultimately be known through this 
intelligence, so that all natural species are governed by intelligence. 
We shall return to this philosophy in more detail later. For the 
moment we shall simply note Etienne Gilson’s view of it:572 
It is as though Thomism had inherited from Aristotelianism the notion 
of substance understood as a solid ontological mass in which essence, 
existence and unity are all one. 
However, it is apparent that neither the aforementioned model of the 
ecliptic nor Aristotle’s physical conception reflect this categorisation. 
A return to the Posterior Analytics will enable us to grasp this fully. 
Firstly, if the concept of existence did not exist in Aristotle’s work, 
what status should we give to the “signs” he calls tekmêrion? These 
are indeed special signs, underpinning the syllogisms which, by 
induction, ground the notion of existence in the categories. It is true 
that in Aristotle’s epistemology induction is possible only in physics, 
while logic is dominated by deduction and, unlike physics, does not 
make hypotheses. We shall nevertheless seek to lift existence out 
from under the yoke of intelligence the better to place it in the empire 
of the senses which, for Aristotle, are themselves governed by 
phantasia. In order to defuse the criticisms this thesis will arouse, we 
should like to make available to all Aristotle’s thinking in Sense and 
Sensibilia:573 
For if it is impossible that a person should, while perceiving himself 
or anything else in a continuous time, be at any instant unaware of his 
own existence, and if there is in the time-continuum a time so small as 
to be absolutely imperceptible, then it is clear that a person would, 
                                                 
571 Thomas Aquinas, L’Etre et l’essence. (De ente et essentia) French trans. C. 
Capelle, Vrin, 1982. We shall follow the commentary of Canon Daniel-Joseph 
Lallement, Tequi, 2001. 
572 Etienne Gilson, L’Être et l’essence, Vrin 2000 (1948), p. 93. 
573 Aristotle, Sense and Sensibilia, VII, 448a 26-29, trans. Barnes. 
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during such time, be unaware of his own existence, as well as of his 
seeing and perceiving.  
We will say openly that, when we came upon the meaning of this 
statement, much of our understanding of Aristotle’s thought fell apart. 
So we shall consider the autonomy of existence over being (ousia) and 
whether this dichotomy is applicable to time itself. Along the way we 
shall seek to show that time is underpinned by phantasia, which, by 
epistemic circularity, will enable us to assert the independence of 
time’s existence from its being. We shall also see whether ousia (ti 
esti et tode ti) can be reduced to substance (essentia), as Aquinas says. 
We think it somewhat hasty to turn to Book Z of the Metaphysics 
while completely ignoring the rest of the Aristotelian corpus, as 
Heidegger also did.   
 
In sum then, while Aristotle’s discourse is grounded in astronomy, at 
no point does he seem to find it necessary to back it up with any 
scientific evidence. For Aristotle, proof remains a matter of language. 
It is provided only by the internal consistency of what he says, by 
means of syllogisms. So deep down Aristotle is more Athenian than 
Ionian. Instead of measuring, he talks; instead of demonstrating, he 
argues; instead of numbering, he conceptualises. Not a single 
measuring tool is mentioned in his Posterior Analytics and not a 
single number is used. This observation is enough to gauge the gulf 
between the Ionian and Athenian worlds. It remains true that the 
fragment of Anaximander posits the the physical existence of time. 
Time exists through its binary movement of generation and 
corruption. It is the enduring constancy of this movement that implies 
that time lasts and thereby frees up the possibility of the future. But 
how can Aristotle move from this technically demonstrated existence 
of time to its quiddity? Does the scale of this question not oblige him 
to return to the ideas of the théologoï? This is the reason we shall cite 
in order to understand why the Ionian approach is not enough. If the 
so-called “Italian” current  makes a comeback in Aristotle’s work in 
order for him to think about time, this is because the quiddity of an 
object cannot be reduced to its existence, however formally attested.   
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Then comes the application of astronomical notions to human beings 
in his On Generation and Corruption. Here we find the following, 
somewhat odd reasoning:574 
Thus, since the upper movement is cyclical, the sun moves in this 
determinate manner; and since the sun moves thus, the seasons in 
consequence come-to-be in a cycle, i.e. return upon themselves; and 
since they come-to-be cyclically, so in their turn do the things whose 
coming-to-be the seasons initiate. 
Then why do some things manifestly come-to-be in this fashion […] 
while men and animals do not return upon themselves so that the same 
individual comes-to-be a second time (for though your coming-to-be 
presupposes your father’s, his coming-to-be does not presuppose 
yours)? Why, on the contrary, does this coming-to-be seem to 
constitute a rectilinear sequence?  
The present work ends with this question, which thus remains 
unanswered here. How can we comment on this passage? We are 
faced with an argument that seems absurd, as did that of Solon on 
time, before we compared it to its Ionian source. In the first place we 
can say that, while, at the analytical level, physical movement is linear 
in the Physics, it is circular at the level of synthesis, since when linear 
movements as a whole are placed in a sphere they join up to form a 
circle, as attested by the notions of the equator and tropics. However, 
at the local level, where human beings find themselves located in 
space by their biological body, the analogy does not seem to work. 
How can a human being return to the start of a cycle, as do the seasons 
or the course of the stars on their sphere? So human beings seem to be 
the site of a split between local and global time. While global time can 
be theorised by research into the ecliptic, local time resists this 
analogy by maintaining its linear movement. But these are not 
categories used by Aristotle. We find an answer to this question within 
the Aristotelian corpus, in the treatise entitled Meteorology, but it 
deals only with non-human living beings. In the following passage 
Aristotle considers the disparity of the cycles of generation in different 
parts of the world:575 
The principle and cause of these changes is that the interior of the 
earth has its periods of maturity, like the bodies of plants and animals. 
Only in the case of these latter the process does not go on by parts, but 
each of them necessarily grows or decays as a whole, whereas it does 
go on by parts in the case of the earth. Here the causes are cold and 
heat, which increase and diminish on account of the sun and its 
                                                 
574 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, II, 11, 338b 01-12, trans. Barnes. 
575 Aristotle, Meteorology, 14, 351a 27-35, trans. Barnes.  
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course. It is owing to them that the parts of the earth come to have a 
different character, so that some parts remain moist for a certain time, 
and then dry up and grow old, while other parts in their turn are filled 
with life and moisture. 
So, in applying Anaximander’s principle to human beings, we should 
respect Aristotle’s conception of the heavens. In this model human 
beings have no direct connection with the heavens; there are many 
concepts that make it possible to move from human beings to the 
heavens, set out in Meteorology and On the Heavens. They will be the 
subject of the next part. Moreover, the hiatus between the time of the 
heavens and human time underpins Aristotle’s conception of history. 
As the time of the heavens is greater than human time, history cannot 
give us an idea of the history of peoples, since most of them disappear 
before leaving a memory of their presence in the world:576 
But the whole vital process of the earth takes place so gradually and in 
periods of time which are so immense compared with the length of our 
life, that these changes are not observed, and before their course can 
be recorded from beginning to end whole nations perish and are 
destroyed. 
This is also the reason given to explain Aristotle’s great love of 
proverbs; as we shall see, this hiatus also has major consequences for 
his ethical vision. Before focusing more specifically on all these 
notions in his philosophy of man, we shall simply say that this Ionian 
principle is compatible with a conception of time on the human scale. 
It moreover became the notion of akmè, which the Greek historians 
used in writing the history of the figures of archaic Greece. This 
notion takes its energy from the traditional concept of thûmos,577 
which can be translated as the human capacity of “velocity”. Human 
velocity is fundamentally finite, shooting up towards the akmè, the 
better to fall back down and end in certain death, as Conche clearly 
describes:578 
                                                 
576 Aristotle, Meteorology, 14, 351b 9-12, trans. Barnes. 
577 Bénédicte Durosel, “Un versant obscur du temps: la genèse du vivant. (Homère, 
Hésiode)”, in Constructions du temps dans le monde grec ancien, pp. 65-87. 
Aristotle uses this term in Metaphysics, lamda, 7, 1072b 25-30 and 9, 1075a 10; this 
is confirmed by Brague, Aristote et la question du monde, p. 159; cf. also, Plato, The 
Republic, IV, 439e 3-441c 3. Brague also suggests that the notion of thûmos is the 
crux of Aristotle’s ethical analysis.  
578 Conche, Temps et destin, p. 41. When Conche goes on to say: “The life force 
(aiôn) is fundamentally finished. Human life first has a period of growing vitality 
until the prime of life (akmè), then comes the diminishing and decline of vitality”, 
the term aiôn should be understood in the sense of thûmos (Cf. p. 83). 
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The aiôn can be compared to a jet that first rises vigorously, then 
levels out and finally declines and falls back down. The ages of life 
are youth, maturity and old age, according to whether the life force 
dominates matter, the two are in balance or matter gradually 
overpowers vitality.  
So human life is contained in an interval between birth and death, 
whose middle point is the akmè. There is a phase of generation rising 
to the age of forty, a solstice around that age, then the beginning of a 
corruption leading inevitably to death. This is what we wanted to say 
concerning this first analogy of the time of the heavens with that of 
human lives. In the next part we shall take a more analytical approach 
in discussing the a priori conditions of these analogies to gain a better 
understanding of this apparent theoretical impasse.  
 
 
 
 
PERORATION 
 
 
By way of conclusion, we can see that we have gone from an 
initiatory, entirely mythical conception of time, with the image as its 
touchstone, to a truly scientific, Ionian conception in which 
observation-based evidence using an instrument provides proof in a 
discourse of engagement with the world. After this we have sought to 
show that Ionian philosophy is at the core of Aristotelian philosophy 
by returning to the analytical connection of generation and corruption. 
We have been concerned to show that it was through the discovery of 
the ecliptic that change in time was positively asserted, countering the 
mythologies that portrayed it as an illusion. This Ionian change in 
time, understood through the binarity of generation and corruption, 
remains a revolution in conceptions of time in the history of 
philosophy. In addition, we have shown that, rather than contrasting 
circular and linear movement, circular movement should be 
understood in the light of its grounding in astronomy. It was by 
analysing the circular movement of the stars that the Ionians were able 
to conceive of a future that is positive, rational, scientific and 
irrefutable.   
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So there are two conceptions of circular movement in the Greek 
universe, on which models of time are based. The first is mythological 
and maintains that time is illusory, since it always returns to its origin. 
Human beings are thus prey to a temporal illusion summed up in the 
notion that the future is illusory, which supports the religious notion of 
the “fall”. Conversely, according to the second conception of time, 
which is of “Phoenician” origin and scientifically tested by the Ionian 
thinkers, circular time gives rise to the thesis that time is positively 
unfolding through change in a perceptible manner. This conception of 
time, modelled on the basis of scientific discoveries relating to the 
phenomenon of eclipses, demonstrates that change over time is binary. 
It is this scientific conception that gives rise to the thesis that all 
sublunary phenomena are subject to generation and corruption.  
However, while these notions are valid for describing the time 
of the heavens and physical time, they cannot necessarily be used to 
analyse human time. For this reason we shall go on to consider the 
question of the existence of time within the human sphere. In the 
second volume we shall propose a strictly philosophical approach to 
this subject. We acknowledge that these analyses will become very 
difficult. However it is important to understand that what is at stake in 
this question is beyond the scope of a purely historical approach. So 
we shall now enter the domain of Aristotle’s philosophy itself and set 
out what is called the metaphysics of time.  
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